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From the Editor in Chief
The Autumn issue of Parameters opens with a Special Commentary
by Sir Hew Strachan concerning lessons Western militaries learned,
or ought to have learned, during their campaigns in Afghanistan. His
commentary sets up this issue’s first forum, Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part I.
In the opening article, Seth Johnston’s “NATO’s Lessons”
underscores the importance of the Alliance’s role as a facilitator of
multinational collaboration. He presents a favorable view, arguing
NATO’s established processes succeeded in enabling countries
with limited resources to participate fully in the mission in
Afghanistan. Howard Coombs follows with a contribution concerning
“Canada’s Lessons.” Among other things, he maintains Canada’s
whole-of-government approach resulted in great gains while Canadian
Forces were actively involved in combat. Nonetheless, Canada seems
uninterested in maintaining this capability as a framework for
responding to other crises.
The third article in this forum is Martijn Kitzen’s “The
Netherlands’ Lessons,” which highlights the benefits of having a small
military that enjoys networked learning. Although the Dutch military
seems to be reverting to enemy-centric thinking, the author encourages
its leaders to retain an adaptive mindset that will facilitate adopting
a more population-centric approach when necessary. In “France’s
Lessons,” Christophe Lafaye explains how combat in Afghanistan
contributed to the tactical and doctrinal evolution of the French Army.
With decades of relative peace since the Algerian War, French soldiers
began their service in Afghanistan with little experience and inadequate
materiel. They quickly developed into a combat-ready force capable of
responding rapidly to a variety of military emergencies as the need arose.
Our second forum, World War II: 75th Anniversary, features two
contributions concerning famous US generals. Conrad Crane’s,
“Matthew Ridgway and the Battle of the Bulge” illustrates examples
of Ridgway’s strategic thinking at work during the German’s surprise attack and ensuing crisis. Alexander G. Lovelace’s “Slap Heard
around the World: George Patton and Shell Shock” analyzes Patton’s
possible motives for slapping two soldiers in during the Sicily campaign
in 1943.~AJE
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Special Commentary

Learning Lessons from Afghanistan:
Two Imperatives
Hew Strachan
©2019 Hew Strachan

O

n October 7, 2001, the United States began bombing Taliban
communications and air defenses (such as they were). So began
a commitment to the security of Afghanistan that continues
to this day. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was designed
to use only a light footprint, leaving the bulk of the fighting to the
mujahideen whom the United States had supported in their fight against
the Soviet Union. In March 2002, after its quick success in toppling the
Taliban, Washington turned its attention to Saddam Hussein. Between
2002 and 2009, Iraq, not Afghanistan, dominated American counsels.
Here too initial operations were rewarded with quick success, largely
characterized in terms of state-of-the-art conventional warfare. Signs of
guerrilla warfare and irregular resistance were dismissed, and it was often
junior commanders who detected the changing character of the war they
were fighting. The standard assumption of the late 1980s, shaped by the
Cold War, persisted: an army that prepared for operations at scale against
a peer enemy could adjust to “low-intensity war” against an enemy lacking
in discipline, organization, and sophisticated weaponry.
By 2005, it had become clear the received wisdom was not working,
and that its hold was preventing soldiers from fully understanding the
sort of conflict in which they were engaged. The experience of Iraq
prompted the US Army to reshape its doctrine for what it increasingly
described as counterinsurgency campaigns. The Combined Arms Center
at Fort Leavenworth began work in earnest in October 2005, when
Lieutenant General David Petraeus took over its command after his
second tour in Iraq. Petraeus turned to his West Point classmate, Conrad
Crane, to oversee the development of new doctrine, or in some respects
the recovery of old but neglected knowledge. Crane drew on inputs from
both theaters of war, Afghanistan as well as Iraq, and on the US Marine
Corps as well as the Army. Field Manual 3-24, also branded as Marine
Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, was ready by December 2006.
In 2007, Petraeus was back in Iraq, masterminding the surge. A war
that the United States had been losing was turned around, at least for
the time being. The success in Iraq in 2007 made counterinsurgency the
most obvious lesson learned from the post-9/11 wars, and when the US
Army returned its attention to a now much more dangerous situation
in Afghanistan it took the message of counterinsurgency with it. Field
Manual 3-24 was itself commercially published, and a raft of books and
articles on irregular war both preceded and followed its appearance.

Sir Hew Strachan,
the Bishop Wardlaw
Professor at the St.
Andrews School of
International Relations,
most recently published
The Nature of War.
Before moving to St.
Andrews, Strachan
was the Chichele
Professor of the History
of War at All Souls
College, Oxford.
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In the United Kingdom, the epiphany was both slower and less
dramatic. Britain thought it knew about “small wars” from its experience of
imperial conquest and colonial settlement, and about counterinsurgency
specifically from the “success” of its post-1945 withdrawal from the
empire. That phase of its history ended, comparatively ignominiously,
in the withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and with the decision to close
British bases east of Suez in the following year. The 30-year conflict
in Northern Ireland, which followed almost immediately, began badly:
counterinsurgency principles applied in a colonial context had to be
rethought for use closer to home. But the lessons of Northern Ireland
proved a false friend when its units deployed to Iraq in 2003. Many
officers had only seen the tail end of a campaign, which by then they
were winning: conditions were much more favorable in the 1990s than
they had been in the 1970s, and by then the army had the upper hand in
intelligence, tactical know-how, and public support.
Basra was in every way a tougher operating environment than Belfast,
the troop-to-population ratio was much less favorable, and language,
religion, and culture all presented unfamiliar challenges. By 2006,
humiliated in southern Iraq and confronting fierce fighting in southern
Afghanistan, the British Army began to realize the need to revisit its
background in counterinsurgency. However, it did so reluctantly and
late. Only in October 2009 did the British Army publish an updated
doctrine, and in the same year, the British Ministry of Defense produced
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, on stabilization operations.
During the crisis years of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan,
especially 2006 to 2009, the soldiers of American and British armies, as
they convened conferences and workshops that addressed these themes,
referred with regret to their own absentmindedness and that of their
predecessors. After the Vietnam War, the US Army had opted not to
learn its lessons, but to treat the experience as an aberration, or so the
prevailing narrative ran. Its doctrinal response, Field Manual 100-5,
Operations, particularly in its 1982 edition, focused on the conventional
level of war, and prepared American soldiers to defend the inner
German border against the Soviet Union. The British narrative was not
dissimilar. Those units who fought in Northern Ireland were “doublehatted,” their principal strategic function being, as for their American
allies, the defense of western Europe against the Soviet Union.
In both cases, preparation for war against a peer-competitor
took priority over counterinsurgency. Economies of scale demanded
flexibility. That seemed to be a reasonable expectation of two armies
that were now regular and professional. If they could do the first,
and implicitly harder, task, then—so the wisdom ran—they would
be capable of dropping down a rung, to do the “lesser” work of small
unit patrols, hearts and minds, and stabilization. The slowness of both
armies’ adaptation after 2002, five years for the Americans and seven
for the British (longer than either of their individual experiences of the
Second World War), suggested those assumptions were wrong. An army
is a big beast, its training protocols are reinforced by its hierarchy, and
TOC
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it struggles to adapt quickly from one sort of war to another. For those
thinking about lessons learned from 2005 to 2009, the conclusion was
simple: do not do after these wars what they had done in the 1980s.
They mocked the naivety of their predecessors of a quarter of a century
before for their readiness to see war in only one dimension. Too much
recent real war had proved “asymmetric” for conventional war to be the
dominant paradigm, however much the latter might shape doctrine and
theory. Experience was a more profound lesson, and their generation,
that of the veterans of Al Anbar or Helmand, could not possibly forget
that as those of the 1980s had done.
But many of them have forgotten, or at least they have to an extent
that would surprise those reflecting on these issues a decade ago. In 2019,
the debate is once again dominated by peer-competitors (China for the
United States and Russia for its European allies), counterinsurgency has
dropped out of fashion, and some well-informed commentators have
persuasively argued that its principles have been overstated. A military
tendency to look not back, but forward, to look to the next war not to
be captured by the last, has been reinforced by policy.
In 2009, Barack Obama embraced a strategy that used airpower
(including drones) in conjunction with special forces and local
proxies, rather than “boots on the ground.” Armies conducting
the counterinsurgency campaigns of the early twenty-first century
incurred casualties, which made overseas interventions unpopular. So
democratically accountable politicians have sought other ways to wage
war. The new strategy, not unlike the old, has contained the problem for
the time being. But it is too early to say whether it will produce lasting
results. Soldiers argue presence on the ground, and in sufficient numbers
to have effect, is the only way to implement a satisfactory and stable
outcome. Moreover, the employment of drones and proxies raises legal,
ethical, and political issues, which may not in the long run be compatible
with the norms of democratic states.
So the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and America’s
wider circle of allies are at an inflection point where it ill behooves
them not to reflect on the lessons from Afghanistan and to incorporate
them into their thinking for the future. This does not mean that wars
like those fought in Afghanistan are necessarily a model for what will
happen again. History does not repeat itself, but it certainly deepens
understanding. For a start, allied forces are still in the country, although
most of their publics seem unaware of the fact. Moreover, it would be
rash to suggest that NATO is not going to find itself fighting another
counterinsurgency in, say, the next 25 years. Lessons may be negative (that
of Vietnam: “we certainly will not do that again”) as much as positive
(that of Malaya: “this is a model for how to win the support of the local
population”). The absence of debate and discussion is the worst possible
outcome. It can leave preconceptions unchallenged, and it throws away
the wisdom garnered through hard work, suffering and loss.
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Neither the United States nor Britain has gone through the process
of learning lessons from Afghanistan on a scale commensurate with
the effort put into the war. In Washington, the political will has not
been there, and in the Army, the views on counterinsurgency and its
principal exponents have become too politicized, and in some respects
personalized, for an avowedly apolitical army to collate them effectively.
Thanks not least to the persistence of Raymond T. Odierno when, as the
Army’s Chief of Staff, a history of the US Army’s role in the Iraq War
was initiated. It provides a potentially rich foundation for the learning
of lessons, but whether it will do so is yet to be seen. A similar project
on Afghanistan will require a similar drive from the top.
Britain too has paid more attention to Iraq than Afghanistan.
The British Army sidelined two internal studies on Iraq, before Prime
Minister Gordon Brown, commissioned a government enquiry on the
war in 2009. Since the Chilcot report was published in 2016, the Ministry
of Defense has tackled the lessons to be learned from with commendable
seriousness. However, the delays and costs incurred by the inquiry have
removed any impetus for something similar on Afghanistan. Unlike
the United States, Britain has lost the appetite for official histories:
there is no enthusiasm for one on Operation Banner, the campaign in
Northern Ireland, perhaps itself a reason for British officers applying the
wrong lessons in Iraq. Nor has the Army revisited its counterinsurgency
doctrine since 2009, thus forfeiting the opportunity to embody the
lessons from the severe fighting in Helmand in 2009–13. The revision
of Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 on stabilization operations, begun in
the immediate aftermath of Libya in 2011, has floundered.
The United States and Britain possess the two NATO armies
with the clearest sense of continuity in counterinsurgency operations,
however discontinuous their attention to the subject has been in
practice. Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, was an alliance undertaking.
Common approaches to the conduct of operations, as well as agreed
and standardized procedures, are the bedrock of NATO cohesion.
Its members’ armed forces speak to each other in terms that they all
understand. Policy differences provide volatility, but they are offset by
military commonalities.
Counterinsurgency doctrine is a major exception to this
generalization: NATO collectively does not have one, nor do most of
its individual members. For the states of continental Europe, irregular
and guerrilla warfare is linked historically to major war in ways that do
not apply to Britain and the United States, who are both secured by the
natural defenses provided by the sea. Such forms of war were the only
option left to the states that were overrun and then occupied by Germany
between 1940 and 1942. And the same might have applied during the
Cold War if the Soviet Union had launched an invasion. Partisan war
was an option to be exercised at home because conventional war was
no longer possible: it was politically destabilizing and its conduct was
ruthless. It bore little relationship to the idealized if somewhat fanciful
ideas of counterinsurgency in the Anglophone world, applied at a distance
TOC
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in wars that could be characterized as “limited.” For America’s and
Britain’s partners in Afghanistan, overseas operations were associated
with peacekeeping and policing, and were conducted under a resolution
of the United Nations Security Council.
As the United States and the United Kingdom reembraced and
rethought their counterinsurgency doctrines, they opened a divide
between themselves and their European allies, which they struggled to
comprehend. They could not understand why the Germans, Norwegians,
or Poles did not also develop and adopt comparable solutions. In
particular, they failed to understand how the other NATO member with
a clear inheritance in counterinsurgency, France, interpreted the war in
Afghanistan. France, like Britain, had conquered and pacified an empire
in the nineteenth century, and then had lost it after 1945—in fighting
that proved far more politically divisive and existentially defining
than had Britain’s campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, or Cyprus. Successful
counterinsurgency itself carried revolutionary implications for France:
it had done so after 1792 and 1870 within metropolitan France, and
it redivided the “nation in arms,” shattered in 1940, in Indochina and
Algeria in the 1950s. Americans understood this experience through
an atypical lens, David Galula’s report for RAND, Pacification in Algeria,
1956–58, which became a core text at the operational level but was not
set in its political context: the end of France’s Fourth Republic and the
establishment of the Fifth Republic.
Galula was not translated into French until 2009. Vincent Desportes,
then responsible for defense doctrine, set out to link France’s contribution
to NATO in Afghanistan by drawing the attention of its soldiers to
their colonial inheritance, citing the examples of Joseph-Simon Gallieni
in Indochina and Madagascar and Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve Lyautey
in Morocco. In reality, he might have done better to go even further
back, to Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, duke d’Isly in Algeria. The pattern of
colonial conquest that he promoted put battle at its heart (as—it is worth
pointing out—did Charles Callwell in his textbook, Small Wars, adopted
by the British Army in 1896), not winning over the local population
by “hearts and minds.” Afghanistan was France’s first major NATO
operation following its decision to rejoin the military alliance, and so it
saw it less as a commitment to a “small war” than as its reentry to the
big league. As subsequent operations in Mali and elsewhere have shown,
students of the American and British armies should not see France’s
approach to counterinsurgency and irregular war as more of the same
or as corroboration of what they do.
Learning lessons from Afghanistan, therefore, has two imperatives.
The first is that of the needs of coalition warfare. At its peak over 50
states contributed to the war in Afghanistan, making this probably the
most impressive alliance effort in military history. That achievement
has been overshadowed by the tokenism of many of the contingents
sent into theater, by national caveats surrounding their employment,
and by the part played by domestic politics in the timing of their
withdrawals. The focus on these dysfunctionalities has been reinforced
TOC
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by Washington’s constant reprimand, voiced as much by the Obama
administration as by that of Donald Trump, that NATO member states
are failing to contribute two percent of their gross domestic product
to defense. The United States was reluctant to accept the support of its
allies in the direct aftermath of 9/11, when NATO immediately invoked
Article 5, and has been reluctant to give thanks for their readiness to
serve outside NATO’s core area, in a country in which none of them
had a direct national interest, in war waged on behalf of the United
States. If the United States anticipates fighting future wars with allies,
it needs NATO collectively as well as individually to draw lessons from
Afghanistan, and to do so in ways that reflect the full range of what the
member states experienced.
The second imperative follows from the first. This search for lessons
must not just be in pursuit of commonalities. Such an exercise is in
danger of looking at and recognizing the experience of others through
the prism of the United States, and so ignoring differences—like that of
France—which may themselves be instructive. Just because the US Army
may deem something not to have been “invented here” does not meant
that it is therefore unworthy of consideration. After all, that too-ready
dismissal of others’ experiences and of their possible applicability was
a major source of exactly the problems the US Army confronted from
2002 to 2004.
The challenge inherent in that statement should not be exaggerated.
The overwhelming conclusion in the forum that follows is the power the
United States exercises over its allies.
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NATO’s Lessons
Seth A. Johnston
©2019 Seth A. Johnston

ABSTRACT: This article identifies the importance of NATO’s
role as a facilitator of multinational collaboration. The Alliance’s
established processes and standards worked well, enabling
countries whose available resources might otherwise prohibit their
participation to fully-contribute to the mission in Afghanistan.

T

oday’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no Cold War alliance.
Few developments illustrate NATO’s capacity for adaptation
more than its 21st century role in Afghanistan.1 NATO allies
invoked the collective defense provision—Article 5—of its founding
treaty for the first and only time just one day after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks.2 Few present at the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty in 1949 could have imagined it would be invoked by European
countries and Canada seeking to support the United States or that the
Alliance’s largest and longest military operation would occur in central
Asia. Fewer still might have predicted NATO allies would agree to the
mission so soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a crisis the then
US ambassador to NATO described as a “near death experience” for
the Alliance.3 Yet NATO assumed control of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003 and has remained in Afghanistan for the
better part of two decades.
As the United States has begun negotiating a political settlement
to the Afghanistan conflict with a view to the eventual withdrawal
of international forces there, an assessment from the overall NATO
perspective will complement the national initiatives.4 This effort will
also support ongoing efforts to reassess NATO’s priorities in the face of
other security challenges.5

1      Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), 1–15, 40–42.
2      The September 12, 2001 decision was contingent on evidence that the attacks originated
from a foreign source. When US officials confirmed this condition to the North Atlantic Council
early in October 2001, invocation of Article 5 became official. “Statement by the North Atlantic
Council,” Press Release (2001) 124, NATO, September 12, 2001; and George Robertson, “Statement
by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson,” NATO, October 2, 2001.
3      R. Nicholas Burns, “NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance with a New Mission,” New York Times,
May 24, 2003.
4      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned (conference, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland,
February 11–13, 2019).
5      For a recent official summary of NATO’s agenda on current challenges, see “Brussels Summit
Declaration,” Press Release (2018) 074, NATO, July 11, 2018.

Dr. Seth A. Johnston,
a fellow of the
Project on Europe
and the Transatlantic
Relationship at the Belfer
Center for Science and
International Affairs at
Harvard University and
US Army officer, served
in NATO missions in
Europe and Afghanistan
and wrote How NATO
Adapts: Strategy and
Organization in the Atlantic
Alliance since 1950 (Johns
Hopkins, 2017).
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Although NATO has undertaken formal studies of its activities in
Afghanistan, recent scholarship by Heidi Hardt, Jörg Noll, and Sebastiaan
Rietjens cast doubt on the efficacy of formal lessons learned processes
in international organizations generally and in NATO specifically.6 This
article offers an external and an unofficial assessment of the Alliance’s
efforts and provides initial suppositions. In sum, NATO’s impact in
Afghanistan may not have been enough to mitigate national shortcomings
or to achieve victory on its own, but it was significant and positive. The
Alliance’s adaptability and highly institutionalized character are at the
root of these contributions.
Moreover, the mission in Afghanistan affected NATO in ways that
promoted allied political cohesion, organizational effectiveness, and
military interoperability. The chief implications of these findings are
that while national political leadership and strategy formulation remain
paramount in war, NATO remains a proven and effective instrument
of organizing and implementing coordinated multinational efforts.
The most important lesson learned from NATO in Afghanistan may
therefore be about NATO’s more general value to the United States and
other members.

NATO: Alliance and International Organization

In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the
formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in
that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but
also an international organization—and a highly institutionalized one at
that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently
staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military
and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated
joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without
equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.
This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons
and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in
Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various
formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise,
the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United
States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other
regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.
International relations theory would emphasize the formal
institutions of NATO have very weak independent power and agency.
6      Heidi Hardt, NATO’s Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jörg Noll and Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Learning the Hard Way:
NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation,” in Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance, ed.
Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price (New York: Routledge, 2016).
7      NATO’s integrated military command structure technically boasts two strategic commands of
officially equivalent status: Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, Virginia, and Allied
Command Operations at SHAPE.
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But although NATO consists of such formal institutions, the Alliance
remains an alliance among states. All decisions at NATO Headquarters
are taken by consensus among member states (which will soon number
30). Politics among those countries happens, and the relative influence
of individual member states is closely associated with their power.
NATO’s institutions matter chiefly because of how they facilitate and
structure the relations among the states. Like any other international
organization, states may derive value from such institutions because they
provide benefits such as establishing predictable structures and routines
for decision-making; increasing information sharing; improving
efficiency and reducing transaction costs; and defining roles, status, and
identity. The most important questions for NATO in the context of
assessing its role in the Afghanistan conflict is whether and how well it
has performed these functions.
An important theme in the assessment of NATO’s role in Afghanistan regards the reciprocal impact of the Alliance and Afghanistan,
as Alexander Mattelaer and others have noted.8 Thus, one kind of
lesson relates to NATO’s effect on the mission and the implications
for future coalition expeditionary warfare; another, the future of the
transatlantic Alliance.

NATO and Strategy in Afghanistan

The causes of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan appear logical:
an international terrorist group based in Afghanistan attacked the United
States. Citing the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO allies declared the attack
on the United States as an attack on all allies. The participation of allied
countries or the whole-of-NATO in a US-led response in Afghanistan
seemed straightforward. How NATO became involved in Afghanistan
was in fact murkier. The United States initially preferred not to involve
established alliances after 9/11. As then US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld memorably explained, “The mission determines the coalition,
and the coalition must not determine the mission.”9 When the United
Nations authorized the ISAF in 2001, with a limited functional and
geographic mandate around Kabul, the lead countries of the ISAF
coincidentally tended to be members of NATO.
In planning for an ISAF rotation in 2003, the lead nations realized
they could achieve some capability enhancements and cost savings by
applying NATO resources. Still struggling meaningfully to demonstrate
the consequences of its post-9/11 invocation of Article 5 and searching
for a way to reconcile allies divided over the Iraq War, NATO saw an
opportunity: supporting or participating in the Afghanistan campaign
could reinvigorate the Alliance; encourage rapprochement between the
United States and those (mostly western European) allies opposed to
8      Alexander Mattelaer, “How Afghanistan Has Strengthened NATO,” Survival 53, no. 6
(December 2011–January 2012): 127–40; and senior NATO official 2, interview by the author,
February 8, 2019.
9      Donald Rumsfeld, “Text: Rumsfeld’s Pentagon News Conference,” Washington Post, October
18, 2001.
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the Iraq War; and offer others (mostly newer eastern European allies,
NATO aspirants, and global partners) an occasion to cultivate even
more positive relations with the United States and NATO.10
For its part, the United States warmed to the idea of greater allied
involvement in Afghanistan as the cost of the Iraq War increased. For
the allied institution, therefore, the initial entry into Afghanistan had
broad politico-diplomatic benefits for transatlantic relations as well as
some small practical advantages for some countries. But it occurred
without much clear debate or unified strategic ends in Afghanistan.
Tellingly, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political decisionmaking body, did not issue an “initiating directive” with guidance for
the development of military plans for Afghanistan. This decision may
be understandable insofar as NATO deferred thinking about those ends
to the United States, and the UN authorization of ISAF, which NATO
was taking over. But Afghanistan itself may have been a secondary
concern. Evidence suggests at least some NATO countries explicitly
expressed reservations about the purpose of the Alliance’s involvement
in Afghanistan but supported it anyway.11
Such early inattention to strategy in Afghanistan caused at least
two major problems. The first concerned time. As the years passed,
NATO was drawn incrementally further into the conflict and the lack
of clear and agreed strategic ends at the institutional level became
increasingly troublesome. Expanding the ISAF from an organization
with a predominantly noncombat and geographically limited mandate
around Kabul to one responsible for conducting a full range of military
operations throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2006 elevated the
prominence of this issue. The confusion over NATO’s strategic ends
became most apparent in southern Afghanistan where the insurgency
raged but different ISAF countries acted almost autonomously within
their respective areas of responsibility, with greatly varying priorities
in counterterrorism, local security, development, security force and
governance assistance, counternarcotics, and other aspects of the
counterinsurgency approach that had gained currency in US military
circles by this time but were not widely shared among NATO allies.12
Short tour lengths and frequent changes in commanders compounded

10      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned; Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The
Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006),
120; and Seth A. Johnston, No Longer Obsolete: How NATO Endures in the Twenty-First Century (West
Point, NY: Modern War Institute, 2017), 14–17.
11      Judy Dempsey, “France Bars Moves for Greater Alliance Role,” Financial Times, February
10, 2003.
12      Benjamin Schreer, “The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” in Pursuing Strategy:
NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 144–45.
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these problems, as new personnel naturally applied their own priorities
and interpretations of strategic ends.13
NATO had embarked on a security assistance mission but ended up
in a war without much discussion of war aims. The Alliance ultimately
confronted this problem and, by 2008, had achieved consensus on a
clear and detailed strategy.14 But this occurred five years after NATO’s
initial involvement in Afghanistan and seven years into the conflict. The
duration of the war was becoming a significant political concern by this
point, and following the entrance of a new US presidential administration
in 2009, the United States soon adopted a new strategy that called for
large troop increases and a goal of starting troop withdrawals by 2011.15
The international mission was thereafter extended only incrementally
two or three years at a time, reflecting tension between the domestic
political reality among allies and the ambition of the strategy and its
counterinsurgency approach.
The second, related problem with NATO strategic ends concerned
their suitability in Afghanistan. The agreed strategic goals depended
on the creation of effective and sustainable Afghan government and
security institutions. The 2009 Afghan presidential election debacle
underscored the difficulty of such a goal. ISAF commander General
Stanley McChrystal rightly recognized this difficulty in describing
the capability of the Afghan government and the Taliban as obstacles
to victory.16
Proponents of counterinsurgency in general may conclude the
Afghan government’s troubles in this case were so great that a strategy
may have required resources beyond what NATO and ISAF member
countries would be able to give. Those more skeptical about the general
efficacy of counterinsurgency may conclude Afghanistan is yet another
case demonstrating the inherent limitations of foreign powers to reshape
other nations. Either way, the lesson for NATO’s strategic ends recalls
the idea from Carl von Clausewitz that policy ought not ask of strategy
that which its chosen means cannot deliver.17 Admittedly, this question
may be less about NATO specifically and more about counterinsurgency
and other such missions in general. Yet this question has resonance not
only because of Afghanistan but also because of the demand for NATO
13      Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences
and the War in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): 673–99; and Stephen
M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National
Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (March
2012): 67–84.
14      The confidential Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan was announced publicly at the
2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. “ISAF’s Strategic Vision,” Press Release (2008) 052, NATO,
April 3, 2008.
15      Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward
in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, December
1, 2009).
16      Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: International Security
Assistance Force, August 30, 2009).
17      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.
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involvement in similar situations. In Kosovo, for example, the Alliance
has maintained a peacekeeping force and imperfect relationship with
local government for 20 years after the 1999 intervention. Allied countries
also grapple with such questions and the prospect of similar calls arising
from elsewhere. Thus, the Alliance has a stake in the debate.18
A ready critique of the conflict in Afghanistan is that resources
were either too small or too slowly applied to bring about the desired
strategic ends. This critique might point out NATO’s original 2003
involvement in the ISAF was motivated by short-term cost savings on
the part of a few allies; the expansion of ISAF under NATO leadership
was a tacit acknowledgment that the United States chose to economize
its commitments in Afghanistan as an effort to address the concurrent
deteriorating situation in Iraq; and the buildup of US forces in 2009–10
may have been too little, too late—unpersuasive to a Taliban adversary
that viewed the time-limited withdrawal intentions as its own plausible
path to victory. But this critique of means has less to do with NATO
than with the impracticality of matching means to uncertain ends,
as described above. Moreover, the provision of means to any allied
initiative or strategy depends less on the Alliance and more on the will
of participating countries. National responsibility for resources is the
essence of the burden-sharing issue not just for Afghanistan but for all
NATO activities.
The Alliance’s main role in resourcing a strategy is therefore to
clarify and organize what countries provide. NATO deserves credit for
its positive contributions in this respect. The Alliance’s overarching
NATO defense planning process (NDPP) and the mission-specific
combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR) for Afghanistan
are well-organized processes for identifying and communicating
requirements as well as integrating resources provided.19 Even when
nations did not always fully resource every requirement in the CJSOR,
which was usually the case, the process helped serve as an assessment
tool and benchmark for intra-alliance politics and negotiations.20 The
United States, for example, has used information from the CJSOR to
tailor specific requests to other countries in bilateral diplomacy with a
view to filling out the comprehensive statement of means. Moreover,
NATO offered common doctrine, standards, and even some training to
facilitate interoperability for allies and nonmember partners participating
in the coalition. This architecture facilitated the integration of forces

18      Official 2, interview. As in Afghanistan, local actors in Kosovo have frustrated NATO
efforts to achieve its strategic goals for lasting peace and stability. Kosovo’s assertion of national
independence through its intention to create an army has enflamed relations with Serbia and
occurred despite NATO’s protest, to cite a recent example.
19      “NATO Defence Planning Process,” NATO, June 28, 2018; and NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine
for the Planning of Operations, Allied joint publication (AJP)-5 (Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency, 2013).
20      John R. Deni, “Perfectly Flawed? The Evolution of NATO’s Force Generation Process,”
in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, ed. Sebastian Mayer, (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 176–93.
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and capabilities from the more than 40 countries that participated in the
NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.21
The effect of the mission on the Alliance is a more positive story in
several respects. First is the durable commitment of NATO and its allies
to the campaign, which includes remaining in Afghanistan as long as the
United States does. Non-US members of the coalition have suffered more
than 1,000 combat fatalities, spent billions of dollars, and maintained this
commitment for more than 15 years.22 This commitment is even more
remarkable given the domestic political unpopularity of the conflict in
many of the participating countries and the absence of a direct interest
in Afghanistan for most of them. As one senior European official said
to a group of Americans at a recent meeting of the NATO Military
Committee, “My country had no direct security interest in going to
Afghanistan. We did it for you [the United States].”23 The maintenance
of the allied cohesion on involvement in Afghanistan thus benefited
the United States. It also says something larger about the convening
and staying power of NATO in general. The allies’ commitment to an
unpopular conflict that was at best tied only indirectly to most countries’
security interests is an indicator of the importance states attach to the
Alliance in general.24
Notwithstanding conclusions about the quality of the strategy
for the Afghanistan conflict, NATO played a positive and useful role
in offering a structured forum for the strategy-making process. The
Alliance demonstrated the potential for aggregating this process—
always complex and difficult, even for one nation—among all the allies
and partners in the coalition. The institutions, including the various
committees at NATO headquarters, as well as higher-level foreign and
defense ministers meetings and summits, provided both a structure
for deliberation and routine political accountability.25 This structure
facilitated the articulation of strategic ends as well as the iterative process
of matching ways and means to those ends.
Compared to ad hoc multinational coalitions, the NATO structure
encourages political cohesion and staying power because nations have
a mechanism for their interests and concerns to be heard on a political
as well as a military level.26 Compare, for example, the NATO effort
in Afghanistan with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria): all NATO allies and the institution are members of
the coalition devised during the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. And
the military forces of the coalition are interoperable, to a great degree,
21      Official 2, interview. For an archival list of contributing countries to the NATO mission
see “Meetings of NATO Ministers of Defence: Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and
Figures Placemat,” NATO, June 25, 2019.
22      Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis (Cambridge, MA:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2019), 2.
23      NATO Military Committee meeting, Washington, DC, March 14, 2019.
24      Afghanistan: Lessons Learned.
25      Nicholas Burns et al., “NATO’s Leadership Crisis” (seminar, Harvard Kennedy School,
Cambridge, MA, September 18, 2018).
26      Official 2, interview.
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because of the members’ common NATO experiences. But there is no
inherent mechanism for political consultation among the coalition’s
members. Arrangement of coalition meetings thus fell to the United
States and other countries on a multilateral basis. A significant part of
the rationale for NATO institutions joining the coalition was so the
Alliance could host or convene meetings of the coalition, again often on
the sidelines of a NATO-only meeting.27
The Alliance extended this deliberative structure to include the
participating nonmember partners in the Afghanistan mission.28 The
increased prominence of the office of an ambassador-level NATO
senior civilian representative in Afghanistan after 2010 further
institutionalized this political coordination. These derivative benefits
of NATO’s partnership program and longstanding tradition of civilian
engagement and political dialog facilitated multinational contributions
to the mission in Afghanistan. Even with the elusiveness of victory and
the marginal significance of Afghanistan in the direct national security
interests of coalition members, the longstanding commitment of allies
to the NATO mission in Afghanistan reflects positively on the perceived
value of the Alliance.

Organizing for Afghanistan

An advantage of NATO has been its role as a forum for coordinating
decision-making and action among allies. Results depend mostly on
what allies decide and do. But NATO institutions can assist countries
in collective decisions and facilitate implementation. Though NATO’s
role in offering a process for strategy-making in Afghanistan has been
positive, aspects of organization and implementation in the Afghanistan
conflict, particularly in the military area, deserve closer examination.
Command authority is one such issue. The political reality of
coalition warfare necessarily complicates military authority and gave
rise to several challenges in Afghanistan. One prominent challenge
concerned the caveats imposed by most troop contributing nations
on the employment of their forces. Some limitations affected material
capabilities, such as the range of vehicles or equipment to operate at
night. Legal or political considerations, such as rules of engagement or
the taking and treatment of prisoners also played a role. Many of these
restrictions stemmed from the lack of consensus on strategy, especially
during the first years of NATO involvement. National caveats, especially
the previously unstated or those not specified in advance, were some of
the clearest consequences of strategic differences and frustrated NATO
27      Official 1, interview by the author, May 22, 2019; and “Meeting of the Ministers of the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” (US Department of State, Washington, DC, February 6, 2019).
28      The inclusion of non-NATO contributing partners in political deliberations at NATO
Headquarters was not immediate. Australia, one of the larger non-NATO participants in the
Afghanistan mission, made a particular point of advocating for the opening these discussions to
partner nations. The effect of this effort has been significant, as nonmember partners are now
routinely included in relevant NATO deliberations and information on a range of allied initiatives.
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned.
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commanders in the field.29 Successful commanders made the most of
the available resources, of course, but the caveats increased the burdens
for planning staff, reduced commanders’ flexibility, and negatively
affected camaraderie and perceptions of fairness among the troops.30
Yet they were the price of broad international participation and political
cohesion. Stronger political agreement and strategic clarity may reduce
the salience of caveats. But risk discouraged broad participation. Similar
trade-offs will continue in Afghanistan and in future missions.
Another problem involved overlapping authorities. “Dual-hatting”
is a common practice in NATO that can produce neutral if not positive
effects. A prominent example is the role of Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), who is customarily an American who also commands
the US European Command. Although this officer must split time
between the two responsibilities, each headquarters has its own staff and
the authorities of each office tend to reinforce the other. The SACEUR
can prioritize and lead NATO military efforts to reinforce US initiatives,
and vice versa.
In Afghanistan, however, the greater number and types of hats
placed on senior leaders did not always produce reinforcing effects. To
take one example from the air domain, a single US Air Force general
officer toward the end of the ISAF mission in 2014 was wearing at least
five hats representing various command and staff duties in both national
and multinational NATO contexts.31 Particularly when roles did not
come with additional resources, such as the dual-hatting of entire staffs
or organizations, the unavoidable practical effect was prioritizing some
roles and inattention to others. This challenge especially affected US
servicemembers who were relatively less familiar or experienced in
NATO doctrine and standards compared to their counterparts from
other countries in the Alliance.32
A compounding factor in Afghanistan was the relatively distinct
missions of the NATO-led ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring
Freedom, with the latter placing greater emphasis on counterterrorism.33
The United States largely tolerated the separation between NATO and
US missions until the approach approved by President Barack Obama
in 2009 enabled General Stanley McChrystal to enforce a degree of
29      Official 1, interview; and Saideman and Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats,” 67–84.
30      Official 4, correspondence with the author, February 9, 2019.
31      Kenneth S. Wilsbach and David J. Lyle, “NATO Air Command-Afghanistan: The Continuing
Evolution of Airpower Command and Control,” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no. 1 (January–
February 2014): 12.
32      In the words of one (American) NATO commander, “The NATO country whose troops
understand NATO the least is the United States.” This difference in familiarity with NATO
practices is an understandable consequence of the global nature of US military commitments; US
servicemembers are more likely to serve in Asia or other non-NATO environments. But insofar as
the learning curve for NATO leadership was steep compared with other national roles, the incentives
to “go with what you know” did not favor the prioritization of NATO responsibilities for US leaders
dual-hatted in NATO positions. Official 3, interview by author, June 6, 2018.
33      This distinction remains an issue in Afghanistan today as the NATO-led Resolute Support
is a noncombat “train, advise, assist” mission while that of US Forces-Afghanistan has broader
authorities. Many Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan key leaders are dual-hatted.
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previously unseen integration. This change was due in no small measure
to McChrystal’s credibility within the US special operations community
as well as his understanding of the NATO mission and counterinsurgency
approach.34 But however commendable this integration was, one of the
leading methods for achieving it was through dual-hatting.
The Alliance’s organization and chain of command outside the
theater further frustrated NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan.35 Formally,
the chain of command ran from the commander of the ISAF through
the Netherlands headquarters of NATO Allied Joint Force Command
Brunssum (JFCBS) and then to SHAPE and SACEUR. Yet the
commander of JFCBS had little practical authority and headquarters
was not resourced to provide much support to the Afghan theater.
By subordinating ISAF to an operational-level JFC headquarters, the
NATO chain of command implied ISAF was tactical, a classification that
made little sense even before the creation of the ISAF Joint Command
in 2009 expressly facilitated the higher ISAF Headquarters’ focus on
operational and strategic matters.36 Moreover, four-star US commanders
in Afghanistan reported in their national capacity to the commander US
Central Command, who could provide significant enabling resources
and was a peer to the US European Command commander, the
SACEUR. Bypassing JFCBS in the NATO chain of command may
have seemed sensible or appropriate from a nationally oriented resource
and protocol point of view, but the practice reflected negatively on the
NATO command structure.37
One non-US member of the NATO military structure who had a
prominent supporting role for the Afghanistan mission was the Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), customarily a British officer.
The principal role for DSACEUR involved force generation, and
specifically management of the CJSOR process, which to some extent,
reflected the importance of the process to NATO’s overall contribution to strategy in Afghanistan being procedural rather than
substantive. But this trend may have created unintended consequences
for the future capability or readiness of the DSACEUR office actually
to command, as envisaged for example in the case of a European
Union mission using NATO resources as agreed under the Berlin Plus
agreement or successor arrangements.38
Another component of NATO organization relevant to Afghanistan
concerned training, doctrine, and lessons learned. Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) plays a large role in the NATO exercise program
34      Official 1, interview. This distinction between US and NATO mission roles has reemerged
since the end of ISAF and launch of the expressly noncombat NATO Resolute Support Mission
after 2014.
35      Sten Rynning, “ISAF and NATO: Campaign Innovation and Organizational Adaptation,”
in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
36      Schreer, “Evolution of NATO’s Strategy,” in Edström and Gyllensporre, Pursuing
Strategy, 140.
37      Official 4, correspondence.
38      “Washington Summit Communiqué,” Press Release NAC-S(99)64, NATO, April 24, 1999.
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and maintains training institutions such as the Joint Warfare Centre in
Stavanger, Norway, and the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz,
Poland. In theory, these resources can and do prepare allied forces. In
practice, training is predominantly a national responsibility, and national
commitment to NATO standards is often a more important factor in
determining the readiness and interoperability of forces.
NATO established a Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
(JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal, under the auspices of ACT in 2002.
Originally intended to assess NATO exercises, the JALLC adapted to
take stock of real operational lessons learned from Afghanistan and
other places. But, as with training, the real impact of the lessons depends
largely on national priorities.39 Finally, formal changes to NATO
doctrine and standards is often slow. The first edition of its doctrine
for counterinsurgency, for example, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4,
was not published until 2011, years after NATO had adopted such an
approach in Afghanistan.40
A final critique of NATO composition concerns the complexity of
relationships with non-NATO organizations in Afghanistan. In the efforts
to develop the Afghan government and its security forces, for example,
allied and coalition organizations included the ISAF mission broadly, the
NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, the US-led Combined Security
Transition Command–Afghanistan, the provincial reconstruction
teams, and bespoke organizations such as the anticorruption Combined
Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat. Coordination with other nonNATO actors in the environment such as the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan, nongovernmental organizations, third countries (such
as Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia), and above all, the Afghan
government compounded the complexity.
The current NATO Resolute Support Mission focus on “train, advise,
assist” is less ambitious and less complex, but also more reliant on the
actions of non-NATO entities to achieve its goals. NATO acknowledged
as much by greatly increasing its emphasis on external partnerships in
its 2010 Strategic Concept, which was promulgated concurrent to that
year’s Lisbon Summit decision to terminate the ISAF combat mission by
2014. NATO reaffirmed this emphasis through the establishment of the
aforementioned office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative and
by the unprecedented step of inviting the governments of Afghanistan
and ISAF countries to participate in its 2012 summit deliberations and
declarations on Afghanistan in Chicago.

39      Tom Dyson, Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A New Model for Lessons-Learned
Processes (New York: Routledge, 2019); and Hardt, NATO’s Lessons in Crisis.
40      NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP-3.4.4 (Brussels: NATO
Standardization Agency, February 4, 2011); and NATO, “Allied Joint Doctrine for CounterInsurgency (COIN),” NATO Standardization Agreement 2611 (Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency, February 4, 2011).
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Field Support Services

Some of the most significant developments of NATO’s involvement
in the Afghanistan conflict have been in the lesser-known areas of
support and sustainment services. Logistics may be the most notable of
these developments, particularly given the challenges of Afghanistan’s
rough and landlocked topography and the remoteness of central Asia
from NATO’s traditional geographic area. According to the principle of
“costs lie where they fall,” transportation and sustainment in NATO is a
national responsibility. But few NATO nations possessed the capability
to transport their forces to Afghanistan and to supply them once there.
Yet NATO troops in Afghanistan have rarely suffered for want of fuel,
ammunition, spare parts, food, water, or other supplies in Afghanistan.
Successful diplomacy deserves credit for keeping supply lines open
through neighboring countries that have not always had smooth relations
with NATO and the mission in Afghanistan, including Pakistan and
Russia. NATO’s role in the allocation of common logistic services in
Afghanistan is one of the clearest examples of how the Alliance can
facilitate multinational cooperation.
Particularly for countries with a light footprint in Afghanistan, the
burden of establishing independent supply chains for a small national
contingent may be prohibitive. But the ability to access a common
logistics system relieves those concerns by lowering costs and increasing
the potential for broad international participation. Benefits existed for
larger countries as well. American and British logistics systems at the
beginning of the conflict were, for example, initially incompatible with
NATO systems but later reconciled.41
In 2009, the United States decided to rely on a NATO platform
for fuel acquisition and distribution in Afghanistan, expanding access
from large installations to forward operating bases. This measure
increased both the amount of fuel delivered and the flexible capacity
to sustain other allies and partners in those locations.42 The key NATO
institution for organizing many of these logistic services is the NATO
Support and Procurement Agency, which had its origins in Cold War
era supply organizations but was reorganized in 2010 with a clearer
focus on support to operations like Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the
direct success of these efforts to keep NATO forces supplied, negative
consequences included the distorting effect of foreign money and goods

41      Heidi Reisinger, Not only “Containerspotting”—NATO’s Redeployment from Landlocked Afghanistan,
NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 98 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College October
2013), 4.
42      Logistics and fuel in particular offered ample opportunity for fraud and corruption in
Afghanistan. Official 1, interview; and Michael J. Evans and Stephen W. Masternak, “The Silent
Revolution within NATO Logistics: A Study in Afghanistan Fuel and Future Applications” (master’s
thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012), 120.
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on the Afghan economy and the attendant potential for crime and
corruption—a problem hardly unique to NATO.43
Intelligence is another example of the potential for NATO to offer
a process for multinational cooperation that also depends on national
participation. NATO offered a system and the standards for classifying
intelligence at the institutional and ISAF mission levels as well as an
architecture for sharing that intelligence. The mixed results of this
effort in Afghanistan likely occurred because the quality of such allied
intelligence depends largely on input from each nation. Countries were
usually willing to share low-level information related to force protection,
but tended to guard higher-level intelligence and information that might
reveal capabilities, sources, or methods. This reluctance is inherent in
multinational environments, and there are often trade-offs between the
number of countries participating in a mission and the willingness of
those countries to share intelligence with the entire group.44
NATO and ISAF experimented with several different models for
facilitating intelligence sharing given these constraints. Models that
were more likely to result in sharing involved a NATO or ISAF hub
with spokes to national intelligence cells that shared what they could.
The more common model of intelligence organization was housing
the institution’s intelligence function within a national structure. The
latter model prevails at the highest echelons of the NATO mission in
Afghanistan, where the NATO intelligence staff is dual-hatted with that
of US Forces-Afghanistan.45
Another lesson from Afghanistan involved communications, which
further exemplifies some of the challenges identified above, including
unity of command and intelligence sharing. Throughout the conflict
in Afghanistan, headquarters personnel often monitored more than
four communications and information technology systems representing
various coalition groupings, classifications, and technical capabilities.
This fragmented information environment was inefficient and taxed
users, even though it created a redundancy that guaranteed a working
communications channel. Early in the coalition expansion effort, NATO
realized a single, secure network for missions would be necessary for
NATO and non-NATO partners. Fielding of the network demonstrated
NATO’s capability as a process facilitator.
43      Furthermore, much of the NATO logistics work was contracted to private companies
which were largely responsible for their own security. The profusion of armed private contractors
was yet another challenge to unity of command and created at least the potential for violence or
destabilizing effects that worked at cross purposes to NATO’s overarching campaign objectives. See
Elke Krahmann, “NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: the Problem of Principal-Agent Networks,”
International Affairs 92, no. 6 (2016): 1401–26.
44      James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009); Helge Arnli, “Intelligence Sharing with Host Nations in Multinational
Operations: Hurdles and Dilemmas in Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Norwegian Defense Command
and Staff College, Spring 2010); and James L. Mader, “Diplomat Soldiers: A Study of Military
Counterintelligence Cooperation in NATO, 1951–1960” (dissertation, University of Utrecht, 2017).
45      Cleared US veterans of the Afghanistan campaign may recall the common but bizarre
prevalence of “NATO” documents classified or processed on US systems labeled “Not Releasable
to Foreign Nationals” (NOFORN).
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Best practices from NATO Europe, such as the creation of
the Afghan Mission Network Operations Centre in Kabul, were
implemented in theater. Countries or organizations that had built their
own classified networks, such as the battlefield information collection
and exploitation system [BICES], to NATO standards had interoperable
field-ready systems, demonstrating the potential value of NATO
standards and processes. But ISAF also relied on Afghanistan’s civilian
wireless communications backbone. The relative luxury of confronting
an adversary that was not a significant cyberthreat, however, limits
the application of any technical lessons learned from Afghanistan to
contexts involving advanced cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

NATO Is Not a Shooter

NATO’s command of the International Security Assistance Force
mission from 2003 to 2014 was the largest and longest running conflict
the Alliance has faced in its 70-year history. That mission continues
today under the more modest Resolute Support Mission to train, advise,
and assist the Afghan government and security institutions. This article
offers a preliminary Alliance-wide assessment of NATO institutions
as well as some initial suppositions that may complement national
initiatives to learn from Afghanistan as well as efforts addressing
future NATO adaptation.46 In terms of strategy and organization,
NATO’s contributions to the international effort in Afghanistan
were procedural rather than substantive. Its structures and processes
facilitated multinational cooperation. But national actions mattered
most. Although NATO’s efforts did not entirely mitigate each nation’s
shortcomings, they were effective.
Perhaps the most significant example of NATO’s value is the fact
that allies remained cohesive and committed in Afghanistan over such
a long period, and in spite of so many political and strategic obstacles.
On an implementation level, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan both
demonstrated and spurred further development of its field support
services, especially logistics, which enabled many countries to participate
and facilitated cost sharing. Furthermore, the mission in Afghanistan
provided training and experience to the participating national militaries,
promoted their interoperability, and led to the development of several
NATO functions and common standards. The chief implications
of these conclusions are that while national political leadership and
strategy-making remain paramount in war, NATO remains a proven
and effective instrument of organizing and implementing coordinated
multinational efforts.
But will NATO ever attempt something like its Afghanistan mission
again? The answer may be different for the territorial defense of a NATO
46      For an up-to-date summary of challenges facing NATO, see Lute and Burns, NATO at
Seventy. Significant for NATO not only because of the official end of the ISAF mission, 2014
also marked the rise of Islamic State terrorist attacks in Europe, Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
and Russian aggression against Ukraine. These events refocused the attention of NATO allies on
security threats closer to NATO’s traditional geographic area.
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member state than for an expeditionary operation. Today the Alliance
is understandably focused on threats closer to home, and its attention to
future challenges will be increasingly motivated by technological changes
and looming shifts in the global balance of power, such as the rise of
China.47 Variation in the capabilities and the investments of each nation’s
defenses is a contention within the Alliance. Yet nearly every source
consulted or interviewed for this article judged that only two entities
in the world are capable of running a large-scale multinational military
campaign: the United States and NATO. This reality and recent history
strongly suggest NATO will at least be considered when its European or
North American members seek to undertake military action.
The cases of Libya in the Arab Spring, the Global Coalition to Defeat
ISIS, and even current attempts to provide maritime security in Strait of
Hormuz demonstrate this lesson in different ways.48 Many of the basic
questions for evaluating the appropriateness of NATO involvement
are political: does a mission require the participation of non-NATO
countries or entities? If so, do the benefits of NATO’s convening power
and institutional capacities outweigh the costs of adapting NATO to
something new? Does a consensus exist among allies to address the
issue through NATO and to involve the necessary non-NATO partners?
Such questions are reasonable and would need to be addressed and
decided based upon the merits of future cases. In many situations, the best
answer may be no. But reflexive complaints about NATO bureaucracy
or process are less well-founded. Some kind of process or method will
be needed for any multinational activity. If not NATO, then the United
States and other countries would need to establish something that
offers many of the same features. In the likelihood that such a coalition
would be composed substantially of NATO member countries or global
partners, those countries would benefit from the interoperability of
NATO’s common standards. As the counter-ISIS campaign illustrates,
even a well-developed multinational military coalition is unlikely to have
the built-in political consultative mechanisms. And the often overlooked
but essential logistics, communications, and field-support services that
NATO developed and improved in Afghanistan facilitates countries’
participation and cost sharing.
So, if NATO did not exist or was not involved, the United States
and other allies would need to create it or something like it to carry
out the mission. This all argues powerfully for the value of NATO in
Afghanistan as well as future conflicts.

47      Lute and Burns, NATO at Seventy, 35–38.
48       “Statement by the NATO Spokesperson on the Seizure of Two Ships in the Strait of
Hormuz,” NATO, July 20, 2019; Benjamin Mueller, “U.K. Joins U.S.-Led Effort to Protect Ships in
Strait of Hormuz,” New York Times, August 5, 2019; and Jeffrey H. Michaels, “A Model Intervention?
Reflections on NATO’s Libya ‘Success’,” in NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic
Alliance, ed. Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Ben Zyla (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also,
Johnston, How NATO Adapts, 148–51, 166.
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ABSTRACT: This article reflects on the evolution of Canada’s
whole-of-government approach in the context of international
cooperation in Afghanistan. Although the effort resulted in great
gains when Canadian Forces were actively involved in combat roles,
the nation does not seem interested in maintaining the capability
as a framework for quickly responding to current or future international crises.

P

olitical scientist Stephen M. Saideman captured the incomplete
state of Canada’s post-Afghanistan learning with this simple
advice: Canada should “not to do it again.”1 Five years after
the commitment ended, national introspection has been left to scholars
attempting to understand the consequential changes. To comprehend the
modifications resulting from Canada’s experiences in Afghanistan, one
must understand the shifts that occurred within the government during
the conflict and then scrutinize the outcomes.2 Finally, reflection can
occur to determine if the efforts changed how Canada engages in postAfghanistan missions and if there are lessons that have been learned
and implemented.3
The unprecedented level of interdepartmental cooperation and
involvement that was necessary to advance objectives in Afghanistan
obviously made the effort unique. By the end of the combat mission
in 2011, needs for integrated strategic coordination, planning, and
guidance, as well as requirements for interoperational departments were
accepted and applied. These were necessary to produce integrated effects,
or impacts, in the mission area. Notably, other countries involved in this
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment, such as the
United States, faced similar challenges, which also resulted in adaptation
and innovation. This article demonstrates that, despite Canada identifying
and implementing these lessons during the Canadian combat mission
The author would like to thank Brigadier-General (Retired) Serge Labbé, Colonel (Retired)
Brett Boudreau, Major-General (Retired) Terrence “Terry” Liston, and Ms. Lindsay Coombs.
1      Stephen M. Saideman, “Lessons of History: What the Afghanistan Mission Teaches Canada,”
International Journal 72, no. 1 (March 2017): 131.
2      Saideman, “Lessons of History,” 131.
3      The exception to this has been the ongoing Canadian Army Training and Doctrine Centre
tactical lessons-learned project, which has produced a series of analytical and, where possible,
scholarly monographs for the Canadian Army examining the “major lessons from our Kandahar
operations by Corps and Capability.” See Lee Windsor, “Lessons Learned for Soldiers: The
Royal Canadian Infantry Corps in Afghanistan,” Dispatches 17, no. 1 (December 2013): ii; and Lee
Windsor, David Charters, and Brent Wilson, Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada’s Afghan
Mission (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 279.
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in Afghanistan, the interagency, or whole-of-government, learning
activity has not been integrated into national and international activities
in the post-Afghanistan era. Ultimately, these “lessons identified” are
not “lessons learned.” This lapse may have a deleterious impact on the
ability of the Canadian government to address the challenges of such
interagency cooperation in current and future interventions.

Afghanistan and Canada

Canada’s early involvement in Afghanistan was depicted by Canadian
researchers, Janice Gross Stein and J. Eugene Lang in their 2007 work,
The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar. Initially, Canada’s participation
was to be limited to a post-9/11 combat mission in tandem with the
United States during 2002. But this led to a much longer Canadian
involvement in Afghanistan. The initial commitment of a light infantry
battalion group within a United States Army brigade was followed with
more than three successive years of continued involvement in the Afghan
stabilization mission. In 2003, Canada generated the headquarters for
a multinational brigade and an infantry battle group based in Kabul.
The following year, Canadians assumed command of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
These obligations were succeeded by what was supposed to
be provincial stabilization and capacity building that included
establishing the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).
By 2006, Canadian Forces had inexorably migrated into participation in
low-intensity conflict through counterinsurgency operations.4 Canada’s
role changed again in 2011 as it shifted from fighting in southern
Afghanistan to giving advice and assistance within the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan. By the end of the involvement in 2014, there were
165 Canadian deaths (158 soldiers, 7 civilians) and more than 1,800
wounded soldiers.5
The mission also tested the defense, diplomacy, and development
approach created in 2003 as Canada expressed its foreign policy in
conflicted regions.6 This concept evolved into the ideas represented by
the more inclusive “whole-of-government” expression of integrating all
instruments of governance and development to produce a desired effect
linked to national strategy. The growth of this integrated approach to
the conflict in Afghanistan was well recognized by the end of Canada’s
final year in Kandahar. Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated:
Friends, behind every girl now in a classroom, behind every healthy baby
in its mother’s arms, behind every farmer who can feed his family without
taking up arms, behind all of this progress are innumerable acts of heroism,

4      Janice Gross Stein and J. Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto,
ON: Penguin Canada, 2007), 1–229, 244–45.
5      Stephen Azzi and Richard Foot, “Canada and the War in Afghanistan,” Canadian
Encyclopedia, accessed July 15, 2019; and Brett Boudreau, email message to author, May 19, 2019.
6      Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 107–8.
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of selfless devotion to duty by you, the men and women of the Canadian
Armed Forces, our diplomats and our aid workers.7

Ultimately, if any discernable lessons arose for Canada from this
conflict it was those associated with this methodology. The rebuilding
of Afghanistan required integrating the efforts of those involved with
defense, diplomacy, and development to achieve positive and lasting
results in regenerating this war-torn nation.8

Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations

Canada’s intergovernmental efforts in Afghanistan evolved from
nascent beginnings. The foundation of this campaign was laid in
January 2004 when then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, the Canadian
commander of the ISAF rotation V (ISAF V), entered into discussions
about national challenges with President Hamid Karzai, who was leading
the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). They identified the lack
of unified action by Afghanistan, Canada, international community
members, and NATO toward rebuilding Afghanistan. Without a
common plan or a coordinating mechanism, the lack of coherency was
weakening the potential of many positive nation-building outcomes. The
lack of a shared approach also prevented ISAF V from moving beyond
lower-order (tactical) military activities that could achieve immediate
effects to higher-level, enduring strategic objectives.9
Hillier understood that without a coherent strategic concept that
allowed all involved parties—military, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, donor institutions, the international
community, and most importantly the ATA and Afghan people—to
participate, no operational-level campaign could be created.10 He also
believed “rebuilding failed states or failing states was not a security,
governance or economic problem; it was all three.”11 Accordingly, he
used his ISAF V staff, and later two Canadian officers with advanced
planning backgrounds who were specifically tasked with assisting the
7      Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada,” Canada, May 31, 2011.
8      Kimberley Unterganschnigg, “Canada’s Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan—
Lessons Learned,” Canadian Military Journal 13, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 16. The importance of Hillier’s
role in the degree and form of Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan cannot be understated. Stein
and Lang, Unexpected War, 1.
9      The Afghan Transitional Authority was the temporary governing body of Afghanistan
put in place by Loya Jirga, or traditional Afghan grand assembly, in June 2002; it lasted until
national elections in October 2004 confirmed Karzai’s continuance as president. See Richard J.
Ponzio, “Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” Global
Governance 13, no. 2 (April–June 2007): 260–63.
10      Howard G. Coombs and Rick Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying
Operational Art in Post Conflict Afghanistan,” Canadian Military Journal 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2005):
5–14. Hillier made many efforts to engage Canadian government support for his interagency
approach during this time with some local success amongst Canadian officials, but not to the same
degree back in Canada.
11      Rick Hillier, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War (Toronto ON:
HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2009), 389; and Serge Labbé, interview by the author, June 6,
2019. Labbé, the deputy chief of staff to Hillier’s headquarters, highlights Hillier’s emphasis on an
interdepartmental approach as part of the mission, as well as his efforts to implement this within
ISAF and through NATO Senior Civilian Representative Hikmet Çetin. Sadly, these ISAF efforts
to engage NATO in a holistic approach did not seem to persist beyond Hillier’s departure in 2005.
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Afghan Transitional Authority, to begin articulating a strategic concept
released as “Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and
Stability in Afghanistan.” Though developmental, it specified ideas that
were used to assist with developing governance and security. The core
ideas later emerged within the Afghanistan National Development Strateg y, an
overarching Islamic Republic of Afghanistan policy document guiding
the multiple activity streams working to rebuild Afghanistan.12
Recognizing the success of this effort, Karzai requested similar
support after Hillier became the chief of the Canadian Defense Staff
(CDS). Regrettably, this Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan only
ran from 2005 to 2008, roughly the duration of Hillier’s tenure in the
role. Since capacity building and assistance was not viewed by some in
the former Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade as a Canadian military mission, it met its untimely demise as a
result of interdepartmental politics.13
The termination of the strategic advisory team indicated the early
challenges Canada faced in producing a whole-of-government approach.
Difficulties ranged from orchestrating processes between different
organizations, to overcoming uneasiness with civil-military cooperation,
to calming outright hostilities and suspicions.14 This friction translated
into less than stellar results—for example, British General Sir David
Richards, who commanded the ISAF in 2006, observed that it took
months for Canada to deliver nonmilitary assistance in regions of
Kandahar that had been affected by intense fighting. This delay
exemplified the need for a whole-of-government approach to ensure the
immediate gains of military forces could be followed with stabilizing
effects from governance and development.15
Over the course of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, there were
two heavily debated parliamentary votes—one in May 2006 and the
other in March 2008—concerning the extension of the mission and its
essential character.16 The latter debate was informed by the results of the
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan convened by
the Conservative Party in 2007 to make recommendations on Canada’s
involvement in the mission. Based upon the interviews and the associated
research, the panel conducted to consider the Afghan, Canadian, and
allied perspectives, the Manley Report stated any recommendation would
need to take the following factors into account: Canadian efforts and
progress made to date in the course of stabilizing the security situation
12      Coombs and Hillier, “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in
Post Conflict Afghanistan,” 5–14.
13      Michel-Henri St-Louis, “The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan—Part of the Canadian
Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 3 (2009): 58–67.
14      Tara Holten et al., “The Relationship between Non-Governmental Organizations and the
Canadian Forces,” in Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive
Approach, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal, ON: School of Policy Studies and
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 218–23.
15      Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 272; 259–83.
16      Geoffrey Hayes, “Canada in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Transition under Threat, ed.
Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2008), 292–94.
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in Afghanistan; the significant investment of resources, energy, and
infrastructure already made by Canada; the possibility of deterioration
in the security as well as the development aspects of potential future
options; NATO and United Nations (UN) objectives to create better
conditions for Afghans and prevent the reestablishment of terrorist
groups in Afghanistan; and Canada’s reputation internationally.
The report outlined a few possible options regarding the level of
continued Canadian engagement in Afghanistan during 2009 that ranged
from leaving the Afghanistan mission to continuing full involvement
as well as variations between these two extremes. But it ultimately
concluded—considering Canadian efforts and sacrifice to date, NATO
and UN commitments, and the need to make life better for Afghans—
Canadian involvement should continue. The findings raised fundamental
questions: “How do we move from a military role to a civilian one, and
how do we oversee a shift in responsibility for Afghanistan’s security
from the international community to Afghans themselves?”17
The Manley Report argued security forces needed to be strengthened,
agriculture encouraged, government institutions strengthened, and
national infrastructure restored. The Canadian portion of this plan
could only be achieved through a holistic governmental approach
with clear benchmarks that supported the “Afghanistan Compact”
on achieving peace and security in Afghanistan and a body for
strategic-level coordination, assessment, public reporting, and achieving
these integrated objectives.18
Hillier notes an important outcome of this period of debate
in Canadian politics was the development of a defense policy that
provided the overarching strategy for the use of Canada’s military.19 The
Canada First Defence Strateg y mandated the Canadian Forces “be a fully
integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in
partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel
of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team
will constitute a key element of a whole-of-government approach to
meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.”20
Furthermore, this very public political debate created recognition
of the breadth and complexity of the Afghan challenge, which in
turn contributed to a substantial evolution in both the strategic
whole-of-government coordination framework in Ottawa as well as the
corresponding mission structure and civilian resourcing in Afghanistan.
The Manley Report, and the new defense policy, ushered in a new
Canadian political perspective on the whole-of-government concept.
17      John Manley, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa, Ontario:
Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and Government Services of Canada, 2008), 8.
18      “The Afghanistan Compact” (agreement, London Conference on Afghanistan, January
31–February 1, 2006).
19      Hillier, Soldier First, 470–71.
20      Canada, Department of National Defense (DND), Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa,
Ontario: DND, 2008), 3–4.
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Resultantly, by early 2008, Canadian efforts in Afghanistan were,
for the first time, overseen by a cabinet committee on Afghanistan
that was supported by the newly created Afghanistan Task Force in
the Privy Council Office. The activities of the Afghanistan Task Force
were reported by the clerk of the Privy Council directly to the prime
minister and supported the Cabinet committee. Although mainly
staffed by senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, the task force included representatives from several
other departments including the Department of National Defense
and the Canadian International Development Agency. This whole-ofgovernment innovation was a first in Canadian political affairs.21
In March 2008, the Canadian government unveiled a detailed set
of six whole-of-government policy objectives for the mission derived
from the Manley Report and the “Afghanistan Compact.” These were:
“Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a
more secure environment and promote law and order; strengthen Afghan
institutional capacity to deliver basic services; provide humanitarian
aid to vulnerable people; enhance border security with facilitation of
Afghan-Pakistani dialogue; help advance Afghanistan’s democratic
governance; and facilitate Afghan-led political reconciliation.”22
Benchmarks were developed to help report on the progress
achieved on key priorities that included four regional objectives for
Kandahar and two national objectives for Afghanistan. The first
regional measure, a secure environment and establishment of law and
order would be accomplished by building the capacity of the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police. Supporting efforts were
identified in the areas of justice and corrections. Second, jobs would be
created, education would be provided, and essential services, such as
water, would be made available. Third, humanitarian assistance would
be delivered to people in need. Fourth, the management and security
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would be improved. The national
measures included encouraging Afghan institutions that were central
to Canada’s Kandahar priorities and supporting democratic processes
such as elections. The ultimate objective was that the Canadian efforts
would contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at
weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.23
Subsequently, these six policy objectives and their corresponding
efforts facilitated the integration of Canadian officials into Canadian
21      Nicholas Gammer, “Integrating Civilian-Military Operations: The Comprehensive
Approach and the ATF Experience, 2008–2009” (conference paper, Canadian Political Science
Association Conference, University of Alberta, Canada, June 13–15, 2012); and BrigadierGeneral Dean Milner, OMM, CD, Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10, “Helping
Afghans Secure a Brighter Future ROSHANA SABAH” (presentation, Conference of Defense
Associations in Ottawa, Ontario, June 18, 2010).
22      Canada, Privy Council Office, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Quarterly Report to
Parliament for the Period of October 1 to December 31, 2010 (Ottawa, Ontario: Government of Canada,
2010), 2–3.
23      “Backgrounder: Canada’s Six Priorities in Afghanistan,” Government of Canada, accessed
May 7, 2009.
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military operations. It was the expression of political interest in and
the coordination of a comprehensive governmental approach through
the Privy Council Office and the Cabinet. This teamwork was further
encouraged by the requirement to provide corresponding detailed
quarterly assessment of activities to the Parliament of Canada. As a
result, by the end of the combat mission, this whole-of-government
process included not only the Canadian Forces, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and National Trade, and the Canadian International
Development Agency, but also other government departments like the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Correctional Service of Canada.24
It should be noted, however, that even with increased harmonization
among the efforts of all partners throughout this time, strategic
communications and public affairs remained inconsistently visualized
and carried out by the various participants. Former Director of
Communications of the Afghanistan Task Force Colonel Brett Boudreau
observed the coordination structures created when the task force was
established had a positive impact:
This forcing function to work together better, faster and in a more integrated
fashion over time showed real value from a policy and communications
perspective both in theatre and at respective departmental [headquarters]
HQs—it is perhaps why public support for the mission and particularly for
“the troops,” remained generally consistent even in the face of a significant
number of Canadian killed and wounded, as well as the considerable financial
cost. By 2012 though, after a major national effort of 10 years, the lack of
positive results or much substantive evidence of real progress on the ground
coupled with the public perception that NATO (excepting the [United
States], [United Kingdom] and Netherlands) had “abandoned” Canada in
the South during heavy fighting there, continues today to negatively impact
Canadian public perceptions of the Afghanistan mission.25

From this, one could opine that the strength, and the weakness,
for the Canadian mission over these years was its overarching focus
on building Afghan capacity. As much as the international community
collectively underestimated the strength of the insurgency, it overestimated
the ability of Afghan leadership, in governance and in security efforts, to
assume full responsibility for responding to the challenges posed by the
insurgency. Under these circumstances, Canadian activities in Kandahar
revolved around balancing efforts to enable Afghan civilian authorities
and security forces, while at the same time neutralizing the insurgents.
With the success of the 2007 American military surge in Iraq and the
renewed commitment to ISAF after President Barack Obama was elected
in 2008, the United States became reinvested in the dilemmas of the
ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Americans provided
a strategic vision and the resources necessary to create a multinational
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. With an influx of tens of
thousands of American troops, and more clearly defined international
24      Milner, presentation; and Howard G. Coombs, “Whole of Government Operations by
Task Force Kandahar September 2010 to July 2011,” (presentation, Conference of Defense
Associations in Ottawa, Ontario November 3, 2011).
25      Brett Boudreau, email message to author, May 16, 2019.
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objectives in late 2009, the various national campaigns became more
fully integrated into a broader international counterinsurgency and
nation-building campaign. Taken as a whole, this improved strategic
coherence—on top of the flow of American personnel and material—
renewed international interest in Afghanistan and gave fresh impetus
to NATO efforts to resolve the expanding violence. It was within this
increased security context that a relatively robust Canadian whole-ofgovernment approach developed in Kandahar province and the role of
the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team evolved.26
In 2008, NATO created a similar comprehensive approach. In 2009,
General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of the ISAF, identified
a lack of coordination between military and nonmilitary operations as
inimical to achieving ISAF security objectives. As a result, many of
the major nonmilitary organizations operating in Afghanistan met for
a conference in Kabul in 2010. Mark Sedwill, NATO’s senior civilian
representative in Afghanistan, then raised the issue of implementing an
effective comprehensive approach and the necessity of a NATO-level
coordination mechanism through the NATO Senior Civilian Representative
Report: A Comprehensive Approach Lessons Learned in Afghanistan. The ideas
put forward by Sedwill never came to fruition and arguably the ability
of ISAF to facilitate the provision of a secure environment was, in
turn, diminished.27

Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team

The objectives in the Manley Report were achieved as Canada
exercised the whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan at the
regional and national levels during the final year of the combat mission.
Quarterly reports by the Afghanistan Task Force kept the Canadian
government apprised of the progress. The reconstruction team,
which had become a combined Canadian-American effort, included
62 Canadian civilians. The group worked closely with Afghanistan’s
governing structure, through the Office of the Provincial Governor,
the Provincial Ministries, and the Provincial Council, to identify and to
support the implementation of priority projects throughout the region.
The Canadian staff in this organization was comprised of diplomats,
aid workers, corrections officers, and civilian police who shared the
mission of reconnecting Kandaharis with an effective, representative
government. In support of these efforts the reconstruction team
collaborated with Canadian Forces, American civilian and military
partners, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The group partnered
with the Attorney General’s Office and the Provincial Court on justice
issues, the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, and the
Central Prison Directorate.
26      James A. Russell, “Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan,” in
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 68–72; and Stephen M. Saideman, “Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan: Minority Government,” in Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, Military Adaptation, 221.
27      The initiative was never implemented. Labbé, interview.
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The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team worked intimately
with Tooryalai Wesa, then governor of Kandahar, and his office.
As the appointed provincial executive officer, Wesa’s direction and
leadership was important to Canada. As such, the team assisted him with
planning, budgeting, and coordinating major projects. In this fashion,
the organization and its efforts were aligned with provincial ministry
projects, plans, and budgets to support the people of Kandahar.
The reconstruction team had a strong relationship with the
Provincial Council.28 As a body of elected representatives who listened
and mediated disputes in the Afghan tradition, the council encouraged
people and the civil society to participate in governance. This effort
provided an important adjunct to the provincial administration by
helping the people find common ground with the government.
District stabilization teams, comprised of small groups of American
and Canadian government advisors with military assistance, worked
closely with their Afghan counterparts outside the provincial capital,
in the district ministries, and alongside district governors to increase
local capacity. The measurable growth of governance between 2010
and 2011 was, in no small part, due to the efforts of these teams of
dedicated professionals.
Moreover, the six policy objectives linked with the Afghanistan
Compact, served as an overarching term of reference for the civilian
components of the mission—for example, Canada created a unique
operational capacity that increased the civilian role in Kandahar.
This expanded whole-of-government approach enabled a more robust
partnership with the Afghan provincial government, and it was
supported by programs financed by Canada’s Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International
Development Agency. Some of these initiatives included the Arghandab
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, which involved one of the largest
dams in Afghanistan; the development of 50 schools; eradicating polio;
improving the primary detention center in the region; training police;
and improving government infrastructure.
As Canada’s plans in Kandahar were achieved, the Canadian staff
of the KPRT gradually relocated to Kabul or returned to Canada. In
January 2011, Canada transferred leadership of the reconstruction team
to the United States as part of the Canadian process of winding down
its activities in Afghanistan. And, Canadians and Americans served
together closely until the end of the Canadian combat mission in 2011
so as to achieve significant progress in both Afghan development
and governance.29
28      Throughout this period, the Chair of the Provincial Council was the powerful half brother
of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, known as AWK. AWK was murdered by
a bodyguard in July 2011. “Bodyguard Kills Hamid Karzai’s Half-Brother,” CTV News, accessed
May 19, 2012.
29      Tim Martin, representative of Canada in Kandahar from August 2010 to July 2011 (speech,
Kandahar Provincial Council, Kandahar City, Afghanistan, March 6, 2011).
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Task Force Kandahar

Canadian and American military forces in the Canadian-led brigade
known as Task Force Kandahar implemented Manley Report-based
initiatives in conjunction with the KPRT to ensure all military activities
were coordinated within a whole-of-government framework. Security
aims were to recruit, equip, and organize community policing; to
train, mentor, and partner with an increasingly independent Afghan
National Army; and to deny insurgents influence on the population.
Governance goals included creating responsible and responsive district
leadership that subordinated to the governor; developing representative
subnational processes, such as community meetings called shuras;
and establishing a capable ministry staff that delivered basic services.
Finally, development objectives included establishing functional district
development committees, village development representation, and
increased economic capacity.
The task force worked toward a number of integrated measures of
effectiveness in its whole-of-government approach. Within the area of
security, it was necessary to ensure adequate numbers of capable Afghan
police who were addressing village requirements and protecting, not
preying on, the people. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
led both combined- and single service operations as well as integrated
command and control, which was responsive to the district governor and
village elders (such as maliks). When examining support to governance,
it was necessary to reinforce and assist with creating responsible and
responsive district governors and staff; representative and functioning
district and village shuras and subnational processes; and provincial
ministry representatives working at district centers and reacting to
village requirements.
The task force developed the support needed to help with the
establishment of functioning district development committees that
represented the needs of local Afghans and managed centrally controlled
funds. In turn, this village development representation connected to
all the development activities that were coordinated through district
governors. This cooperation enabled district governors to meet priorities
set by the district, in conjunction with the villages, and a working rural
and urban interface of markets, transportation, and so on.30

Canadian Whole-of-Government Lessons

The Manley Report resulted in an amalgamation of various
interdepartmental perspectives, objectives, programs, plans, and
activities that directly underpinned the creation of a Canadian wholeof-government approach in Afghanistan over the last few years of the
mission. This concept involved Canadian field partners and members
of the international community as well as Afghan authorities at all
levels. It was creative and responsive to the exigencies of Canada’s most
current intervention. While some detractors argue Canada’s approach
30      Milner, presentation; and Coombs, presentation.

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part I

Coombs

37

to whole-of-government activities in Afghanistan has been replete with
flaws, others more optimistically reframe this perspective and note
Canada’s engagement in the region is rich with lessons to be learned.
In early 2011, the Afghanistan whole-of-government lessons-learned
project was launched by the Afghanistan Task Force. Subsequently, the
Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team organized a conference
on the lessons learned to examine the multiagency experiences of the
whole-of-government effort.31 Participants looked at cross department
civil-military binational cooperation, the evolution of the reconstruction
team, and strategic communications, as well as contracting and
implementing a “rule of law.” Representatives utilized the 2010–11
experiences of the whole-of-government team in Kandahar to derive a
series of recommendations for the Afghanistan Task Force:
1. The need to have expertise across the domains of security, governance,
reconstruction, and development was highlighted. Without balanced
civilian expertise and support, the host nation is unable to extend
its influence into the communities. Two areas cited as lacking key
Canadian civilian expertise in the conflict-ridden environment of
Kandahar were agriculture and justice.
2. The need to integrate with other government departments, particularly
the Canadian military prior to the deployment, was brought forward.
Understanding other departmental cultures and modes of operation
would have reduced friction between different organizations, as well
as improved communications and effectiveness.
3. It was thought the binational, civil-military nature of the reconstruction
team was effective. It reached across the province to the districts
and assisted greatly in the handover of structures, programming,
and operations.
4. The need for the deployed civilian field agencies of the Canadian
government to be able to communicate to the media was emphasized.
While the Canadian Department of Defense had great latitude
in dealing with the media, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Canadian International Developmental
Agency did not, with a commensurate negative impact in informing
the Canadian public of their activities and achievements. This disparity
was stark and the Afghanistan Task Force focused considerable effort
toward resolving it. Unfortunately, success was never truly achieved.
5. There is a need to standardize contracting procedures across the
Canadian whole-of-government effort. While the practices of the
Department of National Defense and the Canadian Forces are flexible
31      DND, “3350-1 (JLLO) ‘Report on Kandahar Whole of Government Lessons Learned
Workshop,’ 02 June 2011,” 2; Canada, “Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop, Task Force
Kandahar and Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team,” February 24, 2011; Sara Hradecky,
email message to author, March 10, 2011; and Canada, Afghanistan Task Force, “Lessons
Learned,” 10. David Mulroney, deputy minister responsible for the Afghanistan Task Force,
conceived a series of lessons-learned activities after the formation of the Afghanistan Task Force
that were only possible as a result of the governance framework established by the Manley Report.
Brett Boudreau, email, May 19, 2019.
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and were deemed to represent the best practices, those of other
departments were, at times, seen as problematic and cumbersome.
6. While Canadian expertise was recognized in the area of rule of law,
a more comprehensive and detailed program that would reach to the
districts and their people would have been more efficacious.32
The Afghanistan Task Force later put together the results of
various inputs, like that of the reconstruction team, to create high-level
perspectives on the results of Afghanistan’s whole-of-government
experience. These strategic observations reflected the evolution of
the Afghanistan Task Force and its activities. Leading the list was the
requirement for an interdepartmental assessment to establish clear
national objectives and priorities. Related to this was the requirement
for an interagency planning exercise to create common understanding
and intent, plus establish operational guidance. Directly connected to
the formation of the Afghanistan Task Force was the need to create
coordinating bodies at the political level to produce an integrated
approach across and within departments.
The necessity of enhancing cultural and process understanding
between departments to set the conditions for successful
intergovernmental collaboration was also suggested in a fashion similar
to the recommendations expressed by the reconstruction team. This
cooperation could be achieved through cross-department assignments,
colocation, and shared predeployment preparations.
The need for deployable civilian capability was also highlighted.
Such a resource would need decentralized authorities who were able
to make appropriate and timely decisions and who would be part of
a unified whole-of-government effort from the very beginning. In a
nod to the quarterly reporting process implemented in Afghanistan,
the need for a benchmarking framework to monitor and to report on
whole-of-government activities was also brought out by highlighting the
importance of measuring progress. Finally, the requirement to build a
nuanced and multifaceted engagement strategy to gain and maintain
popular support from the public and partners, which had been lacking
for the KPRT, was emphasized.33
Not apparent in this narrative was the hard work necessary to make
the whole-of-government construct work. These exertions occurred
daily throughout the years of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
The friction produced by integrating dissimilar departments and
organizations was very real, and operationalizing this integrated
approach required the labor and good will of many public servants and
military personnel. Also, critical to success was the strong leadership
from the highest levels, embodied in the structure of the Afghanistan
Task Force. Only in this way did the mission become, and remain, a
whole-of-government effort.34
32      DND, “3350-1 (JLLO)”; and Canada, “Kandahar Lessons Learned Workshop.”
33      See Canada, Afghanistan Task Force, “Lessons Learned,” 10.
34      Boudreau, email, May 19, 2019.
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Conclusion

Canadian efforts to build coordinated interdepartmental activities
in Afghanistan evolved in conjunction with the growth of the NATO
mission, national debate, and the end of the combat mission in 2011.
This discussion and the record it generated is wide-ranging and contains
much value from the strategic and tactical perspectives. Points of
immediate importance for future whole-of-government practices can be
derived from this collaboration. Of all this discussion, the need for more
intragovernment contact, understanding, and collaboration prior to such
missions is critical. This need was highlighted by Lieutenant-Colonel
Kimberley Unterganschnigg, Canadian Armed Forces retired, who led
the joint lessons-learned cell in Task Force Kandahar during 2010–11:
Interdepartmental civilian-military cooperation was essential to address
the broad scope of security, governance, reconstruction, and development
activities that were undertaken by the KPRT and TFK in the final year of
Canada’s involvement in Kandahar. Looking back, rather than a strategy
document focused upon fixed signature projects, a more comprehensive
framework and approach to the [whole-of-government] mission that
provided clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each of the departments,
particularly with respect to activities in support of governance and
development, would have improved our effectiveness, as it would have
guided consistent progress over the years.35

Although they have been identified as an essential element of mission
success in documents from the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
Team and the Afghanistan Task Force, integrated effects, nor concrete
recommendations to facilitate whole-of-government understanding and
outcomes, have yet to come to pass in a permanent manner. Even in 2009,
prior to the lessons-learned exercises documented in this discussion,
Canadian development specialist Andy Tamas argued the necessity of
the creation of a “hybrid” organization consisting of “an integrated
team of soldiers, development workers, diplomats and others who can
protect themselves.”36 This organization would be funded and resourced
sufficiently to deploy quickly and to commence working effectively
wherever required, regardless of security concerns to produce integrated
effects. The ability to create, deploy, and sustain such a structure over
the duration of the mission, along with established strategic planning
and coordination mechanisms, would permit Canada to maintain the
skills and relationships so arduously gained in Afghanistan.
Tamas’s ideas support the KPRT and Afghanistan Task Force
conclusions. Twenty-first century interventions require teams of people
that are familiar with each other and their capabilities. In turn, this
suggests establishing integrated professional development systems
and increasing interdepartmental assignments to increase operating
familiarity within the departments of the Canadian government.
These steps, in conjunction with developing whole-of-government
35      Unterganschnigg, “Canada’s Whole of Government Mission,” 16.
36      Andy Tamas, Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan
(Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2009), 219.
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organizations that contain a necessary cross-spectrum of skills and
attributes and that can deploy quickly where ever needed, would increase
Canada’s pool of deployable capabilities. Sadly, none of the lessonslearned have been systemically operationalized in an enduring manner.
As the Canadian government looks toward future involvement in
other fractured environments, it needs to heed the lessons identified from
its contribution in southern Afghanistan, particularly over the last year
of the combat mission. Canada must ensure the observations captured by
the Afghanistan Task Force and the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
Team, as well as the activities of Task Force Kandahar, are addressed to
improve the effectiveness of its future whole-of-government activities.
In order to create success in current operations, such as those in Iraq
and Syria, as well as future interventions, the Canadian lessons identified
over the course of the mission in Afghanistan must be operationalized,
institutionalized, and sustained. Only in this fashion will lessons
identified truly become lessons learned.
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ABSTRACT: This article highlights the benefits a small military
enjoys with regard to networked learning through the lessons the
Netherlands’ learned while contributing to the NATO mission in
Afghanistan. Although the force seems to be reverting to enemycentric thinking, the author encourages leaders to retain an adaptive
mindset that will allow the force to adopt a more population-centric
approach when necessary.

T

he Netherlands has been involved in Afghanistan since the fall of
the Taliban regime in 2001. That event prompted the international
community to start reconstructing the country for long-term
stability. In addition to developmental aid and diplomatic support, Dutch
soldiers started deploying to Afghanistan on January 1, 2002. Since then,
the Dutch armed forces have contributed to the international coalition
in many different forms and places, including various contributions to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): an infantry company
in Kabul (2002–03), a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Baghlan
(2004–06), a task force in Uruzgan province (2006–10), and a police
training mission in Kunduz province (2011–13). Also, Special Forces and
air assets such as F-16s and attack helicopters have deployed in support
of these operations as well as the wider coalition efforts that took place
under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
By the end of the ISAF mission in 2014, the Netherlands had
participated in training Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
in northern Afghanistan as part of Resolute Support, a mission that
was extended through December 2021.1 Since the first Dutch soldier
landed in Kabul in 2002, an estimated total of 30,000 Dutch soldiers
have deployed to Afghanistan.2 That is almost two-thirds of the current
overall strength of the Dutch armed forces (39,839 active duty and
5,046 reserve).3
The various contributions to the Afghan campaign have had a huge
impact on the relatively small Dutch military. Moreover, this impact
coincided with the completion of the transformation process that
1     Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Defensie, voor Buitenlandse Handel en
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en van Justitie en Veiligheid [Letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Foreign Trade and Development Aid and Justice and Security], June 15, 2018, Dossier
27925, no. 630).
2     “Afghanistan,” Veteranen Instituut, October 2, 2014.
3     Ministerie van Defensie, Kerngegevens Defensie—Feiten en Cijfers [Essential data on defense—
facts and figures] (The Hague: Ministerie van Defensie, 2018), 26.
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reshaped the Dutch military from a Cold War force to an expeditionary
organization. Consequently, Afghanistan marked the first serious test for
the newly acquired ability to conduct military operations in conjunction
with other departments and as part of an international coalition.
So, in the eyes of the Dutch armed forces, their contributions to the
Afghanistan War were not only vast in intensity, but also challenging in
nature, a major experience for a small military.
The various deployments to Afghanistan have provided the Dutch
military with a wide range of experiences over the past seventeen years.
This article focuses on understanding how Dutch soldiers adapted to
the specifics of their mission and to the challenging Afghan operational
environment. The Dutch military is encouraged to not only take
notice of such observations, but also to explore the ways the military
community has disseminated and processed newly obtained insights. In
other words, when seeking to obtain an insight on the lessons learned by
the Dutch armed forces in Afghanistan, one should not only study the
lessons observed, but also the extent to which they have become lessons
institutionalized. This article, therefore, answers the question of which
lessons the Dutch military has learned in Afghanistan first by presenting
observations on adaptation in the field and subsequently analyzing the
way the Dutch military has institutionalized them.

Lessons Observed

The most substantial Dutch contributions took place during the
ISAF campaign. The end of this North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) campaign coincided with new Dutch missions against
the Islamic State in the Middle East (as part of Operation Inherent
Resolve) and the deployment of a contingent in support of the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
This marked the end of an era in which the Dutch armed forces had
almost exclusively focused on Afghanistan. The four-year deployment
(2006–10) of the brigade-size Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) stands out as
the defining experience during this period.4 The mission in Uruzgan
province was the largest Dutch military operation since the Indonesian
war of decolonization and the first time since the Korean War that
Dutch soldiers saw intensive combat.
The TFU experience itself demonstrated that the Dutch military is
capable of a high standard of performance in international operations
in a complicated environment. Some international observers have
attributed this success to the Dutch approach, a subtle, nonviolent way
of conducting operations by use of defense, diplomacy, and development
(3D) activities that focus on the local population and the government

4      Martijn Kitzen, Sebastiaan Rietjens, and Frans Osinga, “Soft Power, the Hard Way: Adaptation
by the Netherlands’ Task Force Uruzgan,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell,
Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 159–61.
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rather than on fighting the insurgent opponent.5 Yet the successful
deployment was the result of field adaptations that gradually shifted the
task force’s emphasis from an enemy-centric, kinetic approach toward
a more balanced population-centric approach tailored for Uruzgan’s
complicated operational environment.6 Since a similar pattern is
witnessed among almost all other national contingents that contributed
to the ISAF mission, the TFU case not only offers an excellent insight in
the lessons observed by Dutch soldiers, but is also highly relevant from
a comparative perspective.7
The first and perhaps most important adaptation of the Dutch task
force concerned the evolution of its military strategy. Before the start of
the mission, politicians and decisionmakers in The Hague determined
the mission’s goal as fostering stability and security in Uruzgan. This
effort included guidelines prescribing methods for augmenting the local
population’s support for the Afghan government mainly through civilmilitary cooperation and reconstruction activities. Combat troops would
provide security assistance to create a permissive environment for these
activities.8 Yet, this provided hardly any tangible direction for implication
by the task force. Basically, the TFU deployed on August 1, 2006,
without a proper campaign plan, and its commanding officer, Colonel
Theo Vleugels was told “to do what we [the TFU staff] told them [the
defense staff in The Hague] we would do.”9 Consequently, the first TFU
rotation set out to design its own plan within the framework of highlevel policy. Despite this process being initiated during predeployment
training, the definitive Master Plan was only completed two months into
the actual deployment.10 This plan laid out a military strategy following
the effects-based approach and aimed at obtaining 23 key effects in
5      For an excellent oversight of the debate on the Dutch approach see Thijs Brocades Zaalberg,
“The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies
36, no. 6 (2013): 867–97. See also Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The NeoTaliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 198–99; “The Dutch
Model,” Economist, March 12, 2009; and René Moelker, “The Genesis of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to
Asymmetric Conflicts: Operations in Uruzgan and the ‘Softly, Softly’ Manner of Approaching the
Taleban,” Armed Forces & Society 40, no. 1 (2014): 96–117.
6      For a complete overview of the Dutch Uruzgan campaign see Martijn Kitzen, “The Course of
Co-option: Co-option of Local Power-Holders as a Tool for Obtaining Control over the Population
in Counterinsurgency Campaigns in Weblike Societies” (dissertation, Amsterdam University, 2016),
329–524. For the population-centric turn in TFU’s approach, see also Martijn Kitzen, “Close
Encounters of the Tribal Kind: The Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation
of Conflict—The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 35, no. 5 (2012).
7     Afghanistan: Lessons Learned (conference, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland, February
11–13, 2019). See for instance the various national case studies included in Farrell, Osinga, and
Russell, ed., Military Adaptation. The text on the key adaptations of the TFU contains some material
expanded from Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power.”
8      Brief van de Ministers.
9      Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Gayton, Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Fourth in a Series of Joint Urban Operations and Counterinsurgency Studies (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2008), 9.
10      Brigadier Theo Vleugels (commander TFU-1), interview by the author, November 12,
2009; Belinda Smeenk, Rudi Gouweleeuw, and Harm van der Have “Effect gebaseerde aanpak in
Uruzgan, van het schaakbord naar een bord spaghetti” [The effect-based approach in Uruzgan,
from checkerboard to a plate of spaghetti], Militaire Spectator 176, no. 12 (2007): 553–56; and Kitzen,
Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 167–69.
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order to increase security and stability in all main population centers
over the next two years—initial commitment was until 2008.
Unsurprisingly, it soon became clear that the Master Plan was
unsuitable as its goals proved too ambitious and its approach
inappropriate for facing the complicated neo-Taliban insurgency in a
highly fragmented local society. There had been only limited geographical
expansion of the TFU’s “ink spot”—the main population centers from
which TFU influence would gradually expand its influence—and most
of the intended effects were not met as planned.11 Therefore, the fourth
TFU rotation in 2008 set out to develop and adopt a new strategy, the
Focal Paper.
The Focal Paper was not only a consequence of the urgent need
for a more suitable campaign plan, but also of the Dutch parliament’s
decision to extend the mission for two more years, up to August 2010.12
Heavily influenced by counterinsurgency thinking, the new plan and its
framework of operations clearly echoed the ideas on counterinsurgency
introduced in the United States.13 Thus, the TFU officially adopted
counterinsurgency as its mission. The main task now became assisting
the local government in providing a stable and secure environment by
maintaining and augmenting the security situation, while simultaneously
obtaining the support of the local population.
Furthermore, the TFU would focus on facilitating the development
of governmental structures, security forces, as well as development
efforts of the Afghan authorities.14 The new campaign plan combined
the military’s methodology of structured backward planning for the
long-term with the understanding of Uruzgan’s operational environment
acquired in the first two years.15 This led to the remarkable—yet
realistic—insight that Uruzgan, as a province of the new Afghan
state, would be sufficiently developed to provide the majority of the
population with a middle income and meet their basic needs by 2050
and to have a local government in full control of all development and
security efforts.16 However, the extension of the TFU mission until 2010
rendered this year as the “beacon on TFU’s planning horizon,” and the
end state for the TFU campaign, subsequently, was to provide “the first
step towards a viable and favourable future for Uruzgan in 2050.”17 The
TFU’s short-term counterinsurgency effort, thus, was to establish an

11      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 419, 427.
12      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 419.
13      Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) G5, “Focal Paper: ‘Foundations For The Future’” (unclassified
policy paper, TFU G5, Tarin Kot, Afghanistan, July 20, 2008), 7–10; Headquarters, US Department
of the Army (HQDA), Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, (Washington: DC, HQDA, 2006),
5-3–5-17; and Colonel Richard van Harskamp (commander TFU-4), interview by the author, March
8, 2010.
14      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 4.
15        See also Harskamp, interview; and Lieutenant Colonel Wilfred Rietdijk (commander
provincial reconstruction team [PRT]-4), interview by the author, September 5, 2008.
16      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 7.
17      TFU G5, “Focal Paper.”
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underpinning for the Afghan government and its local and international
partners to work toward long-term stabilization goals.
Another key element of the Focal Paper was its exclusive focus on the
main population centers of Tarin Kot, Deh Rawud, and Chora. These
districts and their surrounding areas were divided into seventeen socalled focal areas. This allowed for a systematical, event-driven approach
for consolidating and expanding the TFU “ink spot,” as soon as the
security situation in a focal area would be sufficiently stable, the task
force would transfer authority to the Afghan government and security
forces and could shift its attention to the next.18 While this approach
meant a huge leap forward in terms of realistic objectives for the
expansion of TFU and local government control, its design contained a
fundamental flaw as Uruzgan’s challenging terrain dictated the borders
of the focal areas.19 Consequently, these borders sometimes cut through
interconnected communities. Nevertheless, the Focal Paper was a proper
population-centric counterinsurgency campaign plan that provided
realistic guidelines and objectives for TFU operations until the end of
the mission in 2010.
In mid-2009 the Focal Paper went through another alteration as it
became clear the mission would most probably not be extended for
another period. This ultimate plan, called the “Uruzgan Campaign
Plan,” predominantly aimed at creating the unity of effort needed for a
smooth transfer of authority to either the Afghan government and its
security forces or international coalition partners.20 The plan provided
common ground for underpinning long-term stability in Uruzgan by
providing an intellectual framework for reconstruction and development
and identifying key disablers (spoilers) and enablers of this process in
the province.
The “Uruzgan Campaign Plan,” however, was labeled “NATO
Secret,” which made it impossible to share with Afghan partners and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the province. Yet,
the plan itself provided a proper guideline for the upcoming transfer of
authority—ultimately, Australia and the United States would take over.
Furthermore, the “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” addressed the problem with
the borders of the focal areas as these were replaced by thirteen areas of
influence that allowed for optimal engagement of local communities as
their confines were determined by following socioeconomic and social
characteristics instead of terrain features.21
18      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 5–6.
19      Although the PRT staff had been consulted with regard to the disposition of communities
and tribal distribution, geographic features—traditionally used to divide the battle space in a military
operation—still prevailed over societal borders. Harskamp, interview; and Rietdijk, interview.
20      See, for instance, the “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” as quoted in Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Between
Expectations and Reality: The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan,” in Statebuilding in Afghanistan:
Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction, ed. Nik Hynek and Péter Marton (London: Routledge,
2012), 74.
21     See Ingrid van Bemmel, Aletta Eikelboom, and Paul Hoefsloot, “‘Comprehensive and
Iterative Planning’ in Uruzgan, De ontwikkeling van het Uruzgan Campaign Plan’” [Comprehensive
and iterative planning in Uruzgan: The development of the Uruzgan Campaign Plan], Militaire
Spectator 179, no. 4 (2010): 205–7.
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Thus, TFU’s military strategy had evolved from the rather ad
hoc and overambitious Master Plan into the solid counterinsurgency
plan provided by the Focal Paper, and ultimately became the “Uruzgan
Campaign Plan,” which provided an underpinning for long-term efforts
after the Dutch withdrawal. All these plans originated from the various
TFU staff rotations, which illustrates the bottom-up character of the
military-strategic process during the Uruzgan mission. This lack of
strategic guidance from above also echoed in the outcome of the mission.
Especially the Focal Paper and “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” allowed for the
creation of a broad and balanced alliance of local subtribal communities
connected to the provincial government. For the time being, this
effectively enhanced security and stability as it diminished support for
the Taliban among Uruzgan’s populace. Yet, due to the lack of strategic
vision, this ad hoc political order failed to materialize as an underpinning
for long-term stability.22
The increased comprehensiveness of the TFU’s organization
encompassed a second key adaptation that enhanced the task force’s
ability to fulfill its mission effectively. While initially envisioned as a
1,200-strong task force, military planners urged for more troops as the
2006 surge of the neo-Taliban insurgency led to a deterioration of the
security situation. As a result, the Dutch military deployed more soldiers,
and total TFU strength during the entire mission varied between
1,400 and 2,000 soldiers—with peaks occurring during rotations.23
The numerical emphasis within the TFU lay on the 600-soldier battle
group, which was to provide security, assist the Afghan government and
its security forces, and enable PRT operations. This latter unit, while
numerically inferior, was key to the task force’s success as it was the
prime tool for enhancing stability by promoting good governance and
facilitating reconstruction.
The PRT was responsible for the development and diplomacy
activities within the aforementioned 3D approach. Despite the
nonmilitary character of these activities, the PRT consisted almost
exclusively of military staff led by a military commander. Initially only
two civilians operated as part of this unit, a development advisor and
a political adviser. This all changed with the deployment of TFU-5 in
July 2008 which saw a surge of civilian staff.24 A total of 12 political,
development, and cultural advisers were added to the task force, with
most of them operating within the PRT.

22      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 517–22.
23      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 378.
24      René Bouwhuis, Martijn Bronhorst, “Steentje voor steentje bouwen aan civilisering” [Stone
upon stone building toward civilianization], Defensiekrant, August 14, 2008; Peter Mollema and Kees
Matthijssen, “Uruzgan: op de goede weg, Civiel-militaire samenwerking in een complexe counterinsurgency operatie” [Uruzgan: in the right direction, civil-military cooperation in a complicated
counter-insurgency operation], Militaire Spectator 178, no. 7/8 (2009): 399–402; Jaïr van der Lijn, 3D
“The Next Generation:” Lessons Learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations (The Hague: Clingendael,
2011), 36; and Peter Mollema (civilian representative [CIVREP] TFU-5), interview by the author,
November 21, 2008.
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The influx of these new advisers was part of a reorganization aimed
at strengthening the development and diplomacy expertise of the task
force. This reorganization also introduced a system of dual command.
From July 2008 onward, the task force was jointly led by a duumvirate
consisting of the military commander and the highest-ranking diplomat,
the civilian representative (CIVREP).25 This greatly enhanced the
status of civilians—and their advice—within the TFU and therefore
allowed for a balanced approach that combined military, development,
and diplomatic activities. This status further increased in March 2009
when command over the PRT also came to rest in the hands of the
CIVREP—in practice, often exerted by the deputy CIVREP.
While the full consequences of this reorganization will be dealt
with below, it should be mentioned here that the increased involvement
of civilians enhanced the cooperation with NGOs and United Nations
organizations. When the TFU first deployed there were only 6 NGOs
in Uruzgan. By 2009, their number had increased to 30, and in 2010
some 50 NGOs were active in the province.26 These organizations
focused on a whole range of activities varying from health services
and education to rural development and veterinary assistance. Dutch
diplomats and development workers in the field therefore managed to
create circumstances in which NGOs were joining the reconstruction
effort and thereby greatly increased the comprehensiveness of the TFU.
The third key adaptation witnessed during the TFU campaign was
the gradual shift in emphasis from enemy-centric toward populationcentric intelligence. Population-centric intelligence had been included
from the planning phase of the mission, yet it was subordinated to
classical military intelligence focusing on the opposing militants and
the challenging terrain. Moreover, dissemination proved troublesome
as the TFU’s military intelligence section remained focused on the
Taliban despite TFU commanders stressing the need for a populationcentric approach or making statements such as “it’s all about the Afghan
people.”27 Even after a specialized tribal adviser was appointed at the
end of 2006, this situation remained unchanged. This adviser either met
stiff resistance when pointing at the importance of understanding local
society or decided that sharing information with the military was of no
use and could possibly endanger key informants.
The PRT, however, which held a traditional nonmilitary role, proved
fertile soil for the knowledge provided by the tribal adviser. This led to the
emergence of a renewed understanding of the conflict ecosystem, which
conceptualized the situation in Uruzgan as multifaceted and consisting
of multiple layers. Instead of the much-used Taliban-Government
dichotomy, the conflict was gradually understood as evolving around
political and economic power struggles involving local strongmen,
25       See also Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 176; and Kitzen, “Course of Cooption,” 443.
26      Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 173–74.
27      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 404.
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former mujahideen factions, various subtribes, and a mesh of solidarity
networks interconnecting all these different strands.28
This insight became firmly embedded when during TFU-2 the
Taliban launched an all-out attack on the Chora district. Dutch forces
managed to fend off the insurgents by first blocking further incursions
with the crucial assistance of hastily mobilized local militias and the
subsequent staging of a counterattack that drove the enemy from the
district. Local allies, thus, were instrumental to the successful outcome of
this battle. The effective rallying of their militias by the PRT was a direct
result of the thriving cooperation between the tribal adviser and PRT
staff, and clearly illustrated the benefits of a thorough understanding of
the local social landscape.
The battle of Chora, therefore, created “awareness and an operational
sense of urgency to adapt” and, therefore, might be considered the key
“adaptive moment” of the TFU campaign.29 Henceforth, the TFU would
integrate tribal and political analyses in its military planning process,
which enhanced the task force’s understanding of the local operational
environment. The aforementioned influx of additional civilian
expertise greatly accelerated this process of integration. In 2009, TFU-6
commander Brigadier General Tom Middendorp clearly illustrated the
insights that followed from this approach when he stated “the Taliban
[in Uruzgan] are less of a threat to the tottering structures of the Afghan
state than feuding local tribes and predatory warlords. . . . This seems to
have created lasting turmoil which is exploited by the Taliban.”30 TFU-7
CIVREP Michel Rentenaar even went a step further when he declared
after the end of his tour in 2010 that not only the emphasis in intelligence
had shifted from enemy-centric to population-centric, but that this also
had evoked a similar shift in emphasis in operations.31
This brings us to our fourth and final key adaptation, the shift
in operations from almost exclusively kinetic to a more balanced
approach emphasising nonkinetic methods.32 Despite the fabled claims
of a nonviolent Dutch approach, the use of force had dominated TFU
operations from the beginning of the mission. Of course, the local security
situation rendered frequent kinetic confrontations with the Taliban
unavoidable. Yet, the absolute emphasis on kinetic operations was mainly
the result of the traditional military skills that had been imprinted on
the soldiers’ minds. Predeployment training initially neither reflected the
complicated nature of the mission, nor the intricacies of the operational
28     Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 397–99. See also Colonel Nico Tak, “PRT Briefing,”
(briefing, Amersfoort, Utrecht, Netherlands, September 4, 2009); TFU Development Cooperation
Tribal Advisor, interview with the author, March 1, 2010; Colonel Gerard Koot (commander PRT2), interview by the author, December 19, 2009; and Vleugels, interview by the author, December
7, 2009.
29      Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 175. See also Frans Osinga and James A. Russell,
“Conclusion: Military Adaptation and the War in Afghanistan,” in Military Adaptation, 293–94; and
Kitzen, “Close Encounters,” 722.
30      “Dutch Model”
31      Hans Ariëns, “Interview: Michel Rentenaar,”One World, April 4, 2010.
32      On the adaptations in the field of operations, see Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,”
176–81.
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environment in which it was conducted. This gradually changed when
the insights from subsequent TFU rotations were incorporated in the
work-up program and more attention was given to cultural awareness
and nonkinetic tasks, such as key leader engagements. Moreover, the
final exercise that brought together the various subunits of a TFU
rotation (called Uruzgan Integration) became increasingly realistic, as it
was supervised by officers who had actually served in Uruzgan.
During the whole four-year period of the TFU mission, patrols
remained the main modus operandi for delivering effects. Typically, an
infantry platoon augmented with a PRT mission team and other elements
(including enablers, such as forward air controllers and explosive
ordnance disposal engineers) would be tasked for multiday missions, in
which they would spend the night at patrol bases or temporary overnight
locations. Frequently encountering firefights, as well as the increasing
threat of improvised explosive devices, these patrols were forced to
take a robust stance. Force protection was bolstered by acquiring mineresistant Bushmaster vehicles and relying on air support.
While such patrols took place among the local populace, their
primary mission typically concerned disrupting Taliban activities,
with PRT affairs, gathering of information from the people, and
psychological operations as secondary tasks.33 This gradually changed
as more population-centric intelligence became available, and the
awareness arose that this conflict was all about Uruzgan’s highly
fragmented social landscape. From 2007 (after the battle of Chora),
patrols were increasingly dispatched to enable PRT activities aimed at
obtaining influence over various communities and connecting these
people to the provincial government. Population-centric patrols came to
dominate TFU operations, a development which was partly accelerated
by the influx of additional civilian advisers who provided much-needed
expertise for delivering development aid and assisting local authorities.
Thus, patrols became the main platform for nonkinetic engagement
which greatly enhanced the TFU’s influence over the local population.
With regard to large-scale operations, a similar shift can be
observed. Whereas the TFU initially had lacked the means for holding
the areas it had cleared from Taliban presence, this changed at the end
of 2008 when Afghan security forces became available in sufficient
numbers. From then on, operations could be planned with the aim of
establishing control over local communities in the target area. This was
first pioneered during Operation Bor Barakai in October 2008, when
at the end of the operation, a patrol base was constructed in order to
consolidate the results. Yet, this proved unsuccessful as the base was
located at a hilltop on the outer boundary of the target valley. Operation
Tura Ghar in January 2009 proved more successful in applying the new
approach as it not only established a patrol base in the middle of the
33      See for instance, Lieutenant Colonel Andy van Dijk, “Personal Diary” (unpublished personal
record, 2007, private collection); and Captain Gijs-Jan Schüssler, “Experiences Platoon Commander
TF-7 in Uruzgan” (presentation, 13 Mechanized Brigade Counterinsurgency Seminar, Breda,
Netherlands, September 3, 2008).
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troublesome Baluchi Valley, but also included shaping operations, such as
establishing “below the radar” contacts with key tribal leaders (of whom
some resided in Quetta, Pakistan). Thus, large-scale operations followed
the pattern of patrols and increasingly became focused on delivering
nonkinetic effects and thereby also contributed to the increase of TFU
influence in the province.
In summary, it can be concluded that four key adaptations that
occurred in the fields of strategy, organization, intelligence, and
operations contributed to an evolutionary process that turned the TFU
from a predominantly enemy-centric, kinetic military force into a capable
counterinsurgency and stabilization force that emphasized nonkinetic
methods for influencing the local population and connecting these
people to the Afghan authorities. The key lesson to be learned from the
Afghanistan War, therefore, concerns the ability to adopt a populationcentric approach—when necessary—from the onset of a campaign.
It should also be mentioned that this approach should be enhanced
through logical and lucid strategic guidelines provided by policymakers
at the political level. In case of the TFU, however, such clear guidance
was lacking. Key adaptations during the Dutch mission were mainly
a consequence of bottom-up initiatives by either the TFU staff or its
subunits. Moreover, while Dutch soldiers showed a remarkable ability to
adapt, the absence of clear strategic guidance and vision from The Hague
would haunt the TFU after the eighth and final rotation redeployed.
Due to the lack of high-level coordination with American and
Australian successors, the results of the Dutch mission were squandered
within four months as the new Combined Team Uruzgan opted
for another approach to local affairs which led to the crumbling of
the so carefully crafted tribal balance.34 Future missions, therefore,
should be deployed with clear political guidelines based on a thorough
understanding of the local situation and the conflict as well as the
international operational environment in which troops are deployed.
Only then might a contribution by the relatively small Dutch military
provide an underpinning for long-term stability. Doing so, however,
first requires the military to learn the lessons from Uruzgan and be
prepared to adopt a population-centric approach whenever necessary.
Therefore, it is important to discuss the extent to which the lessons from
the Uruzgan campaign have been institutionalized within the Dutch
armed forces.

Lessons Learned?

Paradoxically the numerical weakness of the Dutch military is both
a strength and a weakness. Thanks to its small size, it possesses the
ability to learn quickly from operational experiences through informal
information sharing, especially within the tight community of the officer
corps. During the TFU mission, this networked learning allowed for
the rapid dissemination of new insights from the field. Best practices
34      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 507.
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as well as information on the local situation freely flowed through the
organization. When the mission proceeded, this process was further
stimulated by facilitating the transfer of knowledge between rotations
during predeployment training. Yet, this informal character of learning
during actual operations comes at the expense of institutional learning,
which is notoriously weak within the Dutch armed forces.
As early as February 2008, an attempt was made to capture the
insights from the field when a draft pamphlet entitled Observations on
Operations in Afghanistan emerged.35 This report was prepared by army
officers who had served in the first two TFU rotations and in the staff of
Regional Command South. These key officers had meticulously recorded
their observations on new experiences at the operational, tactical, and
technical level. Most importantly, the bulletin emphasized the need to
adapt the mindset from enemy-centric kinetic operations to nonkinetic
population-centric counterinsurgency warfare. However, for no obvious
reasons, this carefully prepared bulletin was never officially disseminated
within the armed forces.36 The traditional informal learning process, yet,
guaranteed the draft paper was distributed among future TFU rotations
and informed predeployment training. The insights of the pamphlet
were also to be incorporated into a new army doctrine. Nevertheless,
when this doctrine was published in 2009, it was hard to find any trace
of the lessons from the field as even the term counterinsurgency was
hardly mentioned.37
In 2010, with the end of the TFU mission in sight, a new impulse
was given to the institutionalization of lessons from Afghanistan. An
official report was published on the performance of Dutch officers and
noncomissioned officers in an operational environment characterized
by joint, combined, and interagency operations. Recommendations
included a better integration of civilian expertise and additional training
in counterinsurgency to foster a population-centric mindset.38 These
recommendations were echoed in the official governmental evaluation
of the TFU mission that appeared in 2011.39 The armed forces themselves
had started to collect lessons identified and best practices in order to kickstart the institutional learning process. The army gathered the combined
35      Pieter Soldaat and Dirk Jan Broks, “Concept Informatiebulletin 08/01, Observaties over
Operaties in Afghanistan” [Concept information bulletin 08/01: observations on operations in
Afghanistan], (draft doctrinal pamphlet, Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, Amersfoort,
Utrecht, Netherlands, 2008).
36      Eventually the authors took the initiative to publish the bulletin as two articles in the
professional military magazine Militaire Spectator in mid-2009. See Pieter Soldaat et al., “Observaties
rond operaties in Afghanistan (I)” [Observations concerning operations in Afghanistan I], Militaire
Spectator 178, no. 5 (2009); and Pieter Soldaat et al., “Observaties rond operaties in Afghanistan (II)”
[Observations concerning operations in Afghanistan II], Militaire Spectator 178, no. 6 (2009).
37      Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, Land Doctrine Publicatie, Militaire Doctrine voor
het Landoptreden [Land doctrine publication, military doctrine for land operations] (Amersfoort,
Netherlands: Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, 2009).
38      Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Van Eredivisie naar Europees Voetbal [From premier league to
European competition] (The Hague: Defensiestaf, 2010).
39      Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Ministerie van Defensie, Eindevaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage
aan ISAF, 2006–2010 [Final evaluation Dutch contribution to ISAF, 2006–2010] (The Hague:
Rijksoverheid, 2011), 111.
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insights from all TFU commanders and invited soldiers to submit their
experiences as well. For this purpose, 21 committees were established
to process these contributions and feed them into the learning process.
Furthermore, the defense staff published an extensive report on
lessons identified that were to be preserved for future operations.40
Ultimately, insights from Afghanistan echoed in the 2014 army doctrine,
which elaborates on stabilization operations, the comprehensive
approach, and nonkinetic tasks. The importance of a populationcentric mindset is even stressed in the preface which concludes with
the statement “operations with and amongst people: the strength of the
Royal Netherlands Army.”41 Moreover, by this time the Dutch military
had formally adopted NATO’s new Allied Joint Publication-3.4.4
Counterinsurgency as its official doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.42
Thus, it seems the Dutch armed forces had finally succeeded in
capturing and codifying lessons from Afghanistan. Yet, lessons have
only been learned when they are also incorporated by the very troops
that should bring them into practice during new operations. A 2015 study
revealed this was not the case; knowledge on counterinsurgency and
stabilization had virtually evaporated (even in the case of experienced
officers) or was completely absent, and nonkinetic tasks were rarely
practiced.43 Training and exercises were almost exclusively enemy-centric
and focused on conventional, kinetic military tasks. The traditional,
informal character of learning in the Dutch military had prevented the
ideas and concepts of the new doctrines to feed back into the units that
had initially observed these lessons in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the
renewed dominance of enemy-centric thinking and large-scale, kinetic
operations was stimulated by the military’s top brass. This, of course,
was augmented by the reemergence of the Russian threat. As of yet, the
Dutch military again is fully focused on conventional battle.
In the end, therefore, the conclusion has to be drawn that while
a lot has been learned in the field in Afghanistan and an attempt has
been made to institutionalize these lessons, they cannot be considered
learned. At the moment, the Dutch armed forces are caught in a familiar
pattern: the pendulum has fully swung back to enemy-centric thinking
and large-scale kinetic operations, which renders population-centric
concepts and nonkinetic tasks to perceived inferior importance. While
this has occurred more often in Western military history, our times
40      Ministerie van Defensie, “Lessons Identified ISAF” (unpublished internal report, defense
staff, 2011).
41      Koninklijke Landmacht, Doctrinepublicatie 3.2 Landoperaties [Doctrine publication 3.2 land
operations] (Amersfoort, Netherlands: Land Warfare Centre, 2014), v.
42      Accepting NATO doctrine as national doctrine has not been without critique. While the
Dutch were leading the writing of Allied Joint Publication-3.4.4, this doctrine was clearly the result
of a precarious process of international consensus, and therefore, it is not as strong as the American
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency or the Ministry of Defense, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center, 2009).
Although an improved version was published in 2016, the doctrine is still inferior to other state-ofthe-art manuals.
43      Sjoerd de Winter, “The Army after Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Netherlands Defense
Academy, 2015), 47–51.
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require the urgent breaching of this dichotomous pattern of enemycentric and population-centric warfare.44
Modern warfare typically requires the ability to deal with hybrid
threats (state and nonstate alike) through kinetic as well as nonkinetic
actions. Current instability in Africa and the Middle East might lead
to new interventions in order to foster stability. The Dutch military
is exemplary in this regard as it is predominantly training for highend conventional warfare, but all actual deployments concern either
stabilization or counterinsurgency-like missions. Dutch soldiers are
still active in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. The time has come to learn the
lessons from the Afghan Campaign and imprint the population-centric
mindset in the military toolbox so it can be utilized whenever necessary.

44      See also Martijn Kitzen, “Conventional and Unconventional War Are Not Opposites,” War
Room, March 28, 2019.
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ABSTRACT: This article explains the role combat in Afghanistan
played on the evolution of the French Army. With decades of
relative peace since the Algerian War, French soldiers began their
service in Afghanistan with little experience and minimal materiel,
but quickly paid the price for developing into a combat-ready force
that quickly responded when terrorist activity increased in Mali
shortly after the Afghanistan involvement.

T

he French Army experience in Afghanistan is synonymous with
the return of high-intensity fighting in the context of allied
coalitions. Between 2001 and 2014, some 70,000 soldiers were
deployed, creating the first generation of combat-proven soldiers after
the Algerian War. Within 10 years, missions evolved toward more violent
fighting. Between 2002 and 2006, troops stayed in Kabul to stabilize the
capital. Between 2007 and 2009, the force rediscovered counterinsurgency
and counterrebellion. It was a time of intense training and adaptations.
Between 2009 and 2012, France was fully engaged in the war against
the Taliban. President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12) decided to concentrate
military assets in the Sarobi district and the Kapisa province, and French
Task Force La Fayette was created.
Why did France decide to intensify its involvement in Afghanistan?
The major political and diplomatic goal was to make sure France would
keep its influence in the world as a member of the United Nations
Security Council. Keeping its defense capabilities seemed absolutely
essential. According to Sarkozy, France needed to play a more important
role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That
meant paying in blood together with the French allies in Afghanistan.
In the heart of the summer of 2011, the revised strategy changed
the nature of French involvement in the conflict. The responsibility for
counterinsurgency operations was gradually transferred to the Afghan
National Army (ANA), and French forces left Afghanistan on December
31, 2014, enriched by an intense and meaningful combat experience.

Involvement of the French Army

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the first French
naval, ground, and air units were sent to Afghanistan in accordance with
Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty providing for collective defense.
Operation Heracles was the name given to the French contribution to
the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (OEF). After the fall
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of the Taliban and the Bonn Agreement was signed, France joined the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as part of Operation
Pamir. The Afghan army training and its mentoring were part of
Operation Epidote. French special forces contributions to OEF, called
Task Group Ares, were deployed in the Kandahar province. Forces were
withdrawn in December 2006. Instructors were provided for the Afghan
commando school between 2007 and 2011. After two French journalists
were kidnapped and Task Force Lafayette was created, the Jehol unit of
the French special forces went back to Afghanistan until the fighting
forces withdrew. Within 12 years, 20,000 Afghan soldiers were trained
by French instructors thanks to Operation Epidote.
Between 2002 and 2006, the French battalion engaged in Operation
Pamir was based at two forward operations bases, Cazeilles and
Kersauron, in Kabul. During those four years, insecurity grew steadily
as the Taliban’s insurrection was reinforced. Kabul quickly became an
unsafe zone. Thus, the French Army was given the mission to secure the
city and its surroundings, focusing on Kabul airport, the north region
of the city, the police districts 11 and 15, as well as the Shomali plain.1
At the time, French politicians did not allow the French Army
to join full combat around Kabul. Moreover, before the troops were
deployed, combined arms training in France was not particularly
emphasized. In the early years of French involvement in the Afghan
conflict, some observers saw the triumph of the French reach, a kind
of glorified legacy of the colonial age, considering the relative safety of
its area of responsibility. It was an illusion. The French Army fought
very difficult battles from its forward operating bases in the provinces
of Sarobi and Kapisa. Until then, the troops sent to Kabul had been
assigned to different missions.
The years 2006–7 were a real turning point in the French involvement
in the country. In the summer of 2006, the Region Command Capital
was created under NATO’s command. The Sarobi district was integrated
into that new territorial division as a Coalition Joint Operational Area
(CJOA). As a result, each nation in charge of the coalition command sent
a combined unit to Forward Operating Base Tora to control access to
Kabul. As a consequence, French soldiers commanding the combined
battalion wondered whether it would be appropriate to rapidly change,
or reverse, the style of the action being undertaken. Did the level of their
equipment and their training enable them to lead high-intensity fighting
against the Taliban? An answer was clearly given by President Jacques
Chirac in October 2006, when he refused to send reinforcements to
assist Canadian troops trapped in the Helmand province.
From 2007, the French Army became an essential actor of the
international coalition. France was the fourth largest contributor after
the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Little by little, France
shifted from a careful attitude to fully contributing to the war against
1      Anne-Aurore Inquimbert, Geoffroy de Larouziere-Montlosier G (de), Journal de Kaboul (Paris:
Bleu Autour, 2009).
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terrorism and to the counterinsurgency strategy against the Taliban’s
insurrection in the Region Command East area. In the spring of 2007,
French soldiers participated in the first operational mentoring and
liaison team unit. Mentors accompanied their Afghan kandak (battalion)
on missions to finalize their combat training and to provide them with
close support.
In fact, French participation took a different form when Nicolas
Sarkozy was elected in May 2007. During 2008 and 2009, the doctrinal
adaptation process addressing the issue of guerilla warfare accelerated.
During the Bucharest Summit (April 2–4, 2008), Sarkozy announced
the summer deployment of a new combined battalion (700 soldiers) in
Kapisa. France took charge of two strategic areas northeast of Kabul
that were along a major supply route and had been longstanding zones
of Taliban resistance—Sarobi district and the Kapisa province.
A deadly ambush in the Uzbin valley on August 18, 2008, that
killed 10 soldiers prompted the French Army’s to increase the number
of radio-frequency jammers and improve the quality of individual
protective equipment. Training for deployments was increased from four
to six months and included more guidance on countering improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). In January 2009, a counterrebellion doctrine
was published by the Employment Doctrine Center. This document
underscored the basics of counterrebellion fighting. Afterward, the
military commanders in Kapisa and Sarobi launched a series of tactical
experiments. In order to separate the local population from the Taliban,
French colonels tried several different tactics such as “Cloche à fromage”
with Colonel Nicolas le Nen, “counterreaction” with Colonel Francis
Chanson, and “Mikado theory” with Colonel Benoit Durieux. All these
tactics announced, in a way, the first campaign plan of Task Force
Lafayette that was created on November 1, 2009.
As French military troops gathered in Kapisa and Sarobi, the
French Army commitment in Afghanistan moved from the fifth phase,
counterinsurgency, to retreat (2009–12). The tactical situation became
more complex after two French journalists were captured on December
30, 2009. The prisoners were kept in the Alasay valley, which prevented
the French Army from engaging in combat operations in the Taliban’s
sanctuary zone. Before releasing the journalists on June 29, 2011, Taliban
fighters could negotiate for truces or resume fighting on their own terms.
The French brigade’s first campaign plan mainly focused on
“winning the hearts and minds” of the population. Forward operational
bases spread gradually over the area under French command in order
to control and to pacify the territory. Military engineers worked very
efficiently and successfully in the context of Operation Synapse (March
1–7, 2010) to build a combat outpost on the 46th parallel in the Gwan
valley. Operation Promising Star (September 26, 2010–October 5, 2010)
enabled the French to establish a new advanced outpost, the Sherkhel
combat outpost, aimed at controlling Vermont, a main supply route
facing the entrance to the Bedraou valley.
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The NATO conference in Lisbon (November 19–20, 2010) marked
a clear and strategic turning point. As a matter of fact, when the Western
forces set the deadline for the troops to withdrawal by the end of 2014,
they basically gave the rebels a timetable. It unofficially spelled the end
for counterinsurgency operations and little by little, the goals of the
campaign plan for Task Force Lafayette changed. The new objective
became the weakening of the insurgency forces so the ANA could then
take command of the remaining operations. The main supply road had
to stay open too.
The next two commitments of French troops turned out to be
much more aggressive. The nomadic strategy launched by Colonel
Bruno Heluin in the winter of 2010 to 2011 to break the Jangali
stranglehold was a real success. After December 2010, French troops
embarked on long-term operations. The French soldiers set up camp on
the spot and in local houses, cordoning off vast areas and conducting
systematic searches. The results were more than encouraging: weapon
and ammunition caches, which were vital for the Taliban, were found
one by one. The Taliban, at that point, asked for a much-needed truce
to negotiate the release of the kidnapped French journalists, which gave
them the opportunity to reorganize.
Operation Storm Lightning, which coincided with renewed fighting,
enabled the French to secure Vermont and Jangali, much to the delight
of their American allies. In the meantime, French troops went on
crisscrossing the area between Kapisa and Sarobi, creating new combat
and observation posts in the green zone.2 The fourth commitment
of Task Force Lafayette corresponded to the political and military
disruption concerning the nature of the battles the army had to wage in
Afghanistan.3 To keep the positions won during the winter campaign,
heavy fighting was necessary and the whole situation was harder since
American troops had left Kunar. Within three months, one battle group
recorded a toll of 8 dead soldiers and 30 injured men, another suffered
4 fatalities. After an operational break during the summer, operations
resumed until September, when Lieutenant Valéry Tholy of the 17th
Parachute Engineers Regiment was killed. After that, French forces
never returned to the valleys.
Counterinsurgency operations were gradually transferred to the
ANA: concepts of “ANA first,” “ANA led,” and finally “ANA only.”
The ANA was given sole charge of the fighting, the first step to the
French withdrawal. The election of François Hollande as France’s
new president sped up this process, which had been endorsed during
the Chicago Summit (May 20–21, 2012). Task Force Lafayette was
disbanded on November 25, 2012, after the responsibility for Kapisa
and Sarobi was transferred to the Afghan forces.4 The last phase of the
2      Yohann Douady, D’une guerre à l’autre: De la Côte d’Ivoire à l’Afghanistan avec le 2e RIMA (Paris:
Nimrod, 2012).
3      Renaud Senetaire, Les aigles dans la vallée (Paris: Éditions Mélibée, 2013).
4      Gilles Haberey, Combats asymétriques en Afghanistan (Paris: Nuvis, 2014).
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French withdrawal (2012–14) consisted of the logistics transfer, which
was complex and risky.

French Strategies

From a strategic point of view, the three French presidents during
the period of France’s involvement in Afghanistan personified three
very different attitudes. Chirac favored sending only a few troops in
the field and relying on special forces to fulfill his alliance with the
United States in Afghanistan. Sarkozy, supported by General Jean-Louis
Georgelin, army chief of staff (2006–10), opted for an increase of up
to 4,000 more soldiers in the field during 2011. Moreover, he decided
to concentrate military assets in Kapisa and Sarobi. After the battle of
Mobayan on September 7, 2011, during which Tholy was killed, French
troops remained stationed in their forward operating base. After the
fratricide incidents during the winter of 2011–12, Sarkozy decided to
speed up the withdrawal of French troops.5 Hollande gave deadlines for
the French combat troops to withdraw by December 31, 2012, and the
remaining French soldiers to leave Kabul by December 31, 2014.
Why did France decide to intensify its involvement in Afghanistan
during 2007? As stated, the major political and diplomatic goal was to
make sure France would keep its global influence as a member of the
UN Security Council. Whatever battle plans are made to win, or not to
lose, they have to yield before political decisions that might pursue other
objectives, other priorities, and other goals. National policies can always
impose new decisions and change battle plans.
This issue was worsened by the fact that the Taliban used a strategy
designed to influence Western public opinion to force foreign forces to
withdraw. This weak spot was particularly well identified by France’s
opponents. When the Taliban hit France hard on the eve of the French
national day on July 13, 2011, it managed to deal a tremendous blow to
French resolve—not the resolve of the troops in the field, of course—
but the resolve of the politicians who happened to have another agenda.
The French withdrawal also questioned the coalition’s global strategy
and its ability to rely on realistic, concrete political goals which needed
to be limited in time. Adding up tactical successes is not synonymous
with complete victory. The French Army did not win in Algeria with
its countersubversive strategy. Neither did the new counterinsurrection
process in 2007 enable France to enjoy an overwhelming victory in
Afghanistan. That conflict emphasized the helplessness of modern
democracies when confronted with irregular warfare in the 21st century.
These lessons are yet to be learned.

Transforming the French Army

The French Army’s involvement in Afghanistan was accompanied
by a deep transformation of its capacities. At that time, this army was a
5      Audrey Ferraro, Trahison sanglante en Afghanistan: 20 janvier 2012, massacre de militaires français à
Gwan (Paris: Publibook, 2015).
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young professional one. It improved its performances in Afghanistan, in
terms of leading a counterinsurgency strategy, making a quick, doctrinal
adaptation process, adopting appropriate organization with a combined
joint coalition in the battlefield, facing fire experience, maintenance
(soldiers, materials), fast procurement process for new equipment,
training and mentoring a foreign national army, counter-IED processes,
combat first aid, live-fire combat training, training process in general,
individual and collective physical preparedness for a challenging military
operation, and a “way back home” process for soldiers.
The French Army equipment was renewed and extensively proven
under combat conditions—for example: individual equipment for the
soldiers (helmets, elbow supports, knee braces, bulletproof vests, combat
kits, digital transmissions, and Fantassin à Equipments et Liaisons Intégrés
[FELIN] future infantry soldier system equipment), the new French air
force and naval air force combat aircraft (Dassault Rafale and Rafale M
update for the navy), the deployment of the French carrier battle group
(Charles de Gaulle carrier), precision artillery pieces (CAESAR 155-mm
howitzers installed on 6x6 truck chassis), the Tiger multirole helicopter,
vehicles such as the Véhicule Blindé de Combat d’Infanterie [VBCI] armored
infantry combat vehicle with two turret-operated 30mm cannons,
unarmed drones, and route clearance equipment and search unit.
The French Army had not participated in such a large allied military
operation since the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), but underwent drastic
change in Afghanistan. A fast procurement process for new equipment
allowed the French Army to fill its capacity gaps. From 2008 to 2013,
a budget of €580 million was dedicated to this capability at the risk of
creating isolated groups of equipment difficult to maintain in complete
operational condition.
The French Army had thus shown its value to its allies: faced with
a combative, unpredictable, and determined adversary, it rediscovered
the culture and the fundamentals of combat. Psychological operations
were back in the French Army doctrine. Colonel Roger Trinquier had
practiced “hearts and mind” theory, a well-known part of the French
countersubversive strategy, during the Algerian War.6 On the terrain,
the balance of this doctrine was mixed. The competition between two
radio stations supported by the French Army illustrated this impasse.
Sarobi radio sought to “free hearts and minds” by broadcasting poems
and newscasts written by local villagers and OMID radio only broadcast
the French brigade’s messages. The impact of these two radio stations
on people’s perceptions was limited. The French commitment in
Afghanistan promoted joint cooperation from the top to the bottom of
the alliance, from general to lieutenant, which was an asset for France’s
next commitment in Sahel.

6      Roger Trinquier, La Guerre moderne (Paris: Economica, 2009).
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Train as You Fight and Fight as You Train

After the deadly ambush in the Uzbin valley, the French Army
established a streamlined, systematized, and hardened training cycle
for troops going to Afghanistan. Soldiers spent a year training for,
and fighting in, Afghanistan. The training consisted of a two-month
individual training phase and a three-month collective training phase.
The most important and useful exercises in this training included
survivability in combat, joint counter-IED process, live-fire exercises,
operational English, physical conditioning, and improving attitudes and
coordination in combat situations.
In 2009, the French Army had created an operational instruction
unit detachment that attached to the 1st African Armored Infantry
Regiment in Canjuers. They bought an entire forward operating base
specifically for instructional use. Soldiers lived and behaved as if they
were in Afghanistan. This idea matched perfectly with the famous saying:
“Train as your fight, fight as your train.” Soldiers on the evaluation team
had recently returned from Afghanistan and shared the lessons they had
learned with the soldiers preparing to deploy. The French Army assessed
each unit to confirm it was qualified to perform specific combat-related
tasks. After arriving in Afghanistan, the unit had to perform an ISAF
validation course and a counter-IED trail.
While training in France for high-intensity fighting, a commander
had a lot of available firepower—jets, tanks, artillery, missiles, drones,
combat helicopters, machine guns, and mortars. Naturally, temptations
to use this firepower when troops were in contact with the Taliban
developed. In counterinsurgency situations, however, this option was not
always appropriate. Winning hearts and minds meant not killing them,
or destroying their goods, or damaging cultivated fields. The French
soldiers were ready for high-intensity fighting, but not necessarily for
complex counterinsurgency operations. The devil is in the details. Then
Colonel Benoit Durieux caused the bewilderment of his legionnaires
when he chose once or twice to avoid fighting with the Taliban to gain the
support of the population of Sarobi in 2009. In late November 2010, this
bewilderment was reduced when the road map of Task Force Lafayette
changed. After that, looking for and destroying the Taliban and keeping
the main supply road open, were the French Army’s main goals.
The commitment of the French Army in Afghanistan revealed
deficiencies in its equipment and its state of modernization. The army
deployed its most modern equipment in Afghanistan to the detriment of
the units remaining in the homeland. In France, a quick reaction force
that was ready to respond to international crises and soldiers in training
had to make do with used equipment. There was a shortage of night
scopes, machine guns, modern bulletproof vests, and modern armored
combat vehicles. Each brigade in France was forced to give a portion of
its own modern equipment to Task Force Lafayette in Afghanistan. In
January 2013, during Operation Serval, the French Army started the war
against terrorists in Mali with used equipment. Fortunately, the French
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Army was still effective. Step-by-step, units were equipped with modern
weapons as the withdrawal from Afghanistan continued.

The Return of the Counterguerilla Warfare

French commanders rediscovered the importance of surprise
and taking the initiative when facing an enemy that operated among
the people and knew the terrain perfectly. The Taliban used hugging
tactics to neutralize close air support opportunities, which caused heavy
population losses. That is why movement and firepower were essentials
to defeat an opponent accustomed to infantry combat. Fire discipline,
which is acquired through long training and combat experience, was an
important key for success. Any effective targeted strike required positive
identification of the enemy while it was firing. Massive retaliation would
only cause a high human casualty toll. The action of the French foreign
legion’s 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment was exemplary in Afghanistan
as part of Task Force Altor in 2010.
The nature of combat also pointed out the importance of heavy
weapons in infantry units and in combat support units to face
counterguerilla warfare. French soldiers had to deal with stress.
When the troops were in contact, the battle could last many hours.
In contrast to the Indochina or Algerian Wars, the night belonged to
the French soldiers not the Taliban. This benefit came from soldiers’
night vision scopes and observation capabilities delivered by Persistent
Ground Surveillance Systems. French soldiers tracked Taliban logistic
movement with multiple cameras. The Taliban avoided night combat
because they could not take advantage of their surveillance system based
on the local population. Mountain troops were also important because
of the geography of the country and of the fighting occurring during
very cold winters and very hot summers. Helicopters once again proved
their importance in counterguerrilla warfare. But French resources were
no longer those of the Algerian War. The French helicopter battalion
spent 7 percent of its operational flight time on airmobile operations,
49 percent of this time on tactical transport and 30 percent on VIP
transport.7 To plan major operations, Task Force Lafayette had to request
support from coalition helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook.

Military Operations with Political Constraints

Throughout France’s involvement in Afghanistan, its army and
operational planning faced strong political constraints. Sarkozy
limited the French commitment to 3,500 troops in 2008, without
distinguishing between combat personnel and support. In 2011, the
total number of military personnel reached 4,421. This political limit
weighed heavily upon the conduct of French military operations. This
limit forced high operational tempo, often putting soldiers at risk. It
was sometimes difficult to find sufficient staff to carry out operations.
7      Olivier Fort, Afghanistan : les enseignements de l’opération Pamir (Paris: Centre de doctrine et
d’emploi des forces, 2015), 107.
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The French brigade was conducting its main actions in specific areas,
while other areas remained in the hands of the Taliban. Global action
was impossible. With the building of combat outposts all along the main
supply road, many soldiers were posted to watch “the green zone.” The
French brigade lost its tactical maneuver capability. During the summer
of 2011, the US Army provided a route clearance package detachment
to the French battle group for a few months to ensure roads were not
mined with IEDs.
Finally, six-month commitments were insufficient to conduct
effective counterinsurgency operations. It was difficult to connect
with people and to build trust. French soldiers were seen as occupation
troops waging war on villages. We can say Georgelin won his bet.
After the Afghanistan commitment, the French Army was no longer a
vassal army in the NATO organization. It was able to conduct complex
operations alone, including first entry in conflict zones. The price paid
by the French Army was high: 89 dead, 700 wounded, and many soldiers
with post-traumatic stress disorder.

Lessons Learned

The French Army learned a lot in Afghanistan. Confronted with an
adversary who was accustomed to his country, to using guerilla warfare,
and to adapting swiftly, the French Army rediscovered counterrebellion
techniques and doctrine. According to Professor Jean-Charles Jauffret:
“Almost every French infantry military unit took part in the Afghanistan
campaign, being sent overseas between one and three times each, namely
a total of a bit more than 60,000 soldiers.”8 French soldiers contributed in
the allied fight against Taliban, paying in blood together with their allies.
The French Army took on a new stature with Afghanistan involvement
amongst its allies too. We can say benefits from this war were probably
reaped in Mali. At that time, the French Army was a formidable weapon
developing an accurate fighting experience.
But the combat experience seems now to disappear. Since 2014,
many war veterans have left the French Army. The men and women who
had deployed to Afghanistan quit the institution. In a French engineer
company deployed in Sarobi in 2011, for example, 15 percent of veterans
left the unit less than a year later. Meanwhile, funding remains low.
Equipment is difficult to maintain in complete operational condition.
Important Buffalo mine protected clearance vehicles and mine-resistant,
ambush-protected vehicles are being lost. Spare parts are missing and
no longer available in the US supply chain. Hence, the French Army
must once again renew its combat equipment. Meanwhile, soldiers have
less time to train. They are involved in intense foreign deployments
and homeland security missions. Combined arms training is difficult to
plan. The lessons learned in Afghanistan are not guaranteed. The future
remains uncertain.
8      Jean-Charles Jauffret, La guerre inachevée: Afghanistan, 2001–2013 (Paris: Autrement, 2013), 205.
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Matthew Ridgway and
the Battle of the Bulge
Conrad C. Crane

O

ne of the richest collections at the Army Heritage and Education
Center is that of Matthew B. Ridgway, who served with
distinction in World War II as a division and corps commander,
in Korea as an army and theater commander, and eventually as chief
of staff of the Army. He was in the habit of writing a memorandum
for his personal diary every day describing key events. Furnished here
are excerpts from his war diary during the Battle of the Bulge, when he
commanded the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. Events were moving so fast
for him that he had to consolidate his entries for the first few days. But
he still took time to create longer entries for key decisions. His account
provides a rich picture of the decisions a senior leader may face in largescale combat operations.
Ridgway rarely gets proper credit for his role in the Bulge. As
described in his diary, his corps, in the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force strategic reserve in the United Kingdom, was
alerted on December 17, 1944, for movement to the continent. He
soon detached his 101st Airborne Division to VIIIth Corps to defend
Bastogne, while retaining the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by
MG James M. Gavin, to bolster the defense of the north shoulder of
the enemy penetration under control of First US Army. He was also
eventually given command of all (or elements) of the 30th and 84th
Infantry Divisions and three armored divisions, along with the shattered
remnants of the 106th Infantry Division, a total force more the size of
an army than a corps.
One of Ridgway’s key early decisions was to abandon, finally, the
key town of St. Vith, heroically defended by the 7th Armored Division.
That thorn in the German side had significantly slowed their advance
and helped channel their drive west instead of north. Ridgway included
in his diary letters from BG Robert “Bob” Hasbrouck, commander of
the 7th, and records of conversations with MG William Kean, chief of
staff of First Army. Ridgway wrestled with many problems. He had to
quickly absorb the new units into his corps and create relationships with
their commanders. He had to figure out what to do with MG Alan Jones,
who had two of his regiments surrender and had only parts of his 106th
division left, but technically outranked Hasbrouck in St. Vith. (Ridgway
eventually moved Jones up to be his deputy.) As the battle over the town
continued, there was a major reorganization of Allied forces, as Field
Marshall Bernard Montgomery of the 21st Army Group took overall
command of all forces on the north side of the Bulge, another new
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personality for Ridgway to deal with. And German pressure on the key
bottleneck increased. Hasbrouck’s letters describe his situation clearly,
and Ridgway’s recounting of his conversation with Kean show how the
corps commander viewed his options and responsibilities for the troops
in the town. He also considered the ramifications of heavy bombing
of Belgian towns through cloud cover to possibly support St. Vith, an
option deemed unacceptable at the time. Ridgway had to balance the
needs of the defense with the welfare of the soldiers involved. When
withdrawal was finally authorized, it was a near-run thing, with many
casualties, among retreating infantry of BG Bruce Clarke’s combat
command especially. Hasbrouck and Clarke thought Ridgway should
have authorized the withdrawal sooner. But most of the division was
saved, and resistance against the German advance was maintained.
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Notified to move early on December 18, 1944, Ridgway initially
deployed to Bastogne along with his 101st Airborne. Ordered to
reorganize his corps and report to First US Army Headquarters (FUSA
HQ) for orders, he had to maneuver around German units to escape.
By the time he arrived at FUSA HQ, he had already developed a plan of
action for his new command.
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Called to FUSA HQ on the morning of December 20, 1944,
Ridgway received new orders and new units. He arranged a face-to-face
meeting with all his division commanders that afternoon, and issued
oral instructions for the next 24 hours of operations.
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Ridgway’s initial concept of his corps operation.
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On December 21, 1944, Ridgway was faced with the crisis at St. Vith,
the key position restricting the German advance in the early part of the
battle. BG Hasbrouck’s letter is clear describing the situation of his 7th
Armored Division, as well as that of other units there. Particularly vexing
is what to do with MG Alan Jones, of the shattered 106th Division.
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Map by Pete McPhail
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After assessing the options in St. Vith, Ridgway called the chief
of staff of FUSA. This memorandum presents Ridgway’s view of that
conversation. His description of the critical situation and plea for air
support included a discussion of the strategic implications of heavy
bombing of Belgian towns. Ridgway eventually received permission
to withdraw from St. Vith. The air attacks he desired were eventually
executed a few days later in clear weather.
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Even after pulling out of St. Vith, Hasbrouck’s situation remained
dire. Ridgway received this letter asking for permission to withdraw
further at 1150 on December 22, 1944.
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Within 35 minutes, Ridgway sent orders acceding to Hasbrouck’s
request. They were submitted through MG Alan Jones, who was
technically the senior officer on the scene. Eventually Ridgway would
pull him back to serve as the corps deputy. Early in the afternoon,
FUSA, with the approval of their new Army Group Commander,
approved pulling the battered division off the line and into corps reserve.
Montgomery was up at the front to see the situation for himself.
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“Slap Heard around the World”:
George Patton and Shell Shock
Alexander G. Lovelace
©2019 Alexander G. Lovelace

ABSTRACT: This article addresses the motives behind General
George Patton slapping two soldiers in Army field hospitals during
the Sicily campaign. With a more comprehensive understanding of
the evolution of mental health conditions associated with combat
trauma, the complexities of battlefield leadership become clearer.

O

n a hot August day in 1943 along the northern Sicilian coast,
Lieutenant General George Patton slapped a soldier. Arriving
at the 15th Evacuation Hospital for an inspection, the general
moved along the ward. There he met “the only arrant coward” Patton
claimed to have seen in his army “sitting, trying to look as if he had been
wounded.” When Patton asked about his injury the soldier replied he
“just couldn’t take it.” As one of the doctors remembered, “The General
immediately flared up, cursed the soldier, called him all types of a coward,
then slapped him across the face with his gloves, and finally grabbed the
soldier by the scruff of his neck and kicked him out of the tent.”1 A week
later, Patton repeated the scene at the 93rd Evacuation Hospital (also in
Sicily) where he slapped another seemingly uninjured private.2
These episodes, collectively known as the slapping incidents, are
among the most well-known facts about Patton’s career. Yet little is
known about what Patton actually knew about shell shock. Most of his
contemporaries, and subsequent historians, simply claim the general did
not believe it existed. Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, wrote Patton
“sincerely believed that there was no such thing as true ‘battle fatigue’ or
‘battle neurosis.’ ”3 And in General Omar N. Bradley’s opinion, Patton
“could not believe that men could break under an intense mental strain
as a result of [the] hardships endured in war.”4 Patton’s daughter, Ruth
Ellen Patton Totten, agreed her father “honestly did not believe in battle
fatigue,” while his nephew Fred Ayer Jr. claimed throughout Patton’s

The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Spector, Professor Ingo Trauschweizer, and Major
Jeffrey Mills (US Army) as well as the peer reviewers who assisted in the development of this article
      1      Diary, August 3, 1943, box 3, George S. Patton Papers (GSPP), Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Bess to Eisenhower, August 19, 1943, Report, box 91, PrePresidential, 1916–52, Principal File (PPPF), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Kansas; and Long
to the Surgeon NATOUSA, “Mistreatment of Patients in Receiving Tents of the 15th and 93rd
Evacuation Hospital,” August 16, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
2      Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940–1945 (Boston: Da Capo, 1974), 331.
3      Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1949),
179–80.
4      Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Modern Library, 1951), 162.
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“career he wrote, and told to all who would listen, that there was no
excuse for what was once called ‘shell-shock.’ ”5
Scholars have generally agreed. Two prominent examples include
historian Carlo D’Este, who wrote that Patton “believed that there
was no such thing as ‘combat fatigue,’ and those who claimed to suffer
from it were there only to shirk combat duty,” and historian Dennis
Showalter, who noted Patton believed “battle fatigue was a euphemism
for cowardice.”6 The 1970 movie Patton gave voice to this opinion when
the general says “there will be no battle fatigue in my command . . .
Battle fatigue is a free ride . . . I am not going to subsidize cowardice.” 7
Nevertheless, a search of the general’s extensive diaries,
correspondence, and writings cannot produce a single reliable statement
from Patton claiming shell shock was not an authentic medical
condition. Instead, a more complicated understanding of shell shock
emerges. Between the two slapping incidents, Patton encountered other
soldiers whom he acknowledged were suffering from shell shock. The
reason for the different reactions was Patton’s adherence to an older
definition of shell shock from his experience in World War I that
viewed total immobilization as the only acceptable symptom requiring
hospitalization. Any lesser attack of nerves was normal fear and should
be dealt with at the unit level. As Patton wrote after the war,
The greatest weapon against the so-called battle fatigue is ridicule. If soldiers
would realize that a large proportion of men allegedly suffering from battle
fatigue are really using an easy way out, they would be less sympathetic.
Any man who says he has battle fatigue is avoiding danger and forcing on
those who have more hardihood than himself the obligation of meeting
it. If soldiers would make fun of those who begin to show battle fatigue,
they would prevent its spread, and also save the man who allows himself to
malinger by this means from an afterlife of humiliation and regret.8

If a soldier were able to communicate, Patton did not believe the
stage for hospitalization had yet been reached. Though he understood
the strain battle put on the human psyche, he also knew it was the
commander’s job to maintain fighting strength. Victory, not to mention
shorter casualty lists, depended on keeping soldiers at the front. Likewise,
Patton’s actions were probably sparked by reports of troops malingering
in hospitals immediately before the slapping incidents.9 It is therefore
more likely Patton did not strike the two soldiers because he thought
they were shell-shocked, but rather because he believed they were using
the hospitals to escape the front.
5      Ruth Ellen Totten (lecture, Topsfield Historical Society, 1974), quoted in George Forty, Patton’s
Third Army At War (London: Arms and Armour, 1978), 62; and Fred Ayer Jr., Before the Colors Fade: A
Portrait of a Soldier George S. Patton Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 136.
6      Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 534; and Dennis
Showalter, Patton and Rommel, Men of War in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berkley Caliber,
2005), 314.
7      Patton, directed by Franklin J. Schaffner (1970; Twentieth Century Fox).
8      George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It (New York: Bantam Books, 1947), 322.
9      Jack Kneece, “A Soldier’s Story Takes,” Washington Star, n.d., folder 19, box 23, GSPP.
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What one general thought about shell shock may appear of little
importance in the wider events of World War II. Yet it parallels other
important issues of command and for the armed forces. This scandal
demonstrates how military needs and changing medical knowledge
can clash. Though the maladies are very different, past discussions of
shell shock resemble today’s issues arising from post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Both are complicated psychological problems that sap
the Army’s strength. The definitions of both conditions also expanded
during war.
Patton’s understanding of shell shock was shared by much of
the US Army’s leadership during the period. Patton and many of his
contemporaries saw shell shock in black and white terms. If a soldier were
truly shell-shocked, he lost control of his actions. Anything less than this
was cowardice, normal fear, or fatigue that could be corrected outside a
hospital to keep soldiers at the front, preventing greater casualties and
lost battles. For this reason, many generals determined they could not
be too harsh on hospitalized soldiers. Patton was unique in his actions,
not his opinions.
Any revisionism of such a controversial incident runs the risk of
appearing to defend Patton’s behavior. However, this article suggests
Patton’s motives were shared by his peers who held similar views of
shell shock that have often been overlooked by historians. By examining
Patton’s writings, his belief in the existence of shell shock becomes evident
and his actions as deliberate attempts to end malingering become clear.
Though this paper can only briefly touch on shell shock, a short history
of the changes surrounding it provides context for Patton’s actions.
Shell shock was first diagnosed during World War I and was associated
with symptoms such as blindness, paralysis, and problems with hearing,
speech, and memory.10 Yet well before World War II, the term, and the
theory that it was caused by concussion, had fallen out of medical use
and been replaced with psychoneurosis. The term shell shock, however,
remained in popular use. By the beginning of World War II, one study
characterized shell shock as consisting of emotional problems, cognitive
disorders, physical complaints, and manifestations of hysteria.11 Another
leading study, likely read by Patton, listed the basic symptoms as hysteria,
neurasthenia, and “graver temporary ‘mental’ disorder.”12
Psycholog y for the Fighting Man, referred to shell shock as “war neuroses”
and listed the symptoms as blindness, loss of control in limbs, loss of
memory “and everything connected with his [the soldier’s] identity.”13 As
historian Hans Binneveld observed, the symptoms had not significantly
changed between the two World Wars, but the willingness of soldiers
10      Hans Binneveld, From Shell Shock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of Military Psychiatry,
trans. John O’Kane (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997), 85.
11      Binneveld, Shell Shock to Combat Stress, 94.
12      Charles S. Myers, Shell Shock in France, 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1940), 25.
13      Edwin G. Boring, Psychology for the Fighting Man (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1943), 319.
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to admit fear and anxiety was much more common in the Second.14
Terminology evolved from “combat exhaustion” or “battle fatigue” to
the point that the US Army in the Mediterranean initially assigned all
psychiatric cases with the category of “exhaustion.”15 Thus, by the time
of the slapping incidents, all patients with psychological problems were
labeled with exhaustion and associated with shell shock even when they
did not have disabling symptoms. Thus, the tacitly expanded definition
of shell shock was unfamiliar to officers, such as Patton, and soldiers,
including those with less severe psychological ailments.
Patton recalled his first painful experience with shell shock while
defending his actions in 1943. During World War I, one of his friends
had broken down under the strain of combat “in an exactly analogous
manner” with those of the two soldiers he struck in Sicily. “Both my
friend,” Patton claimed later, “and the medical men with whom I
discussed his case assured me that had he been roughly checked at the
time of his first misbehavior, he would have been restored to a normal
state.”16 It has not been possible to determine if the story was true, or if
Patton was simply attempting to defend himself. But the insight helps
explain his actions in the field hospitals in Sicily.
Languishing in the interwar Army, Patton dedicated considerable
time to reading and writing about warfare. In 1927, he published
“Why Men Fight.” The essay did not mention shell shock, but it did
discuss why soldiers avoided combat.17 Though he admitted skulking
could be the result of “nervous collapse caused by fatigue,” Patton
made no differentiation between this reason and others for avoiding
the battlefield. Nor did he make any distinction when reasoning the
execution of skulkers was not for the crime of avoiding combat out of
mere fear “but for [the] betrayal of [one’s] comrades.” Patton believed
if small unit officers and noncommissioned officers took appropriate
measures, referred to as “battle discipline,” skulking would be drastically
reduced.18 But he noted few leaders had the courage to use them.19
Patton also expressed an interest in shell shock. On March 19, 1941,
he wrote to the Infantry Journal requesting to purchase Shell Shock in France
1914–1918 by Charles S. Myers, which was a detailed medical study of
shell shock during World War I.20 Though it is unknown if Patton ever
read the book, Myers made several recommendations consistent with
Patton’s actions in Sicily.21 In a section on malingering, Myers wrote on
rare occasions malingerers would pretend to be shell-shocked, adding
14      Binneveld, Shell Shock to Combat Stress, 94.
15      Calvin S. Drayer and Albert J. Glass, “Introduction,” Neuropsychiatry in World War II, vol. 2,
ed. William S. Mullins and Albert J. Glass (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 9–10.
16      Patton to Eisenhower, letter, August 29, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
17      George S. Patton Jr., “Why Men Fight,” Patton Society, accessed July 1, 2019.
18      Patton, War as I Knew It, 382.
19      Patton, “Why Men Fight.”
20      George S. Patton Jr. to Infantry Journal, letter, March 19, 1941, folder 5, box 26, GSPP.
21      Patton was a confirmed scribbler in his vast military library, bequeathed to the Military
Academy Library at West Point. But Shell Shock in France was not donated. Elaine McConnell
(librarian, United States Military Academy Library), email message to author, February 11, 2013.
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sometimes the attempts were subconscious and could be avoided by
keeping suspected malingerers separate from other patients.22 Myers also
stated, “The infliction of pain [to shell-shocked patients] is only justifiable
in cases of long-standing neglect or of suspected malingering.”23 Patton
demanded the two soldiers in Sicily be immediately removed from the
hospitals after he used physical force. If nothing else, Patton’s interest
in Myers’s book suggests he acknowledged some form of shell shock
did exist.
As in 1918, Patton had few qualms about inflicting physical force to
motivate his soldiers. On November 9, 1942, Patton landed on a beach
outside Casablanca while commanding part of the Allied invasion of
North Africa. The scene was chaotic, and the general went about trying
to restore order. He wrote in his diary, “One soldier, who was pushing
a boat, got scared and ran onto the beach and assumed the Fields [sic]
position (pre-natal) and jabbered. I kicked him in the fanny with all my
might and he jumped right to and went to work. Some way to boost
morale.” Patton then “hit another man who was too lazy to push a
boat.”24 Since everyone on the beach was under fire, nobody thought to
question Patton’s actions. As his friend Major General Everett S. Hughes
reflected, Patton “had to boot men off the beach at Casablanca to get
them into the fight . . . He gets a [Distinguished Service Cross] for one
type of slapping or booting and jumped on for slapping them in the
hospital.”25 This irony was not lost on Patton.
As the commander of the Seventh Army in Sicily, Patton continued
to exert heavy pressure on his soldiers. The route along the northern
coast toward Messina was dominated by steep hills and narrow roads cut
into sheer cliffs. This terrain provided an excellent defensive position
for the Germans, who simply needed to destroy roads along the cliffs
to slow the American advance. Patton’s answer to this was to keep up
the pressure against the retreating enemy so they could not regroup or
complete demolitions.26 Competing with British General Bernard Law
Montgomery was another factor in Patton’s haste. As Patton wrote the
45th Division commander, “This is a horse race in which the prestige
of the US Army is at stake. We must take Messina before the British.”27
The relentless advance began to wear out the Seventh Army. Donald
V. Bennett, an artillery officer fighting in the 3rd Infantry Division,
recalled, “A significant number of men were wandering around behind
the lines, dodging MPs, and, when caught, claiming they were either
lost or their nerves had ‘cracked.’ ”28 A few days before the first slapping
22      Myers, Shell Shock in France, 40–41, 51.
23      Myers, Shell Shock in France, 59.
24      [Patton] diary, November 9, 1942, box 2, GSPP.
25      Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, letter, August 17, 1943, box II 2, Everett Strait Hughes
Papers (ESHP), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
26      [Patton] diary, appendix 48, July 18, 1943, box 2, GSPP.
27      Patton to Troy H. Middleton, letter, July 28, 1943, Patton Papers, quoted in Carlo D’Este,
Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, July–August 1943 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 449.
28      Donald V. Bennett, Honor Untarnished: A West Point Graduate’s Memoir of World War II, with
William R. Forstchen (New York: Forge, 2003), 148.
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incident, Patton asked Major General Clarence R. Huebner how the 1st
Infantry Division was doing. Huebner replied the front line was getting
thinner, and, along with many legitimate casualties being treated at
field hospitals, there were some malingers from combat. “Well, as luck
would have it,” Huebner remembered years later, Patton decided to do
something about the problem.29
Early on August 3, 1943, Private Charles H. Kuhl was admitted
to the 15th Evacuation Hospital and received his third diagnosis of
exhaustion (fear): “He entered the hospital because of nervousness and
fear of noise from artillery; that he would work anywhere but could
not stand the front because it made his nerves raw”; he had no other
symptoms.30 At 12:15 p.m., the command car roared up to the hospital
and Patton hopped out. The hospital’s commander, Colonel F. Y. Leaver,
remembered showing Patton the patients: “He praised each . . . casualty
by shaking his hand or patting his head and telling him what a fine job
he had done in the war effort.”31 Then Patton came to Private Kuhl who
explained he “just couldn’t take it.” Patton wrote, “I gave him the devil,
slapped his face with my gloves and kicked him out of the hospital.
Companies should deal with such men and if they shirk their duty they
should be tried for cowardice and shot.”32 General John P. Lucas, who
was with Patton, remembered Kuhl explained he “wasn’t hurt, he was
nervous, and added that he had been to the front three times but couldn’t
stay there.” Lucas saw nothing unusual about Patton’s response.33 After
Kuhl’s forced departure, Patton calmly continued with the inspection.
As he was leaving, Patton praised the hospital and Leaver for the care
the wounded were receiving but added “a great many of those patients
that just ‘couldn’t take it’ were nothing more than cowards.”34 Kuhl was
later diagnosed with malarial fever and diarrhea.35
Two days later, Patton issued the following order:
It has come to my attention that a very small number of soldiers are going
to the hospital on the pretext that they are nervously incapable of combat.
Such men are cowards, and bring discredit on the Army and disgrace to their
comrades whom they heartlessly leave to endure the danger of battle while
they themselves use the hospital as a means of escaping.
You will take measures to see that such cases are not sent to the hospital, but
are dealt with in their units.
Those who are not willing to fight will be tried by Court Martial for
cowardice in the face of the enemy.36
29      Jack Kneece, “A Soldier’s Story Takes,” Washington Star, n.d., folder 19, box 23, GSPP.
30      “Exhibit ‘B’, ” September 14, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
31      F. Y. Leaver to Richard T. Arnest, letter, August 4, 1943, box 94, PPPF.
32      [Patton] Diary, August 3, 1943.
33      Diary, August 3, 1943, box 14, John P. Lucas Papers, US Army Heritage and Education
Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
34      Leaver to Arnest, August 4, 1943.
35      “Exhibit ‘B.’ ”
36      Patton to Corps, Division, and Separate Brigade Commanders, “Memorandum,” August 5,
1943, box 91, folder Patton, George S., Jr. (4), PPPF.
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It should be observed neither in his departing comment to Leaver
or in the above order did Patton imply all soldiers suffering from shell
shock were cowards. He used the phrase “great many” as opposed to
“all” when warning Leaver about soldiers faking shell shock symptoms.
Likewise, the above order only refers to a “very small number of soldiers,”
even though shell shock was common in the Sicilian campaign.
Another important observation is Patton never claimed, either
at the field hospital or in his diary, shell shock was synonymous with
cowardice. At the time of his visit, nobody knew Kuhl had malaria and
his record of two previous stays seemed to suggest he was using the
hospital to escape the front. Likewise, Patton’s order did not mention
shell shock by any of its many names and simply stated being nervous
did not constitute a legitimate excuse for hospitalization.
The problem of soldiers using hospitals to escape the front, as
Patton surely knew, already had a well-documented history. Helping
wounded comrades to the rear or faking illnesses—favored methods
of malingerers during the American Civil War—eventually developed
such a stigma of cowardice that even genuinely sick soldiers would insist
on going into battle.37
During World War I, shell shock victims were so often assumed
to be malingerers the French military manual on the subject, The
Psychoneuroses of War, spent considerable space explaining the difference
between malingering and shell shock. Malingering was a “voluntary,
conscious act, willed and reasoned, an act which is intended to mislead
and deceive. . . . It is difficult for the malingerer to display a complete
imitation of a series of neuropathic manifestations such as contractures,
tremors, spasms, and certain affections of the gait.” The malingerer
often exaggerated the symptoms, and a few hours of observation were
usually enough for the malingerer to reveal himself.38
The US Army during World War II was not immune from this
problem. As historian Martin van Creveld explained, the Army took an
“extremely permissive attitude” toward shell shock that was
communicated to the troops by semiofficial channels and caused combat
fatigue to be regarded as a legitimate, almost normal complaint. While
preventing the army from applying the somewhat harsh methods of
treatment used by German physicians, this attitude also built golden bridges
for men who wanted to escape combat. There even exists evidence that, for
some soldiers at any rate, going AWOL, deserting and requesting evacuation
on psychiatric grounds constituted alternative courses of action.39

His knowledge of history, combined with Huebner’s report, likely
strengthened Patton’s idea to watch for skulkers in the hospitals. The
37      James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 8, 79.
38     Gustave Roussy and Jean Lhermitte, The Psychoneuroses of War, trans. Wilfred B. Christopherson
(London, University of London Press, 1918), xxxi–xxxv.
39      Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport,
CT: Greenwood, 1982), 96–97.
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damage from shell shock to army strength during World War II could
often be permanent. Only five percent of psychiatric cases in the North
African campaign were returned to their units. Such a high attrition rate
forced the military to reevaluate its treatment of the condition.
Captain Frederick Hanson advocated that most shell shock came
from fatigue and that it should be treated with a short rest involving
good food and sleep.40 The result was a dramatic rise in the number of
soldiers returned to their units.41 Over time, these numbers continued to
improve, and in the campaigns in France and Germany, 90 out of every
100 exhaustion casualties were rehabilitated to some form of military
duty.42 Overall, an estimated 60 percent of shell shock casualties were
returned to combat during the war.43 Of the remainder, a large number
were reassigned to noncombatant jobs. Nevertheless, nearly a million
American servicemen received psychiatric treatment during World War
II.44 Creveld observes this number constituted 8.9 percent of those
who served in the Army during World War II and 43 million days of
service were lost. He adds the number of psychological casualties was
“about equal to that of all battle and non-battle wounds combined and
exceeded the number of those killed by a factor of about three to one.
At one time, indeed, more men were being discharged from the army
for psychiatric reasons than were added by induction.”45 Though the US
Army eventually rose to the problem, shell shock was still a major drain
on manpower.
The problem of treating shell-shocked soldiers was especially
complicated during the Sicilian campaign. The speed of the advance
caused many shell shock casualties to be evacuated directly to North
Africa instead of being treated closer to the front, which significantly
decreased their chances of recovery. Apart from the distance and the
reality of longer treatment often causing symptoms to worsen, it is also
possible some doctors purposefully delayed returning GI’s to combat.
“Having heard the soldier’s tales of battle,” historian Ben Shephard
observed, “they seldom had the heart to send him back to it.” The result
was that out of the Sicilian campaign, only 39 percent of neuropsychiatric
cases were returned to combat.46
The American high command was well aware of the problem of
separating malingerers from legitimate psychoneurotic cases. Writing
40      Hans Pols, “The Tunisian Campaign, War Neuroses, and the Reorientation of American
Psychiatry during World War II,” Harvard Review of Psychiatry 19, no. 6 (November/December 2011):
316.
41      Drayer and Glass, “Introduction,” 9, 10.
42      Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the
Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 330.
43      Creveld, Fighting Power, 95, 96.
44      Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (London: Michael Joseph, 1984),
246.
45      Creveld, Fighting Power, 95.
46      Drayer and Glass, “Introduction,” 13, 8; Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and
Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 219; and Charles
M. Wiltse, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, 1965), 171–72.
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an unsent memorandum a few weeks after the slapping incident became
public, former Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall mused that once
a skulker reached a field hospital, his “potential value to the service is
either destroyed or seriously impaired. There he exchanges information
regarding his ailment with other patients and from them he learns the
symptoms most likely to perplex the doctors. He is recognized and
treated as a sick man. . . . Above all, he escapes from those duties which
he seeks to evade. He cannot be punished for malingering, therefore the
worst that can happen is to be sent back to his organization where he
can and will start the same process all over again.”47
Marshall believed the problem was exacerbated by officers wanting
to get rid of difficult soldiers by sending them to the hospital and by
medical personnel who would not turn away a man who claimed to
be sick. “No record exists of any psychoneurotic ever having been
convicted for malingering,” Marshall noted. “This is because no doctor
is either willing or able to state under oath that the pain complained of
by the psychoneurotic is nonexistent.”48 Privately, Eisenhower made a
similar observation, explaining “in any army one-third of the soldiers
are natural fighters and brave; two-thirds inherently are cowards and
skulkers. By making the two-thirds fear the possible public upbraiding
such as Patton gave during the [Sicily] campaign, the skulkers are forced
to fight.”49 Lucas, reflecting on the slapping incident, likewise believed,
“There are always a certain number of such weaklings in any Army. .
. . However, the man with malaria doesn’t pass his condition on to his
comrades as rapidly as does the man with cold feet nor does malaria have
the lethal effect” of malingering.50
British General Bernard Law Montgomery, Patton’s famous rival,
had the rumor of the slapping incidents suppressed in his Eighth Army
newspaper. As his biographer notes, if Montgomery had “known of
Patton’s hysterical outbursts in the two American field hospitals, he
would probably have had more sympathy with Patton than did Bradley,
Eisenhower, or the American division commanders.”51 The general
sentiment of much of the Allied high command was expressed by
General Curtis E. LeMay when a group of flight surgeons requested he
give his fliers a rest to prevent shell shock. “Gentlemen,” LeMay told the
doctors, “I know you are professionals but we are too. I don’t want you
to interfere with the way we’re running the war.”52
Thus, despite the endless criticism of the Seventh Army commander
after the slapping incidents, the US Army leadership was not far from
Patton’s thinking on what constituted shell shock and cowardice. As
Hughes noted, “What we used to consider as shell shock or what we
47      George C. Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 4, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 224.
48      Marshall, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 222.
49      Harry C. Butcher, diary, August 21, 1943, box 167, PPPF.
50      [Lucas] diary, August 3, 1943.
51      Nigel Hamilton, Monty Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983),
374, 360.
52      Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 303.

TOC

88

Parameters 49(3) Autumn 2019

might now consider as cowards no longer exists. A commander now
is on the defensive, and is going to have difficulty in distinguishing
between a man who is yellow and a man who is mentally ill.”53
Hughes’s comment on the changing meaning of shell shock helps
clarify why Patton did not believe Kuhl was suffering from it. The day
after issuing the order to watch for malingers in hospitals, Patton visited
another field hospital and saw “two men completely out from shell
shock. One kept going through the motions of crawling. The doctor
told me they were going to give them an injection to put them to sleep
and that probably they would wake up alright.”54 What made Patton
think Kuhl was a coward, while these two men were suffering from
shell shock? Mostly it was a difference of definition and perception.
Kuhl was sitting up on a stool coherent enough to tell Patton he could
not take the front. The two other men were clearly stunned out of their
senses. The definition of shell shock that Patton and much of the US
Army leadership were familiar with was a soldier completely unable to
control his actions.
On the afternoon of August 10, Patton arrived at the 93rd Evacuation
Hospital. All went well until Patton spied Private Paul G. Bennett, who
was sitting up shivering. When Patton asked Bennett what was wrong
with him, the private began to cry and answered, “It’s my nerves.” “What
did you say?” demanded Patton. “It’s my nerves,” sobbed Bennett, “I
can’t stand the shelling anymore.” Patton slapped Bennett across the
face shouting, “Your nerves Hell, you are just a God damn coward, you
yellow son of a bitch.” The general’s voice was audible from outside the
tent as he continued, “Shut up that God damned crying. I won’t have
these brave men here who have been shot seeing a yellow bastard sitting
here crying.” Patton then slapped Bennett again hard enough to knock
off his helmet liner, which rolled into the next tent, and shouted toward
the receiving officer, “Don’t you admit this yellow bastard, theres [sic]
nothing the matter with him. I won’t have the hospitals cluttered up with
these sons of a bitches [sic] who haven’t the guts to fight.” Bennett was
managing to sit at attention as Patton turned back to him. “You’re going
back to the front lines,” the general growled, “and you may get shot and
killed but you’re going to fight. If you don’t, I’ll stand you up against a
wall and have a firing squad kill you on purpose.” Patton then reached
for one of his ivory handled pistols and continued, “I ought to shoot
you myself, you God damned whimpering coward.”55 Patton departed
still shouting about Bennett. “I may have saved his soul,” he wrote that
evening, “if he had one.”56
The surgeon general’s report of the slapping incidents arrived
at Eisenhower’s Headquarters two days before a delegation of war
53      Everett Hughes to Kate Hughes, letter, November 30, 1943, letter, box II 2, ESHP.
54      [Patton] diary, August 6, 1943, Box 3, GSPP.
55      Donald E. Currier to Arnest, report, “Visit of Lieutenant General Patton to the 93rd
Evacuation Hospital,” August 12, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
56      [Patton] diary, August 10, 1943, box 3, GSPP.
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correspondents who confirmed the story.57 Eisenhower wrote an
unofficial reprimand to Patton stating, “I clearly understand that firm
and drastic measures are at times necessary in order to secure desired
objectives. But this does not excuse brutality, abuse of the sick, nor
exhibition of uncontrollable temper in front of subordinates.”58 He then
ordered Patton to apologize to the two soldiers, along with the other
medical personnel, and quietly opened an investigation. Eisenhower
also requested the theater war correspondents not report the story since
Patton was important to the war effort.59 Of the sixty correspondents,
not one reported the story.60 The silence held until late November when
radio commentator Drew Pearson heard about it and “decided it was time
to let loose on” Patton.61 The resulting scoop became front-page news.
As one newspaper observed, it was a slap “heard around the world.”62
What was lost in the media coverage and later historical scholarship
was Patton’s belief that shell shock was a medical condition, which
his later statements demonstrate. As he obeyed Eisenhower’s order
to apologize he informed the medical personnel “that he had always
regarded cases of ‘shell shock’ as being most tragic” and his intension was
to shame the soldiers “to try to snap them out of it.”63 He could not resist
adding, however, that the medical personnel should “be very careful
in handling such cases so that we wouldn’t be taken in by cowards and
malingerers.”64 On December 21, 1944, Hughes wrote Patton suggesting
combat officers who were relieved for combat exhaustion (shell shock)
should be examined by a doctor to determine if the officer could be
saved by sending him on leave.65 Patton replied Hughes’s suggestions
were being acted on and “Commanders are being directed to require an
examination by a medical officer in all cases involving the relief of combat
officers as the result of combat exhaustion when there is a probability
that reclassification may be necessary.” He added, “Where such action
is indicated, the officer will of course be disposed of through medical
channels or given the proper treatment including a leave if that appears
desirable.”66 These statements suggest Patton not only believed in shell
shock but thought it could be treated without physical and verbal abuse.
Patton believed shell shock was a genuine medical condition, but the
two privates he slapped were not suffering from it. He had no problem
with soldiers who had lost control of their minds and actions being
treated in hospitals. This was the definition he and other US generals
who had served in World War I understood. Yet the two soldiers he
57      Butcher diary, August 17, 1943, box 167, PPPF.
58      Eisenhower to Patton, letter, August 17, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
59      Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 182.
60      Quentin Reynolds, By Quentin Reynolds (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 297.
61      Herman Klurfeld, Behind the Lines: The World of Drew Pearson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1968), 79.
62      Lee Carson, “Patton’s Wife Offers No Alibi for ‘Tough Perfectionist’,” Washington Post,
November 15, 1943.
63      “Statement of Captain Henry A. Carr,” September 14, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
64      Currier, memorandum, September 7, 1943, box 91, PPPF.
65      Hughes to Patton, letter, December 21, 1944, folder 18, box 33, GSPP.
66      Patton to Hughes, letter, December 30, 1944, folder 18, box 33, GSPP.
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slapped were in control of themselves enough to explain their condition
to him. In these cases, the general believed, the soldiers must be made
to overcome their affliction by shame, anger, and physical abuse. His
actions, however, led most of his friends and family to conclude Patton
did not believe shell shock was a genuine medical condition.
In the rush of historians, journalists, and colleagues to defend or
condemn Patton, the subtle distinctions of his views were lost. Patton’s
actions hardly had universal support in the army’s officer corps. His
old friend John J. Pershing harshly and publicly criticized Patton’s
behavior.67 Nevertheless, many of his colleagues agreed, though usually
privately, with Patton’s definition of shell shock and the need to prevent
malingering. Former Army Chief of Staff Charles P. Summerall wrote
Patton that the incident was trifling and he remembered soldiers
migrating to the rear and being coddled in hospitals during World War
I. “Such cowards used to be shot, but now they are encouraged,” wrote
Summerall. “Only those who carry the responsibility of winning battles
know the difficulty of making men fight.”68 Summerall’s last observation
points to the struggle of making soldiers perform in combat during
World War II and the concern the US Army leadership had about the
problem. Instead of an isolated incident, Patton’s actions more accurately
demonstrate one general’s answer to a complex and universal dilemma.
The modern military leader can draw several lessons from the
slapping incidents. First, commanders must still balance medical needs
with military necessities. In recent years, the great focus in military
psychological health has been PTSD. According to the US Department
of Veterans Affairs, between 11 and 20 percent of veterans of the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer from PTSD.69 Such a wide gap in the
statistics speaks to the controversy over who has PTSD and fears it
is underdiagnosed.70 Conversely, critics have worried the publicity
surrounding PTSD may lead to overdiagnosis, a concern shared by some
in the medical profession about shell shock during World War II.71 The
costs are huge, and the military budget is finite. The army that won
World War II was largely made up of draftees, but the military of today
is comprised of professionals trained at a great cost. A soldier out of
action because of PTSD is a major loss and difficult to replace. Finding
the correct balance between medical cost and military resources is an
ongoing challenge.
Second, like shell shock, the definition of PTSD and what
characterizes it changes over time. What was accepted as shell shock
67      Blumenson, Patton Papers, 379.
68      Blumenson, Patton Papers, 378.
69      “How Common Is PTSD in Veterans?,” US Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed July
23, 2019.
70      Michael P. Fisher, “PTSD in the U.S. Military, and the Politics of Prevalence,” Social Science
& Medicine 115 (2014), 1.
71      David J. Morris with Thomas E. Ricks, “Can Drone Operators Get PTSD?,” Foreign Policy,
June 2, 2015; and Norman Q. Brill, “Hospitalization and Disposition,” in Neuropsychiatry in World War
II, vol. 1, ed. Albert J. Glass and Robert J. Bernucci (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
1973), 231.

TOC

World War II: 75th Anniversary

Lovelace

91

for Patton and many of his contemporaries in World War I was very
different than that in World War II. Yet, the medical definition had
expanded to include people who once would have been viewed as simply
tired or frightened. Today, PTSD is often used in the popular vernacular
to cover a wide range of traumatic experiences. Military officers need
to be cognitive of this and work with medical personnel to provide the
best treatment.
Finally, the slapping incidents are a reminder of the difficulty of
keeping an army fighting. The ultimate duty of a commander is to achieve
victory. To do this and keep casualties to a minimum requires keeping
as many soldiers on duty as possible. One of the least remembered, but
most remarkable, facts about the second slapping incident is the reaction
of the other soldiers in the hospital, many of whom apparently approved
of Patton’s actions. Leon Luttrell recalled, “none of us felt sorry for the
soldier” Patton slapped.72 Donald Bennett, heard the commotion in the
next tent and remembered his fellow patients cheered Patton as he left,
adding, “There wasn’t a frontline soldier who had the slightest sympathy
for the kid Patton slapped.” To Bennett, one soldier’s feelings seemed
inconsequential to the death he had seen in Sicily, and he believed Patton
meant to instill a message for his army to “show backbone, and get the
job done.” 73
Patton’s actions were harsh and counterproductive. Even he
recognized “my motive was correct because one cannot permit skulking
to exist. It is just like a communicable disease.” But he added, “I admit
freely that my method was wrong and I shall make what amends I can.” 74
He had not acted out of deliberate cruelty, but was instead motivated by
a desire to achieve victory and save the lives of his soldiers.

72      David A. Lande, I Was With Patton: First Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton’s Command
(St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002), 91.
73      Bennett, Honor Untarnished, 148–49.
74      [Patton] diary, August 20, 1943, box 3, GSPP.
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Strategic Doctrine
Planning To Fail: The US Wars in
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
By James H. Lebovic
Reviewed by Dr. Lionel Beehner, research director, US Military Academy’s
Modern War Institute

B

uglers of bad news that examine how military leaders and
policymakers have failed to manage wars that go south, such
as Dominic Teirney’s The Right Way To Lose a War (2015), should be
welcomed more in military circles. While the failure of the unfinished
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is well-trodden territory for Beltway scribes,
political insiders, and academics, who is to blame and what lessons should
be learned remain open questions. It is not enough to boil it down to
President Barack Obama’s quip, “Don’t do stupid stuff.” Bureaucracies
are stubborn creatures. Leaders are fickle.
To understand what went wrong and why, James Lebovic, in Planning
To Fail, trains his eye on the military failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. He argues policymakers deserve most of the blame, for
rushing into war with a set of options that virtually guaranteed military
departures short of meeting their objectives. Lebovic does not focus on
why we went to war in each case, or map out a set of alternative strategic
options. But rather he discusses in painstaking detail how we stumbled
into war and then looked for an exit, like a drunk trying to find his keys
in a bar.
His argument can be boiled down to this: when it comes to war, US
policy-making is often too means driven, groping for limited solutions
to problems that require greater commitments of force. Leaders blunder
into wars, expanding the mission while squandering precious resources,
all the while making it up as they go along, then groping for an exit
strategy. A better title for this book might have been “The Powell
Doctrine Reversed” or “The Bermuda-Clausewitzian Triangle.”
The reason for these blinders can be attributed to organizational
failures, political shortsightedness, and psychological biases. Lebovic
paints policymakers as political creatures, myopic and unsympathetic,
driven by unclear objectives, organizational biases, and fixed shortterm time schedules—suffering from all three of Graham Allison’s
pathologies. Yet Lebovic’s process tracing lacks the originality and
rigor of Allison, relying as it does primarily on secondhand sources and
previously articulated arguments.
Anybody hoping for a groundbreaking new insight on America’s
“forever wars” will not find it here. Nor will one find a cogent distillation
of civil-military relations during warfare.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019
256 pages
$34.95
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Yet, this book still deserves to be read, if not by military strategists
and academics, then by aspiring policymakers. His review of what and
how the wars went wrong—and so splendidly, like a slow-moving train
wreck—is a useful compendium to any reading list of these three wars.
Moreover, Lebovic’s analysis of the four stages of intervention, like those
for grief counselors, are helpful analytically to pinpoint how decisions by
key leaders are motivated by factors like organizational biases, resource
constraints, and artificial timelines. Such observations are absent from
much of the journalistic accounts of these wars.
Wars, like Tolstoyan families, are not all alike. But policymakers do
face similar nodes when it comes to decision-making tree matrices. In
the first stage, they decide to engage their military forces. In this stage,
policymakers fixate on short-term mission objectives—for example,
regime change. Yet too often they fail to articulate or align how these
immediate goals should serve long-term grand strategy.
The second stage is to extend military operations—sometimes
called mission creep. Here policy often becomes disjointed. At this stage
policymakers are further detached from the operational level of the task
at hand, and so they both defer to the expertise of those tasked with
fighting the war while simultaneously groping for new instruments to
use and broadening, whether inadvertently or not, the mission. At this
stage, policymakers fall prey both to rational (optimizing the payoff)
and nonrational biases (group think, tunnel vision, and so forth).
Stage three is defined by military setbacks, growing unpopularity
of the war efforts, constraints in resources, and competing priorities.
Suffering from a version of attention deficit disorder, policymakers thus
reverse course and seek a strategy of constriction. They limit resources
to reduce costs and mitigate risks. Then comes the fourth and final stage,
where the goal is disengagement, as policymakers seek to hit the exits
as painlessly as possible, handing over duties to often-unready partners,
all the while imposing artificial timelines divorced from reality or the
conditions on the ground.
Lebovic leaves some fertile ground unexplored. First, he tends
to lump the lion’s share of the blame for these wars on policymakers.
Military leaders come under only glancing scrutiny. That is a shame.
There is a healthy and overdue debate within military circles among too
much optimism among senior leaders in the field. Nor does Lebovic
really explore the civil-military dynamics of how the various crises
contributed to the mission failures. Is McMasterism a relevant factor for
“planning to fail?” It is unclear.
Second, part of his theory touches on policymakers’ compressed
timelines to get stuff done, even if it is operationally impractical or
impossible. Yet he ignores large swaths of literature on this subject,
like David Edelstein’s excellent recent book on this very subject, Over
the Horizon (2017). If politicians are card-carrying procrastinators, as
Edelstein and others argue, why not push off invading Iraq for another
day? Nor does Lebovic really delve into the preventive-war logic of Iraq,
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or the domino folk theories that dominated the foreign policy discourse
of the 1960s and 1970s. Was this a blind spot for policymakers unique
to that era? Were their concerns unfounded?
Finally, Lebovic appears to assume all doomed military interventions
should follow his four phases of failure. But he could use a negative
case to balance his analysis. Why, for example, did George H. W. Bush
decide to withdraw from Iraq in 1991 after the first stage? In other
words, by selecting on his dependent variable, we get three cases which
satisfy his theory of policymaker myopia, but how does he explain cases,
such as Panama, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf War, that do not fit
this description?
His case studies are meticulously detailed, yet unfocused at times.
There is an important variation which is underexplored. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, for example, the initial objective was clear: regime change.
Whereas in Vietnam, it was muddled and unclear from the get-go. In
Vietnam, too, Lyndon B. Johnson was headstrong in not changing
course, facts on the ground be damned. Yet in Iraq, George W. Bush’s
surge caught even his military commanders by surprise for its course
reversal. Obama appeared to punt in Afghanistan, seeking a middle path
unsatisfactory to all parties—his liberal base, military commanders, and
his more hawkish opponents (even to some of his own cabinet).
A discussion of sunken costs makes a brief cameo in the book
introduction—I pulled out a bowl of popcorn and expected a delicious
read about how the Concorde fallacy or Daniel Kahneman’s theories
applied to the “Paul D. Wolfowitz-types” who blunder the United
States into war. Instead, there is little discussion of how sunken costs
shaped Johnson’s or Obama’s decisions. Instead, we are treated to
bland statements like “policy makers must recognize that sound policy requires
comprehensive assessment” (190, italics in original).
Finally, and perhaps most troublingly, rare is this modern book
on military decision-making by not making even a passing mention to
Carl von Clausewitz. Too bad, as this book would have benefited from
a discussion of his trinity on raw emotion, rationality, and chance in
shaping strategy. Nor, strangely, does Lebovic delve into the emerging
currents of grand strategy, or the civil-military relations literature to
diagnose the dysfunction cited in his case studies. However helpful his
exegesis of some of the organizational explanations of war, there is a
“been there done that” to anyone who has read their Graham Allison.
Even his dismissal of James Fearon’s rationalist explanation of war has
a familiar ring.
Policy failures are never preordained. While I applaud Lebovic for
attempting to pinpoint why nations fail at war, lumping all the blame on
policymakers can feel like an academic cop-out. Given the complexity of
the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there was plenty of blame
to go around.
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More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East
By Randall Fowler
Reviewed by Dr. Raymond A. Millen, professor of security sector, Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College
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Lincoln, NE, University of
Nebraska Press, 2018
272 pages
$34.95

n his book, More Than a Doctrine, Randall Fowler explores President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s rhetorical strategies in pursuit of his Middle
East policies. Scrutinizing presidential speeches, addresses, news
conferences, diplomatic communications, and meetings, Fowler argues
Eisenhower transcended the traditional use of the bully pulpit, though
he certainly exploited that venue by deftly employing rhetorical strategies
to frame national security issues, inform and educate the public,
persuade Congress and foreign leaders, and deter congressional criticism.
Specifically, according to Fowler, Eisenhower practiced rhetorical
misdirection as a cover for America’s covert operations and foreign policy
objectives for the Middle East.
As Fowler points out, Eisenhower’s preeminence in military strategy
and national security tempered outright challenges to his command of
strategic issues. Moreover, the public trusted Eisenhower, primarily
due to his image as a straightforward and congenial leader. Hence,
politicians and pundits rarely questioned his competency and motives.
Fowler elucidates the administration’s Middle East policy within the
construct of the broader Cold War containment strategy. Eisenhower
understood the Cold War was rhetorical in nature: words and ideas were
the real battleground. Parsing presidential communications, Fowler
reveals Eisenhower’s adroit use of narratives, history, and logic to make
his case to Congress and the American people.
Within this context, Fowler recounts the strategic factors—the
decline of the British Empire and its loss of prestige in the Middle
East, the rise of pan-Arab nationalism behind the banner of Egyptian
President Gamal Nasser, and the Soviet Union’s intent to exert greater
influence in the Middle East—that prompted Eisenhower to commit
the United States to the security of the Middle East via the Eisenhower
Doctrine. Accordingly, Fowler presents three case studies: the CIA
coup in Iran (1954), the Suez Crisis (1956), and the US intervention in
Lebanon (1958).
The case studies offer few new historical insights and omit details that
would have clarified Eisenhower’s hidden-hand policies. In regards to
Iran, how was it possible for one CIA operative—Kermit Roosevelt—to
overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and reinstate
the shah? According to Gary Sick’s All Fall Down, the conspiracy was a
convenient myth for anti-Shah revolutionaries. Mossadegh had lost the
support of the Iranian populace, clergy, and business community, so he
sought support from the communist Tudeh Party (1985). In contrast, the
shah remained quite popular. Hence, without the active complicity of
Iranian authorities, the CIA coup would not have been possible.
TOC

Book Reviews: Strategic Doctrine

97

For the Suez Crisis, Fowler does not mention the impact of
Eisenhower’s operation in June 1956 on the failed Aswan Dam
negotiations with Nasser. Granted, Nasser’s maladroit bargaining and
diplomacy were factors. But without Eisenhower’s firm guiding hand,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tactlessly broke off negotiations,
which prompted Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal. For Eisenhower,
the ensuing British and French invasion of Egypt, known as Operation
Musketeer, undermined the allies’ Cold War strategy. First, the operation
coincided with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, wrecking an opportunity
to arouse international condemnation of Soviet aggression. Second,
Musketeer hearkened back to great-power brinkmanship, spurning
the spirit of the new international order and recklessly precipitating a
potential war with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Eisenhower
explained the main reason he forced his allies to withdraw was because
we cannot “subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the
strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us.”
In the aftermath, Eisenhower concluded Britain and France had lost
the moral authority and trust to combat aggression in the Middle East,
implementing his own doctrine with the concurrence of Congress.
Fowler’s coverage of the US intervention in Lebanon during 1958
contains some omissions and errors. Although the threat of civil war in
Lebanon, triggered by President Camille Chamoun’s unconstitutional
bid for a second term, did not fit the parameters of the Eisenhower
Doctrine, the unrest did coincide with Pan-Arabism, which threatened
to destabilize the entire Middle East, and provided an opportunity for
Soviet exploitation. Fowler asserts Eisenhower virtually ignored the
situation in Lebanon prior to the Operation Bluebat intervention. In
reality, US and UN officials were in constant dialogue with Chamoun
months before and during the crisis, urging him not to seek reelection
and to support the popular presidential candidate General Fuad Chehab.
Operation Bluebat was an established contingency plan that
Eisenhower activated as a result of the July 14 Iraq coup. His concern
was that the coup would trigger widespread revolutions in the Middle
East, abetted by Nasser. The intervention was limited to Beirut and the
nearby airport, with US Marine Corps and Army leaders working closely
with Lebanese security forces. Eisenhower’s strategic communications
within Lebanon and the greater Middle East effectively conveyed
the Americans were there to stabilize Lebanon until the presidential
elections. The phased withdrawal of US forces, from mid-August
to the end of October reinforced those messages. Eisenhower also
dispatched Ambassador Robert Murphy to Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt
to allay fears and reinforce the US commitment to the Middle East.
Hence, Eisenhower’s swift intervention and messaging reinforced the
Eisenhower Doctrine and served to stabilize the Middle East.
Despite these historical errors, More Than a Doctrine complements
Meena Bose’s Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy and Fred I.
Greenstein’s The Hidden Hand Presidency fittingly, providing useful insights
on Eisenhower’s rhetorical strategies.
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Contemporary Warfare
Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards and Wars in the Middle East
By Nader Uskowi
Reviewed by Alma Keshavarz, associate, Small Wars Journal—El Centro
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ader Uskowi offers an insightful account of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Qods Force (QF) in
Middle Eastern affairs. He begins with a history and follows a trajectory
of Iranian military and proxy activities in the region. Uskowi opens the
book by recalling the time he met Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in which
he said to Uskowi, “the revolution is not about just Iran, but the whole
region” (xiv). This introductory statement sets the stage for what the
book is ultimately about with regards to Iran’s military undertakings and
geopolitical intentions across the Middle East.
As Uskowi explains, Iran is a country at war in Syria, Iraq, and
Yemen, with the addition of covert operations in Afghanistan. In
large part, the book discusses the importance of the Qods Force—the
IRGC’s elite branch. Under General Qasem Soleimani’s leadership, the
Qods Force established the Shia Liberation Army (SLA), which is meant
to safeguard Shia interests and push Iranian militant ideology into the
region. The SLA consists of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan
militants, and the Houthis in Yemen (17). SLA fighters are recruited and
trained in the region before being sent to Iran for additional training
in explosives, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
among other specialized training with the IRGC.
The author also provides a history of the events that took place
during the Iranian Revolution and how the Qods Force came to be in
the post-Revolutionary era. While it may act as an independent entity,
it draws from the IRGC and Iran’s regular army, Artesh. The Qods
Force has its own regional directorates known as “the Corps,” which
cover Iraq, the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan),
the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Other Corps
exist in North Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the Americas (139).
But it relies heavily on Shia militant groups. As such, the author also
offers a history of Hezbollah—including early attacks such as the AMIA
bombing in Argentina in 1994 and the Khobar Towers bombing in
Saudi Arabia in 1996. Other groups have taken on the Hezbollah model.
Uskowi discusses the important Iraqi groups—the Badr Organization,
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)—that form the
core of the Qods Force-led Popular Mobilization Force (25). The Qods
Force has also had long ties with militant groups from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. These include the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun groups, both
of which have experienced heavy combat in Syria. Over time, Iranian
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support extended to some Sunni groups. As the author explains, “Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Qaeda, and the Taliban were seen as
fellow revolutionaries whose efforts were against common enemies,
particularly the US and Israel” (30).
Uskowi’s chapter on Iraq and Afghanistan is most interesting as
he follows a timeline of when Iran seized on opportunities to enter
both countries and maintain a presence. Days after the September 11
attacks, IRGC and Qods Force special operations officers were active
alongside Northern Alliance commanders in Afghanistan. Following US
airstrikes on Taliban targets in November 2001 in Herat, Soleimani saw
the province as a gateway into other provinces in Western Afghanistan,
which included the Farah and Nimruz provinces that had large Shia
populations (51). In Iraq, the Qods Force acted on the US withdrawal to
heavily recruit and fund proxy groups to establish a stronger foothold in
the country. By the end of 2013, Soleimani appeared to have control over
Iraq. Uskowi also addresses how Iranian forces, including their proxy
groups, were instrumental in pushing the Islamic State out of key areas
in the country. As a result, the population developed deeper ties with
the Shia-led Popular Mobilization Forces as they were on the frontlines
in direct combat with the Islamic State.
Moreover, the author dedicates a significant portion of the book
to Iranian involvement in the Syrian crisis. Key battles are explained
in great detail, including the infamous Battle of Aleppo. Following the
Aleppo victory, Uskowi explains how Iranian-led forces moved east
and established a land corridor from Iran through Iraq and Syria to
Lebanon, the Mediterranean, and the Israeli northern fronts (88). These
successes from 2017 onward have been major contributing factors to
Iranian expansion, which includes influence on the Arabian Peninsula.
In Yemen, the Houthis took over the country’s capital, Sanaa, and within
days, the IRGC-linked Mahan Air began direct flights from Tehran to
the city to send military advisers from a range of Shia groups as well as
a variety of advanced weaponry (115). None of these cases could have
been made possible without continued Qods Force aid. As the author
explains, proxy groups rely on the Qods Force to provide not only funds
and training but also weaponry needed to fight their enemies. They
have access to the IRGC’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, UAVs, and other
weaponry, which Uskowi provides in great detail.
Throughout the course of the book, the reader comes to understand
the scope of the Qods Force. It is ultimately a “military headquarters
that gathers intelligence, prepares operation plans, provides logistics
support, and conducts command-and-control functions for its military
campaigns” (13). This is a timely book as it addresses this shadowy
organization that has not been given ample attention. Few publications
that address the IRGC and its branches. Uskowi’s analysis narrows
the focus to the development of Iran’s military following the Iranian
Revolution and how the IRGC and Qods Force have transformed Iran’s
military doctrine. This book is a significant contribution to the field and
a must-read for anyone interested in the subject.
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Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America
and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and
Responses to Integrated, Adaptive Solutions
By R. Evan Ellis
Reviewed by G. Alexander Crowther
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T

his book by the prolific R. Evan Ellis discusses one of the main
security challenges in the Western Hemisphere: transnational crime.
The main argument is that transnational crime is widespread and eats
away at the roots of societies throughout the hemisphere and requires a
whole-of-government approach to resolve.
This book offers two main contributions: it is authoritative in its
discussion about transnational organized crime groups and it may be the
most thorough discussion that proposes holistic, integrated solutions.
These elements alone make it relevant to senior members of defense
communities throughout the hemisphere. But this book also excels
in the chapters on “Transnational Organized Crime Groups” and
“Comparative Solutions.”
A chapter on transnational organized crime groups is one of the
best summaries on this topic that this reviewer has ever read; it is concise
yet thorough. The author creates a new typology of cartels, intermediary
groups, ideologically oriented groups, and gangs that allows him to
discuss a widely disparate group of organizations that have only one
thing in common—crime.
The comparative solutions chapter is particularly well done. Its 68
pages provide detailed recommendations on how to move ahead on what
could be called a wicked problem. These recommendations cover eight
different areas: whole-of-government solutions, interdiction of criminal
flows, targeting of transnational criminal organization leaders, use of
the military in a domestic law enforcement context, institutional reform
within law enforcement, targeting the financial flows and resources of
organized criminal groups, prison control and reform, and binational
and multinational cooperation against organized crime.
Several of these concepts stand out as must-reads for US strategists
and policymakers. Although several are obvious, the sections on the
use of the military in a domestic law enforcement context, institutional
reform within law enforcement, and prison control and reform are not
always understood by US audiences.
In the first case, the US Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385)
prohibits the use of federal armed forces within the United States except
for cases of rebellion or disaster. Because of this law, US decisionmakers
sometimes seek to impose that paradigm on our international partners,
which robs our partners of their militaries, often their most wellresourced capability.
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In the cases of law enforcement and prison reform, many US
decisionmakers do not understand the level of corruption in some
partner law enforcement and prison organizations. Since the days of the
Spanish empire, Latin American countries have often underpaid law
enforcement personnel, which allows transnational criminals to avoid
punishment and even continue criminal activities from within prison
walls. Thus, any holistic approach to resolving transnational crime in the
Western Hemisphere will require significant police and prison reforms.
The examples of success in this book provide a menu of changes
countries can choose and explain how the changes have worked in
similar situations. The variety of Colombian examples is particularly
useful. The Colombian government made sweeping reforms throughout
society in the early 2000s in its successful bid to defeat the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia) insurgency, which survived only due to its transnational
criminal activities.
Although the primary sources based on personal contact with senior
security service people throughout the region are notable, other sources
disappoint. The author speaks Spanish but refers mainly to English
language sources. In chapter two, “The Geography of Transnational
Organized Crime,” only 31 of 167 citations come from the region, 20
entrants cite the author’s own works.
Although there are minor factual errors throughout, such as
referring to the Spanish Gendarmerie rather than the Guardia Civil, they
are not as important as the omissions. For instance, the author makes
tantalizing mentions of illegal minerals coming from Peru and Bolivia.
But the thread is not developed and minerals do not even appear in the
index. Even worse is a total omission of Cuba or Haiti. It is impossible
to discuss transnational crime in the Caribbean thoroughly without
mentioning two of the three largest countries in the region.
This book could have used a more thorough copyediting. It has
some errors such as referring to several US Army colonels as “coronel.”
Other minor issues include multiple references to criminal bands in
parentheses (BACRIM) followed on the next page by criminal bands
in quotation marks (“BACRIM”) and later by the phrase “criminal
bands,” again in quotation marks, or “Bacrim” (with only an initial cap).
For another example, the Red Command is refered to as “CV” without
mentioning Comando Vermelho. Even more irritating, “Red Command” is
used for subsequent references.
In the end, this strong book addresses an important problem
everyone in the Western Hemisphere faces. Transnational crime weakens
the societies and governments of developed and underdeveloped
countries throughout the area. By using this book to understand the
problem better and considering the comparative solutions, US and Latin
American strategists and policymakers can improve their capabilities to
deal with these issues and mitigate the negative impact transnational
crime has on all of our societies.
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Radical Inclusion: What the Post-9/11 World
Should Have Taught Us about Leadership
By Martin Dempsey and Ori Brafman
Reviewed by Lt Col Derek W. Beck, US Air Force Reserves
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adical Inclusion argues one can attract more bees with honey than
with vinegar. The book argues that seeking to include people (a
radical ideal in today’s society, per the authors) versus creating walls (as
we are prone to do) will lead to greater success, be it in business or
civil-military operations in war-torn Afghanistan. Primarily a leadership
book, the text is bolstered by stories from the two authors’ lives, though
it is heavy on examples from the life of General Martin E. Dempsey, US
Army retired, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011–15).
As outlined in the preface, the book’s thesis is what the authors call
the “digital echo, where information passes from individual to individual
more quickly but in the process often becomes distorted” (xii, italics
in original). Simply put, this concept is just the faster-moving digital
equivalent of how information has always grown more distorted with
each retelling. The authors treat this as a neutral force, ignoring actions
such as overt efforts to inject misinformation. The preface concludes
with six “concrete leadership tools” that are anything but concrete, but
aim to inspire inclusion: (1) create a team’s sense of belonging; (2) make
each team member’s contribution matter; (3) be an imaginative leader;
(4) instead of paralysis by overanalysis, “develop a bias for action”; (5)
empower the organization at all levels; and (6) relinquish control to make
the team self-sustaining (xiii–xiv). In other words, the book’s preface
gives some fuzzy and largely derivative advice as concrete leadership
tools, but it is the kind of advice found in nearly all leadership books,
albeit described in this one with different buzzwords.
Throughout, Radical Inclusion gives various lengthy examples to make
its points. An early example of a narrative’s power comes from coauthor
Ori Brafman’s experience. While at the University of California, Berkley,
Brafman, a vegan, protested the eating of animals. His initial efforts
were not inclusive and included shaming carnivores. As a result, he
encountered many obstacles.
Soon after, Brafman and a friend seized upon an idea to set up
a restaurant across from a McDonald’s to sell veggie burgers, dubbed
the “McVegan.” When he shifted the message from debating with meat
eaters to making veganism inclusive, hip, and fun, by selling T-shirts and
giving away free McVegan burgers, people got curious. Even carnivores
were curious. People loved the shirts. After briefly flirting with pursuing
a lawsuit despite local public opinion, in the end, McDonald’s introduced
its own McVegan locally (20).
Brafman helped bring veganism into the mainstream, and
McDonald’s ultimately benefited—not by fighting against the vegan
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burger but by embracing it. That is inclusion: even vegans can come
have a burger at Berkley’s McDonald’s. McDonald’s recently began
experimenting with a McVegan burger in select markets worldwide,
although it is currently not widely available in the United States.
A more pragmatic view is McDonald’s simply responded to market
forces just as the Filet-O-Fish was added to its menu when revenues
declined in response to Catholic customers avoiding meat during Lent.
Without Brafman’s veggie burger, it would have happened eventually.
Thus, is this really a story of radical inclusion or merely a natural result
of a responsive capitalistic entity seeking to increase profits? Or maybe
it was both.
In another example, Dempsey, as a young Army officer in Germany
in 1975, had written off some of his less stellar soldiers as “disgruntled
draftees . . . including several who were awaiting judicial punishment
and discharge for charges involving drugs, racism, and violence” (84).
At one point, a local nun arrived on post to talk with those disgruntled
soldiers. Dempsey later asked her why she had wanted to talk to them.
She responded, “Well, have you given up on them?” Dempsey realized
he had, and vowed to do so never again. Decades later, one of those
soldiers, then a high-ranking sergeant, thanked Dempsey for giving him
a second chance (84–86).
Simply put, leadership is hard and cannot be distilled to being
inclusive. Moreover, the book cherry-picks its examples and glosses over
them to serve the points it tries to make before moving on. If the reader
examines any example too closely, it will reveal more questions than
answers. And there is no discussion about the needs of the many (or the
country or the service) outweighing the needs of the few that the authors
argue need to feel included. The discussions about when the mission
must supersede the needs of inclusion are also absent.
As a leadership book, Radical Inclusion is as good as any. But that is
a low bar. Radical Inclusion is filled with catchy phrases, such as “digital
echo,” “radical inclusion,” and “develop a bias for action,” that give
little new insights. Even the concrete examples proposed in the book’s
preface are little more than catchphrases derivative of what many other
books have described. There is nothing radical about Radical Inclusion.
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Modern Powers
AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley,
and the New World Order
By Kai-Fu Lee
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College
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272 pages
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ai-Fu Lee, the author of AI Superpowers, is a “social media rock star”
with 50 million followers primarily on Sina Weibo, a Chinese social
media platform, and 1.61 million followers on Twitter (@kaifulee) in the
West. He is a leading expert on China and artificial intelligence (AI) with a
pedigree that includes a PhD in computer science from Carnegie Mellon
University as well as experience as the former president of Google
China. Presently, he leads a Chinese technology investment company
with approximately $2 billion assets under management.
While this best-selling book is not a strategically focused military
work per se, the emerging military significance of AI and China’s
growing capacity in this field more than justifies a review.
AI Superpowers is divided into an introduction, nine chapters,
acknowledgments, notes, and an index. The chapters are “China’s Sputnik
Movement” (AlphaGo’s triumph over the human Go master Ke Jie);
“Copycats in the Coliseum” (China’s predatory and semi-illicit internet
sector); “China’s Alternate Internet Universe” (an alternate Silicon Valley
ecosystem); “A Tale of Two Countries” (China’s government support
for AI trumps US AI expertise); “The Four Waves of AI” (internet,
business, perception, and autonomous); “Utopia, Dystopia, and the Real
AI Crisis” (the coming crisis of jobs and inequality); “The Wisdom of
Cancer” (Kai-Fu Lee’s humanism epiphany); “A Blueprint for Human
Coexistence with AI” (human dignity and social investment); and “Our
Global AI Story” (global wisdom related to AI disruption potentials for
humanity). The index is well developed and the references include an
adequate number of sources presented in an italicized sentence fragment
notation system found in popular books. Given the work is really derived
from Lee’s insider understanding of China and its relationship to AI
development, however, such references can be considered secondary to
his functioning as the primary source himself.
The main theme of the book is the Chinese work ethic and approach
to business (a cutthroat fight over market dominance that can quickly
devolve into criminality). The book also addresses China’s massive
online data-rich environment, which is required for deep learning that
enables AI algorithms and is far more important than the US advantage
in world-class human AI researchers (14–17).
This thematic focus takes place in the context of US and Chinese
corporate interests that are “construct[ing] the ‘power grids’ for the AI
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age: privately controlled computing networks that distribute machine
learning across the economy, with the corporate giants acting as ‘utilities’”
(84). A distressing side note related to this topic is that Microsoft
Research China, founded in 1998 under Lee’s stewardship, has been
responsible for training “over five thousand AI researchers, including
top executives at Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Lenovo, and Huawei” (89).
From the reviewer’s perspective, this has represented, in hindsight, an
epic transfer of technology to mainland China.
However the book has little to say about great-power competition
and the potential for military conflict between the United States and
China. From Lee’s perspective, a fait accompli has taken place with China
expected to be the increasingly dominant global AI power. That such
an emerging AI power is authoritarian based—the antithesis of liberal
democracy—and is already implementing this advanced technology
for domestic social control purposes is never mentioned in the work.
Concern over such “AI race[s]” and “international military contests”
is viewed as secondary to “what [AI] will do to our labor markets and
social systems” (227–28).
While Lee has transcended national and great-power interests
within this work—he truly focuses on humanity’s future relationship
with the disruptive nature of AI—he is also a man who exists between
worlds. A Taiwanese national who was educated in the United States
and who has served as an executive of Apple, Microsoft, and Google, he
has transformed into a high-technology venture capitalist operating in
China. In the process, Lee has become a stateless citizen and denizen of
the global capitalist economy.
For those of us with a more pedestrian existence—and who have
sworn to defend our constitution—we should be concerned not only
with the larger disruptive potentials of what AI may portend for our
social class structure but also about the threat of an authoritarian great
power to our nation. If China becomes the dominant global AI power,
as Lee argues, this scenario may well occur.

Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold
War Crisis of World Order
By Richard Sakwa
Reviewed by Michael Fitzsimmons

M

any debates in Russian foreign policy literature revolve around a
chicken-and-egg question: which came first, Russia’s illiberalism
at home and abroad or the rest of America’s and Europe’s hostility
toward Russian power? Hence, the prominent contending themes of
Russian paranoia in Western commentary and of Western hypocrisy in
Russian commentary.

New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2017
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British scholar Richard Sakwa gives ample space to both of these
themes in his latest book, Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War
Crisis of World Order. While the title suggests a tilt toward a critique of
Russian paranoia, Sakwa’s arguments are actually quite sympathetic to
elite Russian perspectives on international politics. Indeed, the book
amounts to a sustained critique of the alternately labeled “Atlantic
community” or “Historical West” for failing to transcend the ideological
and institutional trappings of the Cold War and thereby alienating
Russia. He charts a progression of Russian disillusionment through
four epochs of the post-Cold War era: Atlanticism (early to mid-1990s);
competitive, peaceful coexistence (late 1990s); new realism (2000s); and
neorevisionism (post-2012).
Sakwa’s analysis is comprehensive in scope, and his research is
impressively eclectic. The book serves as a sophisticated elaboration of
Russian viewpoints on international relations over the past twenty-five
years. Western analysts may find chapter 5, which examines alternative
visions for organizing Russia’s relationship with Europe and its other
Eurasian neighbors, especially useful. An insightful thread running
through the book is the continuity of certain principles of Russian
conservatism that are evident throughout czarist, Soviet, and postSoviet thinking. Examples include the importance to Russia of great
power status, multilateralism, and exertion of “privileged interests”
within its region.
However, Sakwa’s arguments are less than convincing regarding the
errors and sins of the so-called “Historical West.” The book’s frequently
repeated thesis posits a path not taken in the 1990s—the transformation
of the “Historical West” into “Greater Europe”—that would have
better integrated Russia into the international system. Rather than
fundamentally rethinking institutions like the European Union (EU)
and NATO, Sakwa believes, Western nations simply expanded their
remit, treating Russia more as a vanquished enemy than as a partner.
Liberal hegemony, a central concept in Sakwa’s analysis, is held
responsible for much of the present discord and is contrast unfavorably
with pluralism in international affairs. Sakwa claims that “Russian
leadership sought to adapt not to Western values and governance norms,
but to what were considered universal values and global norms” (324).
But he is frustratingly vague in defining pluralism or which universal
values are distinct from Western ones.
Multilateralism and the sanctity of state sovereignty are the two
principles of this pluralism that seem clear. But the reader is left to
wonder if it is mainly the most illiberal features of Russian and Chinese
politics that are neglected by liberal hegemony. As Gerard Toal points
out in an H-Diplo review of the book, Sakwa is guilty of “creatively
configuring acceptance of autocracy as ‘pluralism’” (2018).
Sakwa’s assignment of blame to the hegemonic ambitions of the
liberal international order for casting Russia as an outsider is problematic
for at least three reasons (46). First, this formulation paints quite diverse
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political actors within the Atlantic community with the same broad
brush. Second, it denies agency to the peoples of central and eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics who sought refuge of a sort in
the EU and NATO precisely because of Russia’s historical pattern of
regional transgressions. Third, it is not at all clear how to distinguish
hegemonic ambitions, with all of that term’s overtones of coercion, from
the advocacy of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights that enjoy
domestic constituencies throughout the world, including in Russia.
The grand strategy Sakwa attributes to Russia seems designed for
Russia to have its cake and eat it too. Its premise is, a realist understands,
the unique prerogatives of power and a certain measure of deference
that is therefore due to Russia’s will, regardless of principles. Yet it is
dressed in the garb of international law and the multilateral collective
decision-making of an international society.
Russia has repeatedly and brazenly violated its nominal principles
regarding state sovereignty when expedient (see Georgia, Crimea,
Ukraine’s Donbas, covert political activism in Europe, and election
tampering in the United States). A simpler explanation for Russian
attachment to multilateralism rather than the principle of a “democratic
system of international relations” is that it creates a pretext for Russia to
offset its power deficits relative to its competitors (55).
Sakwa at times bends over backwards to absolve Russia’s leaders
of responsibility for their behavior. The book is littered with passages
that obliquely reference Russian aggression while somehow locating its
causes beyond Russian agency. He says, for example, “the fear that its
concerns were not being heard prompted the Russian leadership to speak
increasingly loudly and forcefully, fostering a rhetorical escalation that in
the end spilled-over into violence” (72). He refers to the annexation of
Crimea as a reunification and even a transfer. Sakwa seems particularly
uncritical of the standard Russian government’s talking points on
military issues. He gives space to only the most benign interpretation
of Russian nuclear strategy, highlights NATO exercises but not similar
Russian exercises, and appears to accept at face value Russian criticism
of American ballistic missile defense systems in Europe, despite that
argument’s well-known technical dubiousness.
In chapter 8, Sakwa’s criticism of the United States veers at points
into absurdity. For example, he decries bipartisan anti-Russian hysteria,
doubts the copious evidence of Russian cyberhacking of the 2016 US
presidential election, credulously reports Julian Assange’s denials of
Russian entanglement with WikiLeaks, equates the pervasive dishonesty
of the Trump White House with that of defenders of traditional
Atlanticism, and cites a few websites hawking conspiracy theories.
Still, despite these flaws, Sakwa’s wide-ranging analysis offers
a thoughtful, useful counterpoint to mainstream analyses of Russian
foreign policy. Those looking to devise more a more stable and congenial
future for politics and security in Eurasia will need to grapple with the
worldviews and historical interpretations that Sakwa presents here.
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Military History
Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila
By James M. Scott
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, author of Reading Athena’s Dance
Card: Men against Fire in Vietnam and Rethinking Western Approaches to
Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict and director, Plans &
Policy, G-2 US Army Training and Doctrine Command
New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2019
635 pages
$32.95

J

ames M. Scott’s recounting of the World War II battle of Manila is well
researched, diligently referenced, and accessibly written. It is, however,
not a resource that will be of professional interest to most readers of this
journal. Like its significantly less comprehensive predecessor The Battle
for Manila: The Most Devastating Untold Story of World War II, this work is
less an operational analysis than a compilation of atrocities committed
by occupying Japanese forces.
Those looking for valuable insights regarding urban combat
operations will therefore find themselves unfulfilled and better advised
to refer to the Center of Military History’s official green book analysis
Triumph in the Philippines by Robert Ross Smith. Anyone interested in
combat plans and ensuing unit actions during the battle for the city will
appreciate the tactically-oriented and narrowly-focused resources such as
the Sixth Army’s Combat Notes, number 7, and Japanese Defense of Cities
as Exemplified by the Battle of Manila; the Combat Studies Institute
Battlebook 13-B, Battle of Manila; or Kevin T. McEnery’s staff college
master’s thesis, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila, February 1945.”First
person accounts of Japanese occupation in Manila include both those by
Filipinos and foreigners who spent the war in prison camps. Many of
these were published in the Philippines, among them the unassuming
Boy Guerilla: The World War II Metro Manila Serenader by Rudy de Lara with
Bob Fancher; the scholarly A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, December
7, 1941–May 7, 1945 by Juan Labrador; the social history The Everyday
Life in a Time of War by Thelma B. Kintanar; and an essential reference
of camp life in a Manila prison, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
by A. V. H. Hartendorp. The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and
Reaction edited by Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose provides an
eclectic and often revealing academic view of occupier policies—to
include notable failures in efforts to resource the wider war effort that
includes “Japanese Administration Policy towards the Moros in Lanao,”
“Cotton Production under Japan Rule, 1942–1945,” and “The Rice
Shortage and Countermeasures during the Occupation.”That is not to
say Rampage does not include some material valuable to military readers
or others with operational interests. The initial chapters provide brief
biographical sketches of antagonists Douglas MacArthur and Tomoyuki
Yamashita, contrasting the former’s failures leading to his flight from
the Philippines and the latter’s strikingly successful seizure of Singapore.
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Many of its remaining pages concentrate on individual and small group
experiences of those interned—and often eventually interred—in the
occupiers’ prison camps or others from Manila’s civilian population
during the period between its capture in the earliest days of 1942 and
MacArthur’s return in 1945. These details along with occasional short
descriptions of tactical actions, snapshots of senior leader activities on
both sides (to include MacArthur’s grossly premature declaration of the
capital’s capture), and US soldier reactions on finding American internees
dominate the second and largest component of the text. The trial of
Yamashita and select fellow officers comprise Scott’s focus in the closing
pages. There is little new in this trio other than material regarding the
suffering of specific American, Filipino, and other nationalities’ civilians
derived from author interviews or his subjects’ personal writings.
As might be deduced from the above, there has yet to be written a
commercial or civilian academic study regarding the battle for Manila
that is the equivalent of Brian Linn’s Guardians of Empire or U.S. Army
and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902, covering early US
actions in the Philippines. We are fortunate to have resources such as
those noted above that provide multiple perspectives on what is one of
the Second World War’s most significant urban struggles, certainly the
most demanding for American forces in the conflict’s Pacific theater. It
is intriguing to consider the role its lessons would have offered had the
Allies found themselves executing Operation Coronet, the invasion of
Honshu and the Tokyo Plain. Any wishing to mine that counterfactual
ore—or seeking a single source on the battle to advise the full scope of
urban challenges yet to come—will have to rely on information available
only via wide-ranging exploration of texts, pending an offering that
more greatly focuses on matters of interest to the military professional.

Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs
of a German Chief of Staff
By Fritz von Lossberg
Reviewed by Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski

F

ew historians write about staff performance instead of focusing on
commanders. A similar few have the language ability to translate
scholarly works into accessible English. David T. Zabecki has been an
exception for years. First, in 2008, he edited a useful two-volume set for
the Naval Institute Press entitled, Chief of Staff: The Principal Officers Behind
History’s Great Commanders. Next, in 2015, Zabecki turned his attention
to translation and editorial comment on important German memoirs in
Order in Chaos: The Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck, a
translation done with Dieter J. Biedekarken. Now, he and Biedekarken
continue to bring important German military memoirs to light for
English reading scholars with Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of
a German Chief of Staff. Lossberg’s War thus combines several important
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University Press of
Kentucky, 2017
480 pages
$65.00

TOC

110

Parameters 49(3) Autumn 2019

thrusts into one effort: explaining excellent staff leadership, resurrecting
memoirs from the Great War, and exposing important foreign language
works in English.
Friedrich “Fritz” Karl von Lossberg, who became known as the
fireman of the imperial German Army, rushed to a variety of chief of
staff positions throughout the war to turn failing army defenses around.
He entered the war as a lieutenant colonel, chief of staff for a corps, and
served consecutively to the Armistice when he was chief of staff for a
German army group and a major general. David Zabecki said in his
chapter on Lossberg in Chief of Staff that, “Lossberg was one of the most
important tacticians of the twentieth century.”
The combination of the original memoir, a gripping tale originally
published in 1939, and the extensive modern update provided by Zabecki
and Biedekarken should serve as an essential primer for those military
professionals interested in senior leadership in large-scale combat
operations, staff planning, the role of the German General Staff, the
value of professional military education, and the essentiality of battlefield
calculus. The editors add important notes capturing current arguments
and historiography and clarify the few factual errors Lossberg made in
his memoir based on recent evidence and their analysis.
Fritz von Lossberg was the imperial army’s specialist in defensive
operations. Lossberg was first dispatched by the kaiser himself to rescue
the Third Army in the Champagne region when they were threatened
with rupture in 1915. The Chief of the German General Staff then sent
him consecutively to the First Army on the Somme in 1916 and the
Fourth Army in Flanders in 1917. The sequence of his individual rescues
is a catalog of critical German defensive successes.
Lossberg’s methodology was regular: when dispatched as a chief
of staff to the rescue of a large German defensive formation, he would
immediately tour the front in person, speak to all affected subordinate
commanders to best understand front line conditions, make his synthetic
personal assessment, and then return to brief the affected commander in
person. Only after these steps would he engage the new staff of which
he had been made chief.
His presence, authority, and actions would turn the situation around.
Lossberg would adjust in frontages, reserves, artillery, and logistic
support to stabilize the situation. He applied a trained, professional
soldier’s assessment of battlefield physics and capacities regarding
the importance of defensive frontage, available supporting artillery,
particularly heavy artillery, ammunition resupply, communications
networks, and lines of communications.
Lossberg was not only skilled in the science of war but also had an
innate sense for the human or moral capacity of the formations that
he led, often remarking on the willpower of the individual soldier. He
had a sense of modern warfare, as his battlefield assessments repeatedly
highlighted the emerging, significant role of airpower. He is credited
with the ascendance of the German concept of defense in depth.
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The serious student of operational art will sense the importance
of individual professional development and the study of the art of war
between the lines of Lossberg’s detailed account. Lossberg’s expertise as
a rescuing General Staff officer was built on the professional knowledge
he had acquired through a lifetime of disciplined practice, the rigorous
education given to general staff officers, and their long-term relationships
within that group.
Lossberg often disagreed with his commanders and respectfully
let it be known when he did. His memoir is an alternative telling of
the German history of World War I, as Lossberg makes clear when he
thinks strategic and operational mistakes were made. He is relentless
in his criticism, for instance, of Erich von Falkenhayn’s insistence
on continuing the attacks toward Verdun, just as Lossberg is critical
of the failure of Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff to fall back to
new defensive lines and stabilize the front at the end of the war. The
reader often wonders what the outcome would have been had Lossberg’s
viewpoint prevailed.
There are lessons in the power of relationships throughout this
memoir. Most often, when mentioning a new superior or a flank unit
or higher chief of staff, Lossberg comments, “We knew each other well
from a previous assignment.” Lossberg is dutiful and faithful in his
service to a succession of commanders, even when he saw their flaws
or disagreed with their decisions. Lossberg proves to be a model of the
imperial German Army chief of staff archetype: knowledgeable, loyal,
hardworking to the point of exhaustion, but unrelenting in dedication
to the success of the mission.
This clarity on the attitude and role of the German General Staff
is a strength of this book, carefully explained by the editors in a useful
appendix. There is much to commend this book to the shelf of the
military professional or historian specializing in the First World War.
It credibly contributes to David Zabecki’s long-term effort to help
military professionals understand both exceptional chiefs of staff and
the German exemplars of them.

The Forgotten Front: The Eastern Theater
of World War I, 1914–1915
Edited By Gerhard P. Gross
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg

G

iven the outpouring of excellent recent historical research on the
Eastern Front, one might be forgiven for wondering if it is still the
“forgotten front” that it was in years past. We now know a great deal
more about the east, especially the magnitude of the impact of events
there from the outbreak of war in 1914 to the triumph of the Red Army
in the Russian Civil War in 1921.
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The east bequeathed the Bolshevik Revolution, the proto-Nazi
Freikorps, new states like Poland, and the genocidal battle for what
Timothy Snyder has called the “Bloodlands” between Germany and the
Soviet Union. No serious scholar of the First World War would even
consider a study of the conflict that marginalized or ignored the events
of the east.
Still, specifically because of those monumental events, the First
World War in the east lives in the shadows. But it is not the shadow of
the Western Front that obscures and distorts, but the shadow of the
Eastern Front in the Second World War. Virtually every essay in this
ambitious and important book references the war of 1939–45 either to
offer a comparison, a contrast or, appropriately enough, to ensure that
the history of the Second World War is understood in relation to the
First World War.
This volume is part of a truly impressive centennial project by the
Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed
Forces based in Potsdam, Germany, the same town where Kaiser
Wilhelm II signed Germany’s declaration of war in 1914 and where
Germany’s conquerors met in 1945 to try to close the 30-year period
of conflict. Gerhard Gross and his team have worked diligently and
intelligently to bring scholars together, publish primary documents, and
ensure that historians can treat the complex history of Germany in this
period with all due meticulousness. They deserve a great deal of credit
for their work over the past few years.
This volume is no exception to that diligence and meticulousness. It
brings together some of the most experienced scholars in the field (Hew
Strachan, Stig Förster, and Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius among them), and
presents new research on new themes, such as the place of the Eastern
Front on internet portrayals of the war. This is an ambitious and wideranging book that covers the German, Russian, Austria-Hungary, Slavic,
and Polish perspectives. Strachan sets the stage with a thoughtful and
analytic introduction that places the war in the east in geostrategic terms.
A few themes from the book’s 20 essays stand out, notable among
them the ways that the east differed from the west. Those differences
include the nature of geography, the de-modernization of eastern
battlefields, the much more diverse nature of the peoples living in the
east, and the relatively lower importance of alliances. In the east, Russia
fought with no direct ally, and the Germans so thoroughly dominated
their alliance with Austria-Hungary that the concept of alliance, as
understood in the west, does not apply.
It is also worth remembering that Germany won on this front, as
the 1918 Treaties of Brest-Litovsk transferred to the Central Powers
effective control of most of what is now Ukraine and the Baltic States,
while at the same time effectively making Poland a German satellite.
Victory in the east allowed the Germans to plan and resource their
1918 spring offensives, but, ironically, the collapse of Russia also gave
Austria-Hungary no reason to keep fighting.
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The eastern war also featured movement. Russian armies swept into
the Carpathians in 1914, then German and Austrian-Hungarian armies
pushed east in the great victory of Gorlice-Tarnów. Armies thus came in
contact with new and strange populations, not the least of which were
the eastern Jews the Germans called the Ostjuden. German war policy
had to decide what to do with them, and how to organize a region that
they found disease-ridden, unsanitary, and, because of the panic that
attended the Russian retreat in 1915, underpopulated.
However, the land could help the Germans overcome the material
shortages they were suffering due to the British blockade. The essays
here argue that the Germans did not envision genocide or even forced
removals, but a reform of the east to make its agricultural land more
productive and its people more modern.
Societies at war in the east also needed narratives, both during and
after the war, to explain to their people what had happened. The book
contains essays on literature, museums, and memory as tools for this
explanation. The war in the east became, in effect, two wars: the war for
conquest and the war for memory.
As Förster noted, the eastern front, in the end, had no victor.
Because of Germany’s defeat in the west, and the attendant repudiation
of Brest-Litovsk, all of the belligerents of the east lost this war. Czarist
Russia, Wilhelmine Germany, and Habsburg Austria all ceased to exist,
ushering in radical, revolutionary change. That change, we know now,
kept the dynamic of hate and competition burning, helping to fuel
another round of war. As a result, no one could have written a book
called “All Quiet on the Eastern Front.”
That giant shadow of Stalin, Hitler, and the war they led in the east
from 1941 to 1945, looms over every essay in this book. It cannot be
otherwise. For even if the combatants of 1914–15 (to use this book’s
narrow periodization) did not know what was to come, we do. The
Eastern Front may no longer be forgotten to First World War scholars,
but the immensity of the nightmare to come has reduced it in both
history and memory. This fine book should help to correct the balance.
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Military Cultures
Military Cultures in Peace and Stability
Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon
By Chiara Ruffa
Reviewed by Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky, author of American Allies in Times of
War: The Great Asymmetry and associate professor of political studies, Queen’s
University
Philadelphia, PA: University
of Pennsylvania Press,
2018
204 pages
$65.00

I

f you are conducting research in the field of security studies, it
can be challenging to find scholarly work that accurately depicts
military interactions at the tactical level. Yet, to understand how today’s
multinational military interventions are conducted, this level of military
analysis has become increasingly important to explain variations in
mission outcomes. When considering the war in Afghanistan and the
fifty or so allies and partners that participated in the International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), it is striking to see how individual
nations operating under the ISAF umbrella may have experienced the
war in dramatically different ways. In Canada, ISAF came to be known
as a combat mission and the Canadian Armed Forces suffered a fairly
high casualty rate, while in Italy, the mission was always presented as a
peacekeeping operation, which was reflected in the daily tasks carried out
by the Italian armed forces.
While many factors play into whether military interventions are
perceived as successes or failures, a particularly elusive variable is
military culture, or how a nation’s armed forces might bring unique
characteristics to the battlefield, which in turn translates into different
mission outcomes. As Chiara Ruffa notes in her monograph Military
Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon, “Military
culture is closely related to the national origins of a military unit, and
operates as a filter between domestic political configurations and the
way the military behaves in the field” (32). It follows, then, that the
armed forces of two troop-contributing countries might assess threats
differently and respond in kind. To get at these dynamics, you admittedly
need a complex research design, which is enough to deter many from
pursuing this kind of research. But for all who intend on doing so,
Ruffa’s book can serve as a useful guide.
In order to isolate the influence of military culture on tactical
behavior, Ruffa compares France’s and Italy’s contributions to two
missions: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ISAF. The
contribution of both countries was of comparable size in each case and
the deployed troops were in similar areas of operations and exposed to
the same level of threat. When we look at the range of military tasks and
how they were carried out, however, some interesting differences arise.
While the evidence is far from conclusive (and Ruffa acknowledges as
much), the case studies are instructive. For example, she shows how the
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French units in Lebanon were mainly concerned with patrolling tasks,
while the Italian units prioritized contact with the population and civilmilitary cooperation activities.
Since the French units were performing these tasks with a security
mindset, they placed a premium on force protection and carried out
these patrols in tanks, which displeased the locals (tanks are noisy and
they destroy roads). Ultimately, this mindset made them less effective
in terms of carrying out a UN stabilization operation where success is
heavily dependent on the support of local populations and adapting to
their needs. By contrast, the Italian units in Lebanon had also deployed
with tanks initially but switched to armored vehicles when they realized
local communities were against tanks. A humanitarian mindset led the
Italians to adapt their dismounted patrols and the frequent contact with
the population meant they picked up on this cue rapidly.
Ruffa explains how the different military cultures illustrated different
interpretations of what the patrols were intended to achieve. The French
prioritized zone patrolling, which was intended to “monitor hostile
activities in the area,” while the Italians did contact patrolling, which
is meant to “get in touch with the population and collect information
about the security situation and people’s needs” (75). Military culture
really comes to life in her analysis and the account is compelling, thanks
to her extensive fieldwork.
What is less clear from the book is Ruffa’s level of ambition for
her framework. At the beginning of the book, she states the following:
“I argue that we can make peace operations more successful—in their
ability to save lives, protect civilians, and avoid mass atrocities—by
better understanding the on-the-ground dynamics” (17). Can the
research presented in this book really inform assessments of success
or failure? Even in the case analysis, the only cursory assessment of
mission outcomes surveys local perceptions or media accounts. To be
fair, this critique is commonplace as decisive indicators of operational
effectiveness are hard to come by.
To summarize, the book’s main contribution is the examination of
how armies differ in terms of their military culture, and how that translates
into divergent tactics on the battlefield. While this is interesting in its
own right, it does not help us understand why some missions succeed
and others fail. Hopefully, scholars inspired by Ruffa’s book will take up
the challenge, drawing from her insights on military culture.
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The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture:
Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars
By Jeanie L. Johnson
Reviewed by Dr. Montgomery ‘Mitzy’ McFate, professor, Strategic and
Operational Research Department, US Naval War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press 2018
324 pages
$110.95

J

eannie Johnson’s book, The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture:
Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars, is grounded in the literature
on strategic culture, which posits (roughly) that states have a relatively
coherent set of practices and preferences regarding policy, strategy,
and warfighting. Her objective is to examine the interplay between the
organizational culture of the US Marine Corps and American strategic
culture with reference to counterinsurgency.
Johnson begins by describing the US aversion to counterinsurgency,
stemming from an “acultural and ahistorical predisposition” towards
other societies. As a subset of American culture, US military culture
shows a “partiality for . . . conventional war,” in which political and
military personnel operate within separate spheres (46). She then turns
her attention to the Marines, describing how they develop an identity
through recruiting, training, narratives, and legends. While this identity,
which she describes as “elitist and fight oriented,” has remained stable,
the role of the Corps has shifted over the past two centuries from small
wars to amphibious assault to expeditionary operations.
While the first three chapters will be generally familiar to most
readers with an interest in strategic culture and the history of the Corps, in
chapter 4, Johnson drills down into the organization’s norms and values
to great effect. She teases apart some of the contradictions in Marines
Corps culture, including the exclusion of minorities and women from
the “mystical brotherhood,” the clash between the values of form and
appearance with the “values of pragmatism or utility downrange,” and
the tension between valuing teamwork and valuing the individual (97).
Some of her observations are not just astute but also humorous. Johnson
notes institutional frugality has made necessity into a virtue that results
in Marines excelling at “appropriating” folders, toilet paper, MREs, and
refrigerators. “In good DOD fashion, Marines have made an acronym
of their pickpocket practice: STEAL (Strategically Taking Equipment
to Another Location)” (105). In chapter 5, Johnson discusses how the
Marine Corps commitment to “doing windows”—whatever tasks are
required by the nation—is buttressed by a set of norms emphasizing
flexibility, innovation, and a healthy “disregard” for doctrine.
Part 2 of Johnson’s book transitions from a discussion of the general
organizational culture of the Marine Corps to a more specific discussion
of how that culture has influenced their approach to counterinsurgency.
After short summaries of the ‘banana wars’ and the Vietnam-era
Combined Action Platoons, Johnson indicates many of the lessons
learned or lost “are best explained as a product of a widely shared
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American culture rather than anything the Marine Corps cultivated
on its own” (153). Johnson observes naïveté and paternalistic racism
of American culture resulted in bad behavior in Central America and
during Vietnam the Corps “continued to reflect the prejudices shared
across the American public.” Essentially, she gives the Marine Corps a
pass by assigning negative behaviors such as racism, forced labor, and
unnecessary brutality to American culture in general. Johnson clearly
admires the Marines, and sometimes seems loath to criticize them.
Chapter 7 offers perhaps the most insight on the unintended
consequences of American nation building, namely “Marines, raised
in a democratic system that they viewed as exception and superior,
attempted to duplicate this system by undermining nearly every principle
on which it is founded.” In her view, Marines attempted to increase the
efficiency of Central American republics through centralized authority
and in Vietnam through popular resistance rather than centralized
government. In chapter 8, Johnson discusses the consequences of the
preference for conventional war, including the slow development of
doctrine and the aversion to performing nation-building tasks. In her
penultimate chapter on counterinsurgency in Iraq, Johnson examines
how the lessons learned during small wars were applied in Iraq, including
respecting the civilian population, understanding local culture, and
employing information operations.
Her conclusion, unfortunately, does not return the reader to the
main thesis of her book—namely, the relative impact of US strategic
culture on the Corps performance of counterinsurgency operations—
but rather offers a series of lessons learned, such as the importance
of training indigenous security forces, the importance of intelligence,
and the multiplicity of approaches to counterinsurgency. She candidly
observes how the Marines often tend to get in their own way: “The
reward system and clear hierarchy of the corps means that aptitude in
dissecting the sociocultural aspects of the war will remain an undercelebrated aspect of the warfighter personality” (262).
While Johnson’s book is certainly enjoyable and rich in material, she
has adopted a strategic culture paradigm to studying an organization.
The result is aspects of US strategic culture become difficult to
separate analytically from aspects of Marine Corps culture. A more
beneficial approach might have been to rely on the copious literature
on organizational—such as Studying Organizational Cultures through Rites
and Ceremonials by Harrison Trice and Janice Beyer (1984), Organizational
Stories as Symbols Which Control the Organization by Alan Wilkins (1983),
and Organizational Culture: A Dynamic Model by Edgar Schein (1983)—and
apply it to the Marine Corps. As structured, the main argument of the
book sometimes disappears in the entertaining and colorful details of
Marine Corps culture. Nevertheless, anyone interested in the history
and culture of the Marine Corps would certainly profit from reading
the book. Johnson’s writing shines when she point out contradictions,
discontinuities, and unintended consequences of military culture, and
one hopes she will pursue this topic in the future.
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